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Abstract 
Congenital aphantasia is a variation of the human experience, characterised by a life-long 
inability to generate voluntary mental imagery, and so far, has been examined in the visual 
domain. In a series of 10 experiments, this thesis took an experimental approach to 
examine the possible explanations of congenital aphantasia and the nature of the 
experience in the visual and non-visual domains, using objective measures and matched 
samples. Chapter 2 examines the findings of the early published studies within larger 
experimental designs, and the results confirmed self-reported differences in object 
imagery but not spatial imagery. Chapter 3 investigates whether aphantasia may be 
associated with differences in personality or deficits in broader cognitive functions. The 
results showed no evidence of a difference between individuals with aphantasia and 
neurotypical imagers on personality or selected neuropsychological measures. 
Aphantasic participants were slower in a task during trials that had greater working 
memory load, however, individual differences in performance were apparent and four 
aphantasic subgroups identified. Chapter 4 showed no difference in accuracy or response 
time in complex visuospatial working memory tasks requiring allocentric and egocentric 
transformations. However, aphantasic participants exhibited greater variability in their 
response times for front/back orientations within an egocentric task. In Chapter 5, a task 
that attempted to isolate ‘visual’ from spatial imagery showed no difference in 
performance across visual and spatial features. Nevertheless, self-reports of nonvisual 
sensory imagery showed variability in the range of imagery experience across the other 
senses. Chapter 6 extended exploration of mental imagery in aphantasia beyond the visual 
modality by examining behavioural performance in two auditory imagery tasks, in which 
no differences in accuracy or reaction time were evident. Taken together, this research 
shows that despite the differences in self-reported experience, limited group differences 
are found between aphantasic and neurotypical participants on a range of imagery and 
visuospatial working memory tasks. Nevertheless, individual differences in performance 
were apparent. Further research should investigate the processes adopted by these 
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Term  Definitions 
Mental imagery Representations and the accompanying experience of sensory 
information in the absence of direct external stimulus (Pearson, 
Thomas, Holmes & Kosslyn, 2015). 
Visual mental 
imagery 
Often abbreviated to the term ‘visual imagery,’ it can be defined as 
“seeing in the mind’s eye” in the absence of relevant sensory input 
(Kosslyn, 1994). It is a type of mental representation which 
comprises visual features (e.g. pictorial aspects such as colour). 
Shape/form and texture are often considered a visual features, 
however, shape can also comprise of spatial information as objects 
can be processed spatially through structural components 
(Biederman, 1987). Similarly, texture can be both visual and tactile 
(Eardley & Pring, 2014). In this thesis, visual properties such as 
texture and shape are not assumed to be ‘visual’ features, even if the 
information can be acquired through vision.  
Object imagery  It concerns the pictorial visual appearances of objects or scenes e.g. 
colour, brightness, texture and shape (Kozhevnikov, Kosslyn & 
Shephard, 2005), i.e. the visual aspect of visual imagery without the 
spatial component. In this thesis, shape is not considered to be a 
feature of object imagery as it comprises spatial components. The 
term object imagery is arguably often used interchangeably with 
visual imagery. 
Spatial imagery Relating to spatial relations and movements of objects and their 
parts, and spatial transformations. (Kozhevnikov et al. 2005). Visual 
imagery is not necessarily compulsory for the creation of spatial 




Relating to imagery experience, an abstract code that also 








Visuospatial Working Memory: A working memory subsystem 
assumed to be responsible for maintaining visual and spatial 
information (Shah & Miyake, 1996), with the assumption that both 
types of information are linked. The visuospatial sketchpad 
comprises of the visual cache, which stores passive static visual 
perceptual information (i.e. memory for shape and colour), and also 
the inner scribe (the equivalent spatial component), which actively 
rehearses information regarding movements and spatial locations 
(Logie, 1995).  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to mental imagery 
 
Overview  
For decades, the study of visual imagery has remained a complex and sometimes 
controversial field of study, mainly owing to the long-standing visual imagery debate that 
started in the 1970s. For most people when asked to form ‘an image’ of a person they are 
familiar with, or of the house in that they lived, most people will respond that they ‘can 
see it’ within their mind, or that it feels like ‘looking’ at a picture. In other words, the 
subjective experience feels depictive to many, and the question as to whether visual 
imagery was depictive in nature was at the heart of this long-standing imagery debate. 
Kosslyn sought evidence to show that visual imagery had depictive qualities, even using 
an analogy that we have a ‘screen’ from which images are displayed within our mind. 
However, Pylyshyn disagreed with Kosslyn’s notion of depictive imagery and argued that 
visual imagery is symbolic in nature and described it as a thought process represented 
through abstract code. The behavioural similarities between visual imagery and 
perception favoured the depictive theory. However, the invention of neuroimaging 
techniques has re-stimulated interest not only in visual imagery but mental imagery across 
all sensory domains. The debate regarding the format and neural basis of visual imagery 
is ongoing. Our understanding of visual imagery has been further enhanced through the 
examination of imagery performance in patients who have brain lesions and in individuals 
who are congenitally blind. Furthermore, there has been a recent shift in the literature to 
examine (and acknowledge) the influence of individual differences. The field of visual 
imagery has once again gained interest following the formal identification of a subset of 
the population who consistently report an inability to voluntarily conjure visual images, 
while perceptual performance remains unimpaired. The phenomenon is known as 
aphantasia and is thought to be experienced by 2-5% of the population. Investigating 
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aphantasia is a new way to understand imagery experience, not only in the visual domain 
but across all sensory modalities.  
 
1.1. Mental imagery 
For most people, mental imagery is an everyday cognitive process that enables one to 
generate an instantaneous range of fictitious or previously experienced sensory scenarios, 
free from the constraints of reality. Aristotle (384 – 322 BC) was the first to suggest the 
pivotal role of mental images, famously claiming that mental images were vital for 
thought: ‘The soul never thinks without phantasma’ (Aristotle, 1984; MacKisack et al., 
2016). Despite the familiarity of the subjective imagery experience, historically the nature 
of imagery has been under much debate and heavily influenced by researchers’ own 
beliefs with regards to the underlying processes (Reisberg, Pearson, & Kosslyn, 2003). 
As a result of this, there have been a number of variations in the definitions produced to 
describe this imagery experience; however, most of them share the idea that imagery is a 
quasi-perceptual experience in the absence of perceptual stimuli. Pearson, Naselaris, 
Holmes & Kosslyn (2015) pg. 590, refer to mental imagery as ‘representations and the 
accompanying experience of sensory information without direct external stimulus.’ 
Definitions such as this one, predominantly imply that these representations are conscious 
and require conscious effort (Thomas, 1999) for subsequent inspection. However, more 
recent studies have suggested that these representations may also be unconscious 
(Brogaard & Gatzia, 2017; Nanay, 2018). The ‘sensory information’ within the above 
definition also extends to imagery across all sensory modalities: visual, audition, 
olfaction, gustation, kinaesthetic, and tactile. Numerous neuroimaging imagery studies 
have documented similar patterns of brain activation in sensory areas, which are also 
activated during corresponding perception tasks (e.g. Auvray & Spence, 2008; Bensafi et 
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al., 2003; Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2004; Halpern, Zatorre, Bouffard, & Johnson, 
2004; Olivetti Belardinelli et al., 2009; Sathian & Zangaladze, 2001). It is acknowledged 
that perception and imagery are not synonymous. Although it is thought they do share 
partially common neural mechanisms, the extent and the exact brain networks involved 
are still debated (see Spagna, Hajhajate, Liu, & Bartolomeo, submitted). Despite the range 
of sensory modalities imagery experiences manifest, the majority of studies and debates 
undertaken in the field of mental imagery are predominantly in reference to the visual 
domain. As a result of this, many of the theories established in relation to mental imagery 
have been based on the findings within the visual domain. To date, visual imagery has 
remained the most studied modality and shall be discussed from this point forward. 
 
Visual imagery or as it is colloquially referred to ‘seeing with the mind’s eye’ enables us 
to perceive an object or scene within the mind, without the object or scene physically 
present within the visual field (e.g. Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001). The generation 
of visual imagery arises through the recall of previously perceived information, stored in 
long-term memory, which can be combined, reinterpreted and modified (Kosslyn et al., 
2001). This enables us to create new images using the foundations of stored knowledge 
(Bartolomeo, 2008). In this way, information can be extracted, and visual images can be 
reassembled to depict and revisit aspects or scenarios of a visual object or future event 
(Finke, 1989). Generated visual images are described by some as ‘a weaker version of 
perception’ (Pearson et al., 2015), but the phenomenological experience of the visual 
image is largely influenced by individual differences in imagery vividness (Faw, 2009; 
Fulford et al., 2018). The ability to form and manipulate visual imagery is suggested to 
be key in a wide array of processes (which can also be undertaken non-visually), such as 
the ability to solve problems, episodic memory, future-think, language comprehension, 
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creativity, and the ability to solve problems and daydream (e.g. Eardley & Pring, 2006; 
Just, Newman, Keller, McEleney, & Carpenter, 2004; Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 
2006; LeBoutillier & Marks, 2003; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007; Zeman, 
Dewar, & Della-Sala, 2015). 
 
1.1.1. The imagery debate and the role of the primary visual cortex 
Having originated primarily in the 1970s and spanning several decades, the infamous 
imagery debate, or analogue-propositional debate has concerned the representational 
format of visual images. On the one side of the argument, there were analogue or 
depictive theories based on the hypothesis that visual imagery was depictive (i.e. 
pictorial) and that it shared processes to visual perception (Kosslyn, 1973, 1975; Kosslyn 
et al., 2006; Shepard & Cooper, 1982). This theory relied on the existence of a visual 
buffer (within the primary visual cortex) which was suggested to preserve the same spatial 
structure as the retina and function similar to a computer array (Kosslyn, 1975, 1981; see 
also Kosslyn’s Computational Model, section 1.2.1). On the other side of the argument, 
however, non-depictive or propositional theories claimed that visual imagery was derived 
from abstract code, like language (i.e. non-pictorial) and did not utilise the same 
mechanisms as visual perception (Pylyshyn, 1973, 2003). Depictive theorists did not deny 
the existence of propositional properties within imagery; however, the propositional 
theorists strongly argued that only propositional representations could exist in imagery 
(Kosslyn et al., 2006; Pearson & Kosslyn, 2015). In brief, a few examples of the seminal 
studies undertaken during this time involved asking participants to mentally visualise two 
animals and determine aspects of a shared anatomical feature (Kosslyn, 1975), as well as 
mental scanning between two points on a map (Kosslyn, 1973) and mental rotation 
(Shepard & Metzler, 1971). Kosslyn (1975) argued that visual images retain spatial 
 5 
information, such as the spatial relations between objects and their parts and distance. 
This was reflected as a linear relationship between time and distance the further apart two 
landmarks were on a map, and also a linear relationship between time and angle of 
rotation. Kosslyn (1975) proposed that this pattern of performance was indicative that 
participants were forming visual images within the task, and such images could be viewed 
from a particular perspective and manipulated much like actual objects. Nevertheless, 
these interpretations were challenged by Pylyshyn (1973, 1981), who claimed that 
Kosslyn’s findings were due to participants’ expectations or ‘tactic knowledge,’ which 
suggested that participants used existing knowledge, and their performance in the tasks 
was influenced by their own beliefs, goals and experimenter demand characteristics.  
 
Moreover, behavioural performance within such tasks during this time could not 
conclusively conclude the nature of visual images (Anderson, 1978). However, the 
application of neuroimaging techniques provided compelling evidence to support 
depictive theories, specifically the idea that visual imagery and visual perception shared 
common neural mechanisms i.e. topographical visual cortices (Kosslyn et al., 2006; 
Kosslyn 1994). For instance, in healthy sighted participants, visual imagery was shown 
to activate the primary visual cortex retinotopically (Slotnick, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 
2005). In a repetitive transcranial stimulation study (rTMS), participants exhibited 
impaired performance on a visual imagery task when stimulation was applied to area V1 
(Kosslyn et al., 1999). The authors concluded that this showed the functional role of the 
primary visual cortex for visual imagery. Perhaps the most compelling evidence for the 
shared mechanisms in V1 stem from studies that adopt a voxel-wise modelling and 
decoding approach (Thirion et al., 2006). This models activity and representations created 
during visual perception and uses the model to decode visual images from brain activity 
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using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) (Thirion et al., 2006). During this 
study, the authors developed a voxel-wise model of tuning to retinotopic location, which 
was subsequently used to decode visual images of high-contrast blobs. These stimuli, 
however, are not comparable to the complex visual images that one generates of scenes 
or objects, as these contain rich information, for example, low-level visual features, such 
as, orientation and position (of objects), which are key in visual perception (Naselaris, 
Olman, Stansbury, Ugurbil, & Gallant, 2015). Such a voxel-wise modelling and decoding 
approach was used to show that low-level visual features were encoded in early visual 
cortical areas (V1 and V2) (Naselaris et al., 2015). The model, which was attuned to 
detecting only variations in activity in relation to low-level visual features, and could 
identify visual images associated with this specific pattern of activity across a range of 
complex images (Naselaris et al., 2015). This decoding supported the claim that these 
low-level depictive features were present within visual images.  
 
Studies that employ fMRI, specifically blood-oxygen level dependent (BOLD) responses 
have shown during an imagery task a positive correlation between the self-reported 
vividness of visual imagery and BOLD activity within the visual cortex (Cui, Jeter, Yang, 
Montague, & Eagleman, 2007). Likewise, individuals who self-reported high imagery 
vividness showed greater neural overlap between imagery and perception conditions in 
the visual cortex compared to participants who self-reported low imagery vividness 
(Dijkstra, Bosch, & van Gerven, 2017). Anatomically, studies have shown the size of area 
V1 positively correlated to precision within visual perception and imagery tasks (which 
examined orientation and location - spatial features of an image) (Bergmann, Genc, 
Kohler, Singer, & Pearson, 2016). Furthermore, a negative correlation was evident 
between the size of V1 and imagery strength, a measure that was defined as the effect of 
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priming of visual imagery on visual perception (Bergmann et al., 2016). It should also be 
noted; the authors showed that subjective vividness ratings of visual imagery correlated 
to prefrontal cortex volume, rather than the size of V1 (Bergmann et al., 2016). This 
anatomical variation of V1 has been suggested to be one way to account for possible 
individual differences within visual imagery (Kosslyn et al., 2001). Collectively, these 
studies not only support the idea of retinotopic organisation in visual imagery (Slotnick 
et al., 2005) but also they strongly support of depictive theories of visual imagery.  
 
1.1.2. Evidence questioning the role of the primary visual cortex in visual imagery 
Earlier brain imaging research on the relationship between visual perception and visual 
imagery was presented in terms of an overlap in brain mechanisms. However, there is a 
growing body of evidence questioning the extent of this overlap within the primary visual 
cortex. For instance, activation in the primary visual cortex is evident to a lesser extent, 
with a greater overlap in fronto-parietal areas (Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2004). This 
suggests that larger brain networks are involved in the generation of visual imagery, with 
visual areas activated by top-down processes from fronto-parietal regions (Ishai, 
Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000; Yomogida et al., 2004). Activity within these areas also 
reflects shared cognitive control processes required for both visual imagery and 
perception, such as attention or retrieval of information from memory (e.g. Cabeza et al., 
2003; Kosslyn, 1994), while activity in regions (other than fronto-parietal areas) has been 
influenced by the content of the visual image, for instance, differences in activation for 
imagery of faces compared to imagery of places (O’Craven & Kanwisher, 2000). 
Specifically, in terms of primary visual cortex, discrepancies in activation during visual 
imagery tasks have been documented for V1, with several studies showing activation 
during visual imagery (e.g. Amedi, Malach, & Pascual-Leone, 2005; Mazard, Laou, 
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Joliot, & Mellet, 2005), whereas other studies have not documented activation of this 
nature in V1 during visual imagery (e.g. Ishai et al., 2000; Yomogida et al., 2004). 
Discrepancies in activation have been suggested to be caused by individual differences in 
image vividness, or to be the result of the nature of the high-level resolution details 
required to be generated within a task (Cui et al., 2007; Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003; 
Winlove et al., 2018). 
 
Further evidence which contradicts the hypothesis of visual perception and visual 
imagery showing shared activity in the primary visual cortex (i.e. this similarity is at a 
lesser extent) stems from studies of patients with brain lesions. There exist some patient 
studies that document parallel impairments in visual imagery and visual perception; for 
instance, patients with unilateral visual neglect who ignore objects on one side of their 
bodies in both visual imagery and visual perception tasks (Bisiach & Luzzatti, 1978). 
Other studies of patients with brain damage show that they cannot distinguish colours 
(DeVreese, 1991) or faces (Young, 1994) perceptually, or in visual imagery. However, 
there are also a number of patient studies (based on patients with achromatopsia, cortical 
blindness and brain lesions) who show impairments in one process (e.g. visual imagery) 
but not impairments in another (e.g. visual perception - and vice versa). Patient studies1 
have shown individuals to have a deficit in visual recognition of objects, while they 
remain unaffected in the ability to conjure a mental image of such an object (Bartolomeo 
et al., 1998; Bridge, Harrold, Holmes, Stokes, & Kennard, 2012; Chatterjee & 
Southwood, 1995; Shuren, Brott, Schefft, & Houston, 1996) whereas some have been 
shown to display normal performance on imagery tasks (Servos & Goodale, 1995).  
                                               
1 While collectively these studies provide evidence for a dissociation between visual perception and 
visual imagery, it should be noted that the imagery tasks used within these case studies differ greatly in 
nature, for instance, in terms of the task requirements and demands.  
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Conversely, other case studies have shown that some individuals are unable to form visual 
imagery; however, they have intact perceptual abilities (Charcot & Bernard, 1883; Farah, 
1984; Moro, Berlucchi, Lerch, Tomaiuolo, & Aglioti, 2008; Sirigu & Duhamel, 2001; 
Zeman et al., 2010). Hence, these studies suggest a double dissociation between visual 
imagery and visual perception. More recent studies within healthy individuals have 
shown that visual imagery and visual perception have differing temporal dynamics 
(Dijkstra, Mostert, de Lange, Bosch, & van Gerven, 2018). The authors showed that when 
examined in ‘real-time,’ temporal processing in perception was characterised by distinct 
stages in temporal processes, which was not evident in visual imagery (Dijkstra et al., 
2018). Collectively, these studies suggest that both visual perception and imagery do not 
share common mechanisms, specifically in the primary visual cortex in the way 
previously thought, and there is an ongoing debate with regards to these exact brain 
networks. 
 
Controversially, the authors of a recent meta-analysis (reviewing 52 fMRI studies) have 
proposed the involvement of the left fusiform gyrus (termed the Fusiform Imagery Node) 
as the ‘hub’ for retrieving visual information from long-term memory (from the anterior 
temporal lobe) and visual information from the occipital cortex (from the ventral 
pathway) (Spagna et al., submitted). The authors suggest that structures in the medial 
temporal lobe and the fronto-parietal attention networks contribute to the 
phenomenological experience (the vividness) of visual images (Spagna et al., submitted). 
The role of the frontal areas, specifically the volume of the prefrontal cortex was found 
to correlate to the subjective vividness ratings of visual imagery within another study 
(Bergmann et al., 2016). The authors state that this model better accounts for the double 
dissociation in visual imagery and visual perception evident within patient studies. In 
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these studies, patients who have impaired visual imagery often exhibit damage to the left 
temporal lobe rather than to occipital areas (Spagna et al., submitted). The findings of this 
meta-analysis are in stark contrast to the majority of the long-standing literature in the 
field of visual imagery, which reports the dominant role of the primary visual cortex in 
the generation of visual imagery. 
 
1.1.3. ‘Anti-representational’ theories of visual imagery 
While the imagery debate is claimed to be resolved in favour of the depictive theory, the 
general consensus is that representations can also be propositional in nature (Kosslyn, 
1996; Pearson & Kosslyn, 2015). In view of this, a number of theories following this 
debate still allude to the notion that visual imagery is not necessarily associated with a 
pictorial representation, but depends on the body and its interactions (e.g. O’Regan & 
Noë, 2001). Such theories are described by some as taking an ‘anti-representationalist’ 
viewpoint (Nanay, 2014). One such theory is the enactive approach, which refers to the 
concept that imagery depends on the action and also on the way the body interacts with 
the environment (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). According to this view, perception 
is a form of action because perception is deemed to be active in the ongoing exploration 
of the surrounding environment (Thomas, 1999). It follows that visual imagery is 
proposed to stem from the re-enactment of visual perception - one must go through the 
motions of wanting to see an object or item, for instance, a cat, in order to have to ‘see’ 
it. In this way, there is only the action of imagining and its associated eye movements 
(rather than the experience of a visual representation) which occur as if the item (e.g. the 
cat) was present in front of us (Johansson, Holsanova, Dewhurst, & Holmqvist, 2012; 
Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002). However, one of the main objections to this theory is the 
lack of visual representation when undertaking complex tasks. For instance, Foglolia and 
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O’Regan (2016) have argued that the re-enactment of visual perception is insufficient to 
explain the processes needed to perform in complex tasks, such as a mental rotation. 
Foglolia and O’Regan (2016) state that a mental representation of some description must 
be involved in this type of complex task. 
 
Likewise, the sensorimotor approach suggests that perception depends on sensorimotor 
knowledge, that is, a set of conscious rules and possibilities ‘of what movements bring 
about’ (Noë, 2010; O’Regan & Noë, 2001; O’Regan, 2011). For example, if we see an 
object such as a cup, we use sensorimotor knowledge to know what it looks like if it were 
to be seen from a different point of view. Unlike the enactive theory, which postulates 
that in order to see an object we have to engage in the activity of wanting to see it, the 
sensorimotor theory proposes that we exist in a state of ‘attunement’ to sensorimotor laws, 
which enables us to ‘know’ how sensory input would change depending on the type of 
movement (motor output). The notion that visual perception and visual imagery share 
neural overlaps accounts for the sensorimotor approach. Foglolia and O’Regan (2016) 
suggest that when one imagines a coffee-cup, the activation corresponds to the knowledge 
and laws associated with that sensation (or object). Conversely, the lack of overlap 
between perception and imagery could depend on the lack of body movements that are 
involved with the interaction with the environment during the process of imagining 
(Degenaar & O’Regan, 2015). The main criticism of this theory is the way these laws are 
stored and consciously accessed, especially if they are to support visual imagery (Di 
Paolo, Buhrmann, & Barandiaran, 2017). In a neuroimaging study, similar cortical 
activations were evident when participants generated visual images from verbal 
descriptions and from visual items; this was not to be expected if different types of 
sensorimotor knowledge systems were involved (Kosslyn, 2005). Kosslyn (2005) 
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suggested that this showed information with regards to objects was retrieved from long-
term memory, and not from differing knowledge systems.  
 
More recent theories have integrated elements of the enactive and the sensorimotor 
approaches to form an embodied representational approach (Palmiero et al., 2019). This 
approach acknowledges that a mental representation comprises of perceptual, motor, as 
well as, cognitive (semantic) components, which are all related to a specific experience. 
These components are stored in long-term memory and retrieved together to form a 
representation (Palmiero et al., 2019). For instance, a visual image will involve the act of 
seeing an item (the motor component), the perceptual details of an item (the perceptual 
component), and the conceptual semantic information about the image (the cognitive 
component), which together form a ‘dynamic embodied representation.’ This view also 
takes into consideration the variation in individual differences, such as, imagery ability 
(i.e. imagery vividness), which may influence the different characteristics of the 
consequent mental imagery (Palmiero et al., 2019). The authors suggest that individuals 
with high imagery ability are likely to generate detailed visuospatial images (e.g. colour 
and shape), as well as corresponding motor representations with regards to the act of 
seeing and handling the object, and semantic information with regards to the conceptual 
attributes of the object. Whereas, individuals with low imagery vividness will have few 
visuospatial details, and the representations will comprise of mostly motor and semantic 
conceptual components (Palmiero et al., 2019). This is still a relatively new theory, but it 
has potential because it can be applied to other sensory modalities, for instance, to 
olfactory images, which are associated with perceptual (olfactory expertise), motor (the 
act of sniffing) and cognitive components (ability to name odours and traits) (Royet, 
Delon-Martin, & Plailly, 2013).  
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1.2 Visual and spatial imagery distinctions 
Challenging the notion that visual imagery is a unitary construct (Hollenberg, 1970; 
Paivio & Harshman, 1983), ‘visual’ imagery is proposed to consist of two distinct 
subsystems: visual imagery and spatial imagery (Farah, Hammond, Levine & Calvanio 
1988; Levine, Warach, & Farah, 1985). Such a distinction is defined within Kosslyn’s 
theory of mental imagery and has been supported by a range of neuropsychological case 
studies and from individual differences investigations within neurotypical populations 
(e.g. Bisiach & Luzzatti, 1978; Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov & Motes, 2006; Farah, Levine, 
& Calvanio, 1988; Kosslyn et al., 2006; Kozhevnikov, Kosslyn, & Shephard, 2005; 
Levine et al., 1985). Visual imagery (also referred to synonymously as object imagery, 
see Kozhevnikov et al., 2005) depicts details of texture, colour and brightness2. Visual 
imagery and object imagery are often synonymous because they both refer to visual 
aspects or ‘object’ characteristics of an object. Contrastively, spatial imagery depicts the 
spatial layout; hence spatial relations between or among objects or parts of an object, the 
object location, its orientation and its corresponding movements through space.  
 
While distinctions have been made between visual and spatial imagery, Kosslyn’s theory 
of mental imagery considers both sub-types as separate yet inextricably linked to each 
other (Kosslyn et al., 2006). More generally, research into visual imagery generally 
examines both constructs, e.g. visuospatial imagery. However, in individuals who are 
congenitally blind (no vision from birth), research suggests that in the absence of visual 
input, they utilise non-visual sensory systems, such as, touch (through perceptual 
                                               
2 In the visual imagery literature, aspects such as shape and texture are often considered characteristics of 
visual imagery (e.g. Farah et al., 1988; Kozhevnikov et al., 2005). However, shape can also comprise of 
spatial information as objects can be processed spatially through structural components, such as spatial 
relations between parts of an object (Biederman, 1987). Similarly, texture can be both visual and tactile 
(Eardley & Pring, 2014). Thus in this context and thesis, texture and shape are not assumed to be ‘visual’ 
features, even though the information can be acquired through vision. 
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exploration), audition and proprioception modalities to form internal spatial 
representations (Occelli, Spence, & Zampini, 2008). This indicates that spatial imagery 
can exist in the absence of a ‘visual’ component (see section 1.2.4 for a discussion). 
 
1.2.1. Kosslyn’s Theory of Mental Imagery 
The most prominent theory of visual imagery in neurotypical sighted individuals is 
Kosslyn’s Theory of Mental Imagery, which had been developed from the depictive 
(Computational Model) theory. Briefly, Kosslyn’s Computational model (Kosslyn, 1981; 
Kosslyn, 2005) is based on the analogy that visual images are displayed on an internal 
visual display system akin to a computer screen known as the ‘visual buffer,’ a 
topographically organised area of the visual cortex (Kosslyn, 2005). It was the role of the 
‘attentional window’ to shift and scan across an image within the visual buffer, through 
which the properties of the image, such as the shape, size or spatial location can be 
consciously inspected (Kosslyn, 1981; Kosslyn, 2005). Kosslyn (1981) postulated that 
the visual buffer received information from long-term memory, which originated in the 
visual system. Although the Computational Model focused on the visual domain, Kosslyn 
(1994) stated that there would be a corresponding process in the other sensory modalities, 
but provided no other details. 
 
Building on the Computational Model, Kosslyn developed his theory of mental imagery, 
which made a distinction between visual and spatial images (Kosslyn, 1994; Kosslyn et 
al., 2006; Kosslyn, 2005). Both visual and spatial images differ in their content, but it was 
viewed that both types of imagery have a spatio-analogical structure (Kosslyn et al., 
2006). According to this theory, spatial images comprise of information with regards to 
location, size, the relations among objects and their orientation; these are processed 
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partially within the parietal lobe, an area which is viewed to be topographically organised 
(Sereno, Pitzalis, & Martinez, 2001). Kosslyn et al. (2006) suggested that spatial imagery 
uses similar processes needed to processes spatial information during visual perception.  
 
In contrast, visual images are constructed in the visual buffer within area V1, and they 
comprise of information relating to shape, colour and texture; thus they are depictive in 
nature (Kosslyn et al., 2006). Both of these imagery sub-types undergo four processes: 
generation, inspection, maintenance and manipulation. According to Kosslyn et al. 
(2006), visual and spatial images are generated from the retrieval of information from 
long-term memory. Visual information can be presented in the visual buffer for 
inspection. However, the visual buffer is not needed for spatial imagery, and it is unclear 
from the model how or even if spatial information is presented or inspected. The authors 
state that the ‘visualised’ part of a visual image is only the part which is present in the 
visual buffer (and must match the stored representations in long-term memory) – this 
visual image is a small part of a spatial image (Kosslyn et al., 2006). The processing of 
both spatial and visual images occurs in parallel (Kosslyn et al., 2006). The construction 
of a visual image (e.g. an object) also requires information about its spatial properties 
(e.g. location), information that is found in the content of spatial images (Kosslyn et al., 
2006). The manipulation of an image alters the spatial image, which underlies the visual 
image. For example, the manipulating and alteration of the size of an object in spatial 
imagery changes the overall presentation of the visual image of that object (presented in 
the visual buffer) (Kosslyn et al., 2006; Kosslyn, 2005).  
 
While a distinction is made between visual and spatial images which comprise of different 
types of information, the theory relies heavily on the notion that the areas that are active 
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in visual perception are also active in visual imagery. Furthermore, it depends on the idea 
that there exists a medium, i.e. the visual buffer, a topographically organised area of the 
primary visual cortex, which possesses a functional role in forming the depictive 
phenomenological experience of visual imagery.  
 
1.2.2. Visual and spatial imagery dissociation in neuropsychological case studies  
One of the most prominent patient studies that identified the dissociation between visual 
and spatial imagery was undertaken by Farah et al. (1988). The authors described patient 
LH, who in the aftermath of an automobile accident, exhibited difficulties in performance 
within a range of visual imagery tasks. These included tasks requiring the ability to 
distinguish the colour of common household objects, and mental size comparisons of the 
size of animals’ tails (Farah et al., 1988). However, in spatial imagery tasks, such as 
mental scanning and mental rotation, patient LH performed just as well as neurotypical 
controls (Corballis, 1997). A similar case study involved patient LE who suffered 
systemic lupus erythematosus (resulting in vast damage to white matter) and was unable 
to generate visual images and exhibited poor performance in visual short-term memory 
and recognition tasks (Morris, Abrahams, Baddeley, & Polkey, 1995). Despite this, 
however, patient LE showed unimpaired performance in spatial imagery tasks and was 
able to draw figures from short-term memory (Della Sala, Gray, Baddeley, & Wilson, 
1997).  
 
Bisiach and Luzzatti (1978) reported the case of an individual with intact visual imagery 
but with spatial imagery impairment. The authors presented the case study of patient EP 
who suffered from slowly progressive deterioration of the brain and atrophy of the 
anterior right temporal lobe. Although patient EP performed accurately on visual imagery 
 17 
tasks that included making accurate colour distinctions of household objects, patient EP 
performed poorly on tasks that involved making judgements with regards to the spatial 
locations of such objects (Bisiach & Luzzatti, 1978). A similar pattern of performance 
was evident in the case of patient MV, who following an ischemic stroke, displayed 
impairments in spatial imagery tasks, such as mental rotation (Carlesimo, Perri, 
Turriziani, Tomaiuolo, & Caltagirone, 2001). Nevertheless, patient MV was able to 
perform within a normal range in visual imagery tasks (Carlesimo et al., 2001). Overall, 
these observations suggest that visual imagery and spatial imagery are dissociated and 
that each of these subtypes of imagery is served by different brain networks (Carlesimo 
et al., 2001; Levine et al., 1985).  
 
Although the case studies discussed suggest a distinction between visual and spatial 
imagery by showing an impairment in one construct but not in the other (and vice versa),  
nonetheless, the two processes remain intimately associated with one another. For 
instance, tasks that involve the ability to distinguish the colour of common objects, at 
least to some extent, require the recall of integrated spatial information with regards to 
the shape and the form of the object. Biederman (1987) postulated that in neurotypical 
sighted individuals, shapes or object stimuli are recognised and processed spatially by 
means of their structural components (Biederman, 1987). Therefore, visual and spatial 
imagery remain linked to one another, although tasks tend to load more heavily on one of 
them (i.e. visual imagery) than the other (i.e. spatial imagery), and vice-versa. 
 
1.2.3. Imagery distinctions in neurotypical populations  
Neuroimaging studies have documented differences in brain activation during visual and 
spatial image tasks in healthy populations (e.g. Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003; McCarthy 
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et al., 1996; Smith et al., 1995; Zacks, 2008). It should be noted that distinctions between 
visual (object) and spatial subsystems are also evident within visuospatial working 
memory, shown within behavioural and neuroimaging studies (e.g. Klauer & Zhao, 2004; 
Mazard, Tzourio-Mazoyer, Crivello, Mazoyer, & Mellet, 2004). These subsystems are 
underpinned by functionally and anatomically separate processing pathways: the ‘where’ 
or ‘how’ pathway in the dorsal system (from the occipital lobe to the posterior parietal 
lobe), which processes spatial information with regards to the location of the object and 
its movements. Contrastively, the ‘what’ or ventral system (from the occipital lobe to the 
inferior temporal lobe) processes information about the visual characteristics of an object, 
such as, colour and shape (Borst, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2011; Goodale & Milner, 1992; 
Kozhevnikov, Blazhenkova, & Becker, 2010).  
 
A number of studies examining individual differences have also provided evidence for 
visual and spatial distinctions (Blajenkova et al., 2006; Kozhevnikov, Hegarty, & Mayer, 
2002; Kozhevnikov et al., 2005). Kozhevnikov et al. (2005) demonstrated that individuals 
who were visualisers (i.e. who interpret information visually, rather than verbally), could 
be divided into two distinct groups: object imagers and spatial imagers. Hence object 
imagers used imagery to generate pictorial, colourful high-resolution visual images of 
scenes and objects, while spatial imagers used imagery to assess the spatial relationships 
between or among objects to undertake difficult spatial transformations (Kozhevnikov et 
al., 2005). In behavioural tasks, object imagers outperformed spatial imagers on object 
imagery tasks, for instance, object imagers excelled in object recognition tasks, such as, 
a degraded picture task, which entailed the generation of high-resolution visual images 
(Kozhevnikov et al., 2005) Contrastively, spatial imagers outperformed object imagers 
on spatial imagery tasks, such as mental rotation, which required spatial transformations 
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of objects (Kozhevnikov et al., 2005). Object imagers were suggested to process images 
globally, whereas spatial imagers process images segment-by-segment in a sequential 
manner (Kozhevnikov et al., 2005).  
 
Individual preferences for object and spatial imagery can also be assessed through self-
report measures (Blajenkova et al., 2006). Although few studies have examined the neural 
underpinnings for these individual differences, nevertheless, Kozhevnikov et al. (2010) 
postulate that there is a ‘bottleneck trade-off’ during the development of visual-
processing resources. However, the authors provided no other details of how this could 
occur. Additionally, Kozhevnikov et al. (2010) claim that this developmental trade-off is 
the reason why visualisers show either visual or spatial preferences; hence this is not the 
result of the individual preference of one ability over the other. Of the few neuroimaging 
studies to explore individual differences of these imagery subtypes, studies have shown 
that spatial and object imagers have efficient neural resources in regions associated 
respectively with spatial and object processing pathways (Lamm, Bauer, Vitouch, & 
Gstättner, 1999; Motes, Malach, & Kozhevnikov, 2008).  
 
1.2.4. Imagery in the blind: Imagery without visual experience  
In conjunction with research in mental imagery in sighted individuals, it is also worth 
considering mental imagery in individuals who are totally congenitally blind, and those 
who have lost their sight in early infancy. The review of research of individuals who are 
totally congenitally blind provides further insight into the relationship between visual and 
spatial imagery. This focuses on the issue of whether visual input is essential for either 
construct or whether one can exist (e.g. spatial imagery) in the absence of the other (e.g. 
visual imagery). If it is assumed that vision is crucial to imagery, then one could 
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hypothesise that totally blind individuals with no visual memory experience mental 
imagery that is propositional in nature. For instance, they possess mental imagery that 
comprises of abstract and semantic representations. In view of this statement, it could be 
assumed that this propositional format of imagery would result in differences in 
performance in tasks that are analogical in nature (i.e. pictorial or depictive). 
Nevertheless, substantive evidence shows that individuals who are congenitally or early 
blind in life are able to perform similarly to sighted individuals on ‘visual’ imagery tasks, 
such as, mental rotation and haptic versions of Kosslyn’s mental scanning paradigm 
(Carpenter & Eisenberg, 1978; Kerr, 1983; Marmor & Zaback, 1976; Zimler & Keenan, 
1983). A number of studies have shown that blind individuals take longer to rotate a 
stimulus or to scan mentally in comparison with sighted individuals (Kerr, 1983; Marmor 
& Zaback, 1976). Hence Marmor and Zaback (1976) have argued that differences in 
reaction time were not because congenitally blind participants used propositional 
strategies, but because mental rotations were ‘easier to perform upon visual 
representations than non-visual ones’ (Marmor & Zaback 1976, pg. 520). Despite the 
lack of vision, congenitally blind individuals were able to perform in these ‘visual’ 
imagery tasks, and they created analogue spatial representations from sensory 
information acquired through non-visual perceptual or through verbal means (Aleman, 
van Lee, Mantione, Verkoijen, & de Haan, 2001; Kaski, 2002; Vecchi, Tinti, & Cornoldi, 
2004). Therefore, the performance of congenitally blind individuals demonstrates that 
these tasks can be undertaken and performed without a ‘visual’ component.  
 
Furthermore, Kerr (1983) claimed that a ‘visual’ imagery task is best described as a 
‘spatial’ imagery task. In view of this, numerous tasks cited in the literature can be 
referred to as spatial imagery tasks. For example, mental rotation and mental scanning 
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can be classified as spatial tasks because they involve either the movement of stimuli/an 
object through space or the approximation of a distance. What is more, other types of 
tasks described as ‘visual’ arguably are ‘spatial’; for instance, they include tasks which 
involve comparisons of sizes of animals, or other features, such as, their tails (Farah et 
al., 1988; Kosslyn, 1975). In their case study, Farah et al. (1998) documented the 
performance of patient LH who performed at 65% accuracy in an animal tails task 
compared to neurotypical controls who performed at 96%. While LH’s accuracy was 
significantly lower than the neurotypical controls, LH’s performance was above chance. 
It may be the case that such comparisons can be answered with spatial imagery, however, 
greater accuracy in the task is achieved if one can also visualise (i.e. form a visual 
representation) the animals in question. Therefore, these tasks could be considered spatial 
tasks as neurotypical sighted individuals can recognise objects (i.e. features of animals) 
spatially through their structural components (Biederman, 1987). Although Kerr (1983) 
viewed ‘visual’ images as ‘spatial’ because individuals who are congenitally blind were 
not reliant on the ‘visual’ component, the term ‘visual imagery’ in sighted individuals is 
viewed to comprise of imagery combining both visual and spatial features (Kosslyn et al., 
2006). These are assumed to be closely associated with one another and potentially 
difficult to separate. While it is assumed that both constructs cannot be fully dissociated 
(but may load more heavily on one than the other), evidence from congenitally blind 
populations suggest that spatial imagery can exist in the absence of vision. 
 
Where visual information is not available, mental imagery is forcibly generated from non-
visual sensory modalities: touch (via haptic exploration), audition, olfaction and 
proprioception (Goldreich & Kanics, 2006; Roder, Rosler, & Spence, 2004; Théoret, 
Merabet, & Pascual-Leone, 2004; Wan, Wood, Reutens, & Wilson, 2010). It is commonly 
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believed that if one sensory modality is impaired or absent, perceptual processing in the 
remaining senses (such as audition and tactile acuity) become more practised in its 
absence (Théoret et al., 2004). However, it should be noted that the results from studies 
testing this sensory compensation tend to be varied owing to individual differences of the 
participant sample within these studies. For example, participants’ performance on tasks 
is influenced by factors, such as the age of the participant, aetiology and manifestation of 
the visual deficit, duration and age from visual deficit onset, musical and mobility ability 
(Thinus-Blanc & Gaunet, 1997). Nevertheless, a number of studies have shown that 
congenitally blind individuals perform better than their sighted counterparts in some 
perceptual tasks, for example, they show better sound localisation (Voss et al., 2004), and 
they also have enhanced verbal abilities (Occelli, Lacey, Stephens, Merabet, & Sathian, 
2017). Furthermore, eye movements in congenitally blind participants (if they have eyes) 
have been observed in association with spatial attention of auditory information (Dufour, 
Després, & Candas, 2005). A similar pattern of eye movements has also been found in 
sighted individuals during auditory tasks (Rorden & Driver, 1999). In relation to tactile 
acuity, studies have shown that early blind participants perform better than sighted 
participants in tactile tasks that require the ability to discriminate among the textures of 
different surfaces (for instance smooth verses thinly grooved) (Goldreich & Kanics, 
2006). Goldreich and Kanics (2003) state that blind individuals (compared to sighted 
individuals) have a more refined and superior capacity to decode spatial information from 
touch (Goldreich & Kanics, 2003). The absence of visual cues results in the enhancement 
of audio-tactile spatial interactions (Occelli et al., 2008).  
 
Moreover, multisensory integration of non-visual sensory information is crucial to update 
the body’s position within space, and it is also necessary for successful navigation of the 
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environment (Butler, Smith, Campos, & Bulthoff, 2010; Prsa, Gale, & Blanke, 2012; 
Schmidt, Tinti, Fantino, Mammarella, & Cornoldi, 2013). Sighted individuals use vision, 
which among all the senses available, provides accurate information with regards to the 
layout of the surrounding space (Loomis, Klatzky, Philbeck, & Golledge, 1998). 
However, blind individuals gather this type of spatial information via audition and 
proprioception, which can jointly provide information on the range of distances within 
space (Kolarik, Moore, Zahorik, Cirstea, & Pardhan, 2016). A number of studies have 
shown that the congenitally blind find it more difficult to adopt an allocentric frame of 
reference compared to the sighted or the late blind individuals (Cattaneo et al., 2008; 
Schmidt et al., 2013; Thinus-Blanc & Gaunet, 1997). However, this observation is very 
task dependent, with reference frames heavily influenced by task-related variables, such 
as the size of the space to be explored within a task (Iachini, Ruggiero, & Ruotolo, 2014; 
Loomis et al., 1993). It has been claimed that the absence of visual experience affects the 
processing of object-to-object spatial relations; therefore somatosensation is required in 
order to acquire spatial information (Ruotolo, Ruggiero, Vinciguerra, & Iachini, 2012). 
Overall, collectively these studies show that information gathered perceptually from 
touch, audition and from proprioception modalities provides rich spatial mental 
representations and compensates for the lack of visual perceptual input. 
 
1.3 Visuospatial working memory (VSWM) 
Both visual imagery and visuospatial working memory concern the ability to represent 
and manipulate visual information (which comprise visual and spatial features). The main 
distinction between these two systems is that visuospatial working memory refers to the 
maintenance of recently presented images, while visual imagery concerns the generation 
of images that have not been presented (e.g. Albers, Kok, Toni, Dijkerman, & de Lange, 
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2013). Another distinction is that visual images are generated on the basis of information 
stored in long-term memory, which is not the case for visuospatial working memory, as 
it stores information from direct visual perceptual input (Borst, Ganis, Thompson, & 
Kosslyn, 2012). Although both visuospatial working memory and visual imagery 
processes involve similar types of information, the precise relationship between these two 
processes remains unclear (Logie & Cowan, 2015). Nevertheless, it is considered that 
they may share common cognitive processes, including representations which are 
depictive (Borst et al., 2012). Historically, the majority of research has examined these 
two processes separately and used different behavioural paradigms with little reference 
to either field (Tong, 2013). More recent studies have examined the relationship between 
visual imagery within visuospatial working memory paradigms (e.g. Keogh & Pearson, 
2011). Other studies have claimed that cortical regions involved in perceptual processing 
also play a part in the maintenance of information in visuospatial working memory 
(Scimeca, Kiyonaga, & D’Esposito, 2018), although this is not a claim viewed by all (e.g. 
Harrison & Bays, 2018). The following section will briefly outline the most dominant 
theory of working memory, followed by a review of the recent literature comparing the 
similarities and differences between visuospatial working memory and visual imagery.  
 
1.3.1. Brief overview of working memory theory 
In 1974, Baddeley and Hitch proposed a multicomponent working memory model which 
has evolved to be the most prominent theory of working memory (although see Miyake 
and Shah (1999) for a review of alternative working memory models). Originally this 
model comprised of three components: the central executive, the phonological loop and 
the visuospatial sketchpad. These components exist independently of one another in that 
they process different types of information and have finite capacities (Baddeley & Hitch, 
1974).  
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The central executive represents the attentional capacity for managing the two ‘slave’ 
systems: the phonological loop and the visuospatial sketchpad. The phonological loop 
plays a role in the storage and maintenance of auditory information, such as, verbal speech 
and it contains an active and a passive store for the rehearsal of auditory information 
(Baddeley, Eldridge, & Lewis, 1981). The visuospatial sketchpad or visuospatial working 
memory is responsible for the storage and maintenance of ‘visual’ and ‘spatial’ 
information. It consists, firstly, of the visual cache, which stores passive static visual 
perceptual information (i.e. memory for shape and colour) and, secondly, of the inner 
scribe (the equivalent spatial component), which actively rehearses information with 
regards to movement and spatial location (Logie, 1995). The inners scribe can be 
subdivided further to deal with dynamic or static spatial information (Mammarella, 
Pazzaglia, & Cornoldi, 2008). Information in the visual cache is subject to decay or 
interference from new information that enters the store unless the information is 
maintained and refreshed by the inner scribe (Logie, 1995; Logie & Pearson, 1997). Later 
the episodic buffer was added to the model to describe the interactions and 
communications between the phonological loop, the visuospatial sketchpad and long-
term memory (Baddeley, 2000). 
 
1.3.2 Ambiguities and differences: visuospatial working memory and visual imagery 
During a visuospatial working memory task, perceptual information is held in the visual 
cache, and it is rehearsed by the spatial inner scribe (Borst, Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 
2012; Logie, 1995; Pearson, Logie, & Gilhooly, 1999). Thus, in such a scenario, the 
visual cache acts as a visuospatial short-term memory store of perceptual information. 
According to Pearson (2001), the visual cache contains representations from perception, 
but these are not visual images. It is the information from the visual cache that can be 
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used to create visual images; these transfer across to the ‘visual buffer’ where conscious 
mental images are experienced (Pearson, 2001). It should be noted, however, that the 
attributes of the visual cache described in the literature are somewhat confusing, 
especially, in terms of its relationship to the ‘visual buffer’ The visuospatial working 
memory ‘visual buffer’ is claimed to be closely associated to the ‘visual buffer’ described 
within the theory of mental imagery (Kosslyn, 2006). However, the literature is often 
unclear whether this is one (or the same) construct. Some studies postulate that the two 
buffers are ‘associated’ with one another (e.g. Pearson, 2001) while other studies assume 
they are the same constructs (Borst, Niven, & Logie, 2012).  
 
Moreover, there are contrasting views on whether the contents of the visual cache are 
conscious (or not). For instance, Pearson (2001) claims that information from the visual 
cache passes to the visual buffer to be consciously experienced. It has also been claimed 
that (abstract) images in the visual cache can also be consciously experienced when items 
are actively mentally rehearsed (Logie & Cowan, 2015) presumably by the inner scribe. 
Nevertheless, it is viewed that the ‘visual buffer’, as described by Pearson (2001) is 
distinct from the visual cache (Borst et al., 2012; Logie, 1995; Pearson et al., 1999). 
Unlike the visual buffer, the visual cache mediates the maintenance of visual information 
from visual perception, but it can also maintain visual representations from long-term 
memory (i.e. visual images) (Borst et al., 2012). Furthermore, Borst et al. (2012) suggest 
that visual images are not maintained in the visual buffer, but they are preserved in the 
visual cache, due to the likely interference from visual perceptual inputs.  
 
If the two ‘visual buffers’ described in visual imagery and in visuospatial working 
memory are different constructs, they are suggested to have characteristics in common 
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(Logie, 1995, 2003), but also differ in a number of ways. In the theory of mental imagery, 
the visual buffer is described as a topographically organised area of the primary visual 
cortex (Kosslyn, 2006). However, no such information has been provided with regards to 
the structure of the visual buffer in visuospatial working memory. In terms of Kosslyn’s 
buffer, visual images are consciously experienced by an attentional window (Kosslyn, 
2006), while in visuospatial working memory, the contents of the visual buffer are to 
some extent maintained by the central executive (Pearson, 2001). Moreover, the visual 
buffer in visuospatial working memory is thought to be supported by the visual cache, 
which acts as a passive temporary store of visual representations (that are not presented 
in the buffer). According to Quinn (2008), this information is held outside of conscious 
awareness. This information is thought to be stored at a lower resolution in an abstract 
format; it is protected from incoming visual perpetual interference (Quinn, 2008) because 
the visual cache is considered to use the posterior parietal cortex rather than the primary 
visual cortex (Pearson & Keogh, 2019). Compared to the visual buffer, which is described 
as prone to interference from visual perception due to its situation in the primary visual 
cortex, similar to Kosslyn’s (2006) visual buffer (Borst et al., 2012; Borst, Niven, & 
Logie, 2012). Irrespective of whether the two visual buffers are the same, they are viewed 
to be functionally and structurally distinct from the visual cache (Borst et al., 2012; Logie, 
1995; Pearson et al., 1999; van der Meulen, Logie, & Della Sala, 2009). 
 
Logie (2003) suggests that both visual imagery (the visual buffer) and visuospatial 
working memory (specifically the visual cache) rely on partially different structures. 
Evidence for this stem from the results of passive interference tasks that present irrelevant 
visual information, such as, dynamic visual noise interference. These tasks have shown 
to interfere selectively with visual imagery rather than with visuospatial working memory 
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(Andrade, Kemps, Werniers, May, & Szmalec, 2002; van der Meulen et al., 2009). 
However, such interference has not been documented in all the studies conducted (Avons 
& Sestieri, 2011). These observations indicate that dissociations exist between the visual 
cache, which supports visuospatial working memory, and the visual buffer, which 
supports visual imagery (Andrade et al., 2002; van der Meulen et al., 2009), thus they 
must be based on partially different processes. The use of the visual cache and that of the 
visual buffer within visuospatial working memory also depends on the type of visual 
information that needs to be maintained. High-level visual details during a visuospatial 
working memory task are suggested to require repeat generation of the image, which 
require the use of the visual buffer, rather than the sole use of visual information in the 
visual cache (Darling, Della Sala, & Logie, 2009; Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003). Overall, 
although there are many ambiguities and differences (more so theoretically) between the 
way visual imagery and visuospatial working memory relate to one another, they remain 
closely associated with each other. 
 
1.3.3. Does visual imagery play a role in visuospatial working memory? 
Visual imagery and visuospatial working memory share common characteristics. For 
instance, it is suggested that both rely on representations that are depictive in nature (Borst 
et al., 2012). Visual noise interference that comprises a structured visual pattern (i.e. 
interference that shares characteristics with objects or stimuli used in tasks) interferes 
with both visual imagery and visuospatial working memory in a similar capacity (Borst 
et al., 2012). This may be the case because irrelevant visual input interferes with the 
temporary storage of detailed visual information, which may require visual imagery 
generation within the visual buffer (Darling et al., 2009). Borst et al. (2012) suggest that 
from this view if they share depictive representations, they must partially rely on some 
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cognitive processes. Sensory recruitment accounts of working memory also propose that 
cortical regions involved in perceptual processing are involved in the maintenance of 
information in working memory (Scimeca et al., 2018). 
 
A number of studies have suggested that the primary visual cortex (among other areas, 
see review D’Esposito & Postle, 2015) play a role in the maintenance of visual 
information within visuospatial working memory (e.g. Ester, Serences, & Awh, 2009; 
Harrison & Tong, 2009; Kang, Hong, Blake, & Woodman, 2011; Pearson & Keogh, 
2019; Scimeca et al., 2018). If visuospatial working memory involves the primary visual 
cortex (where detailed visual information is suggested to be generated and maintained), 
this would explain why interference tasks, which use visual noise such as irrelevant 
pictures or perceptual stimuli, impair performance in visual imagery and visuospatial 
working memory tasks (Borst et al., 2012; Keogh & Pearson, 2011, 2014). This would 
suggest both of these processes share common mechanism (i.e. the visual buffer). 
 
It has been documented that when visuospatial working memory tasks are undertaken, 
some participants self-report the experience of generating highly-detailed visual 
representations of task stimuli for manipulation processes to occur (Gur & Hilgard, 1975; 
Harrison & Tong, 2009). This suggests that individuals can use visual imagery as a 
possible strategy within visuospatial working memory tasks. Specifically, in the study 
conducted by Gur and Hilgard (1975), participants were presented with two picture cards, 
one after the other. After a short interval, they had to identify the features that differed in 
the two pictures. The authors of the study found that individuals who were ‘good’ imagers 
were quicker in reporting the features which were different. For example, they self-
reported that differences between images ‘popped out’ and the participants described the 
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process akin to overlaying one picture over the other one. This was not the case for poor 
imagers who exhibited slower performance on the task (Gur & Hilgard, 1975). These 
observations have led to the acknowledgement that visual imagery may play a cognitive 
role within visuospatial working memory; they also support research previously 
conducted that claimed that they rely on common depictive representations (Borst et al., 
2012).  
 
As observed in the study conducted by Gur and Hilgard (1975), the use of visual imagery 
in visuospatial working memory is influenced by individual differences, namely, the 
vividness of visual imagery. In an interference study, interference was shown to be more 
pronounced in individuals who were more vivid imagers compared to poor imagers 
(Keogh & Pearson, 2014). Similarly, Keogh and Pearson (2011) showed that the strength 
(i.e. self-reported vividness) of visual imagery correlated with visuospatial working 
memory performance, in that individuals who were ‘good imagers’ performed better than 
‘poor imagers’ on visuospatial working memory tasks. These findings suggest that if one 
has vivid visual imagery, they are more likely to use it as a strategy within visuospatial 
working memory tasks, but this is not the case for an individual with poor imagery who 
are more likely to adopt non-visual strategies (Pearson & Keogh, 2019). This would 
arguably involve the recruitment of differing brain areas and networks (Logie, Pernet, 
Buonocore, & Sala, 2011; Sanfratello et al., 2014) and may also be the reason as to why 
there are contrasting findings in interference paradigms (as denoted in section 1.3.2), 
whereby interference (with visual noise) is evident in some studies but not all. It may be 
the case that these participants differed in the vividness of their visual imagery, although 
this cannot be confirmed as no indication of imagery vividness is provided in these 
studies.   
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Neuroimaging studies have also shown that when visual imagery is used as a strategy 
within visuospatial working memory tasks, there is considerable overlap in activity 
(Albers et al., 2013; Harrison & Tong, 2009; Kosslyn et al., 2001). This suggests that 
visuospatial working memory and visual imagery share similar cognitive (Borst et al., 
2012) and neural representations (Albers et al., 2013; Slotnick, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 
2012). In the case of individuals with poor imagery, Keogh & Pearson (2019) have 
claimed that non-imagery-based strategies, such as, propositional semantic information 
can be adopted in visuospatial working memory tasks, which can also result in good 
performance within the task. 
 
1.4. Extremes of imagery experience 
Sir Francis Galton (1880) was the first to observe that individuals experienced a wide 
range of imagery vividness (Galton, 1880). However, it had been assumed that although 
there were individual differences, imagery was a part of everyday cognition for most 
neurologically intact people. Identified in 2015, aphantasia (Keogh & Pearson, 2017; 
Zeman et al., 2015) is characterised by the lack of visual imagery experienced by an 
estimated 2-5% of the population (Faw, 2009). Historically in the literature, there exist 
few case studies documenting the lack of visual imagery. The majority of these case 
studies report an acquired sudden inability to generate visual imagery caused by brain 
trauma (e.g. Botez, Olivier, Vezina, Botez, & Kaufman, 1985). Research into aphantasia 
is in its infancy; it has been investigated only in six experimental studies (Dawes, Keogh, 
Andrillon, & Pearson, 2020; Jacobs, Schwarzkopf, & Silvanto, 2017; Keogh & Pearson, 
2017; Zeman et al., 2010, 2015; Zeman et al., 2020). Additionally, several unpublished 
studies have been conducted (Bainbridge, Pounder, Eardley, & Baker, 2020; Wicken, 
Keogh, & Pearson, 2021; Milton et al., submitted). 
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This section will present, firstly, an outline of historical case studies which have 
documented the lack of visual imagery in the absence of trauma. Secondly, it will review 
the currently existing aphantasic literature. While writing this thesis, another unique 
variation of human experience had been identified, known as hyperphantasia, which is 
characterised by visual imagery that is as ‘vivid and real as seeing’ similar to 
photographic imagery (Zeman et al., 2020; Milton et al., submitted). While the number 
of hyperphantasic participants within the subsequent experiments of this thesis is 
identified, it is not the focus, nor the intention to compare and contrast the two ends of 
the imagery spectrum in this thesis. However, a brief summary of hyperphantasia is 
included in this section. 
 
1.4.1 Historic cases studies describing a sudden loss of visual imagery 
Historically, there are relatively few case studies which document individuals self-
reporting an acquired sudden inability to generate visual imagery, in the absence of 
trauma. One of the earliest cases of visual imagery deficits was described by Charcot and 
Bernard (1883, cited in Young & van de Wal 1996) who presented Monsieur X. This 
individual experienced the sudden inability to generate visual images in conjunction with 
a form of mild prosopagnosia. In another case study, a 38-year-old individual self-
reported the inability to form visual mental images from birth but did not display other 
impairments in visual perception or visual memory (Botez et al., 1985). In both case 
studies, the authors did not document whether the impairments in visual imagery 
extended to other sensory modalities, and the patients were not subjected to an extensive 
assessment of their imagery abilities.  
 
There are numerous case studies that present individuals, who as a result of trauma, 
display an acquired loss of visual imagery (e.g. Bisiach & Luzzati, 1978; Farah, 1984, 
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see also section 1.2.2). Brain (1954) has described two cases of the inability to form visual 
imagery following head injury. In one such case, a builder who was involved in a car 
collision was suddenly unable to mentally visualise blueprints of buildings on which he 
worked, and he also found it difficult to navigate routes with which he had been familiar. 
This was in stark contrast to his visual imagery abilities prior to the accident (Brain, 
1954). Despite this, however, the impairment had no effect on his ability to draw. The 
second case involved an individual who acquired a visual imagery deficit following a fall, 
and he claimed to be unable to ‘see anything’ in his mind. Despite this self-report, the 
individual still performed well on visual imagery tasks (Brain, 1954). Unfortunately, both 
of these cases occurred prior to the development of neuroimaging, and these patients were 
not subject to any further standardised tests of visual imagery or investigation into their 
experience of imagery across other sensory domains.  
 
A neuroimaging study of two patients (referred to as Patient 1 and Patient 2) both of 
whom experienced closed head injuries, which resulted in multiple brain lesion including 
lesions in the left inferior temporal gyrus (Moro et al., 2008). This is an area implicated 
in visual imagery (Bartolomeo, 2002; Mellet et al., 2000). Brain lesions were not evident 
in the primary visual cortex in either patient; nevertheless, both of them reported the 
absence of visual imagery, and they exhibited unimpaired visual, perceptual, language 
and memory abilities (Moro et al., 2008). Both patients performed worse in visual 
imagery tasks with regards to the characteristics and features of common objects, such as 
the description of road signs and everyday symbols (Moro et al., 2008). Although 
performance in other sensory imagery modalities was unaffected in one patient, 
nonetheless, the other patient experienced an imagery impairment in tactile imagery. In 
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view of this, the authors suggested that these sensory modalities have separate neural 
substrates (Moro et al., 2008). 
 
1.4.2. The identification of congenital aphantasia 
The term congenital aphantasia (from Aristotle’s ‘phantasia’ meaning mind’s eye, and 
‘a’ meaning absence), has been coined to describe a sub-set of the population who self-
report the inability to generate voluntary visual imagery, while visual perception and 
semantic memory remain intact (Keogh & Pearson, 2017; Zeman et al., 2015). This 
variation in imagery experience was identified following the case study of patient MX, 
who following a coronary angioplasty procedure, self-reported the inability to generate 
visual images (Zeman et al., 2010). On visual imagery self-reports, such as the Vividness 
of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ), he rated himself to have no imagery. 
Nevertheless, MX performed as accurately as individuals with typical imagery on several 
different imagery tasks; these tested the ability to perform mental rotation and to judge 
the length of animals’ tails (Zeman et al., 2010). During the mental rotation task, however, 
MX displayed longer reaction times compared to neurotypical controls, which the authors 
explained in terms of MX adopting a different strategy in the task (Zeman et al., 2010). 
The strategy used was not specified, and with regard to the other imagery tasks performed, 
no measurements or indications of reaction time were provided (Zeman et al., 2010).  
 
An article which described the experience of MX was featured in science magazine 
Discover (Zimmer, 2010); subsequently, 21 individuals contacted the author to describe 
their lifelong inabilities to generate visual imagery (Zeman et al., 2015). These congenital 
aphantasic individuals self-reported their experiences of aphantasia as stable and life-
long; typically, they discovered that their imagery experience differed from those of the 
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majority of the population during their teens or early twenties (Zeman et al., 2015). The 
majority of individuals included in this sample also reported experiences of involuntary 
‘flashes’ of visual imagery during wakefulness, at sleep onset or while dreaming (Zeman 
et al., 2015). Aphantasics’ ability to dream and recall the visual content of their dreams 
has been documented in recent studies (Dawes et al., 2020; Zeman et al., 2020). This 
implies that aphantasia is not characterised by a total deficit in visual imagery but by 
‘reduced or absent’ voluntary imagery (Zeman et al., 2015; Zeman, Della Sala & Dewar, 
2016). Since 2015, thousands of individuals with aphantasia have contacted Zeman to 
describe their life-long inabilities to conjure visual imagery. In addition, a number of 
prominent figures such as the physicist Nick Watkins (Watkins, 2018), the neurologist 
Oliver Sacks and the retired president of Pixar and Walt Disney Ed Catmull (Gallagher, 
2019) have also shared their personal insights and perspectives.  
 
1.4.3. Understanding congenital aphantasia  
One of the commonalities in studies investigating aphantasia is that the majority of 
individuals with aphantasia provide the minimum score (of 163) on visual imagery self-
report measures such as the VVIQ. The majority of studies have used this as a means to 
identify individuals with aphantasia within their sample, albeit with different cut-off 
criteria (Bainbridge et al., 2020; Jacobs et al., 2017; Keogh & Pearson, 2017; Wicken et 
al., 2021; Zeman et al., 2015; Zeman et al., 2020). Much of the earlier research 
investigating aphantasia involved either case studies or studies which comprised of a 
small number of participants and age-unmatched samples (Jacobs et al., 2017; Keogh & 
Pearson, 2017). For instance, the case study by Jacobs et al. (2017) compared the 
                                               
3 While the majority of aphantasic participants score 16 on the VVIQ, aphantasic participants can also 
score between 17-32 on the VVIQ (e.g. Zeman et al., 2015, Keogh & Pearson, 2017).  
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performance of one aphantasic participant (AI) with that of a control group consisting of 
eleven control participants. Although this control group were the same gender as AI, they 
were not matched in terms of IQ. The authors addressed this issue by comparing the 
performance of AI, specifically to a selected sub-set of four controls within their control 
sample who had matching IQ scores (Jacobs et al., 2017). However, the case study was 
based on the performance of one aphantasic participant within an experimental paradigm; 
thus, the findings may be spurious.  
 
Likewise, the study by Keogh and Pearson (2017) compared the performance of a group 
of 15 aphantasic participants with that of a larger ‘general population’ of 209 individuals 
who had typical imagery. The data for this control group was acquired as apart of 
numerous other published and unpublished studies undertaken by Pearson’s research 
group. Although Keogh and Pearson (2017) addressed the sample difference for their 
behavioural measure by randomly resampling 15 participants from the general population 
(a thousand times), nevertheless, the samples were not matched. For instance, the general 
population group comprised of a wider range of ages from 18-80 in contrast to their 
aphantasic sample who were between the ages of 21-68, and no mean age or standard 
deviation were provided for this group. 
 
While several studies have used larger matched samples (Dawes et al., 2020; Zeman et 
al., 2020), these studies were primarily based on self-report measures. By definition, self-
report measures are subjective, they are impacted by a number of different factors, and 
they are prone to a number of different biases (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2011). For 
example, participants may respond in a socially desirable way (McKelvie, 1995; 
McKelvie & Rohrberg, 1978) and their responses may be mediated by other variables, 
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such as personality traits (e.g. Buchanan, 2015). While self-reports provide insight into 
an experience, these are not objective measures. What is lacking within the literature is 
an objective assessment within a larger sample of aphantasic individuals who are closely 
matched in terms of age and IQ to a sample of individuals with typical imagery in a wider 
range of tasks.  
 
While the VVIQ self-report measure is the most convenient way to identify individuals 
with aphantasia, there are other objective ways in which this can be achieved. As an 
alternative to self-report measures, Keogh and Pearson (2017) have used a binocular 
rivalry paradigm as an objective method to measure the sensory strength of imagery. This 
paradigm is a behavioural technique where a different image is separately presented to 
each eye. Visual perception alternates between the two images - one image remains 
perceptually dominant, while the other image is unconsciously suppressed (Pearson, 
Clifford, & Tong, 2008). Previous studies which used this technique have shown that both 
visual imagery and weak-visual perception can bias responses within subsequent 
binocular rivalry trials (Pearson et al., 2008). For instance, if an individual generates a 
visual image of a green rivalry-display or is perceptually presented with a very faint image 
of a green rivalry-display, an individual is more likely to respond by claiming that they 
have seen a green rivalry-display image in the following trials (Pearson et al., 2008). The 
authors suggested that the extent of this priming reflects the measure of the sensory 
strength of visual imagery. In individuals with aphantasia, however, this priming effect 
is not evident compared to individuals with typical imagery (Keogh & Pearson, 2017). 
Therefore, the authors claimed this demonstrated that individuals with aphantasia 
experienced an absence of sensory visual imagery, and the results obtained were not 
caused by the lack of metacognition (i.e. their inability to introspect on their experience 
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of visual imagery). Although the binocular rivalry paradigm provides an objective 
indication of sensory strength in the visual domain, no such corresponding technique 
exists in the case of other sensory modalities. Moreover, this task is difficult to carry out 
within online settings because of the adjustments which have to be made to the task with 
regards to the individual’s differences in eye dominance (in comparison to the VVIQ, 
which is a quick gauge of visual imagery vividness).  
 
Another preliminary objective difference within the aphantasic literature concerns the 
relationship between visual images, thoughts and emotions. Specifically, individuals with 
aphantasia showed flat-line physiological responses when reading fictitious fearful 
scenarios (Wicken et al., 2021). This is in contrast to individuals with typical imagery 
who displayed aroused physiological responses as is commonly expected due to such 
emotional content. Although no other emotions have been explored within the study, 
physiological responses and binocular rivalry constitute two objective measures, besides 
self-report measures to identify markers of aphantasia.  
 
The study by Keogh and Pearson (2017) was the first one to incorporate different visual 
imagery self-report measures to the VVIQ; it introduced the Object Spatial Imagery 
Questionnaire (OSIQ). The authors demonstrated that aphantasic participants self-
reported a preference for spatial imagery and provided spatial imagery scores that were 
comparable to those provided by individuals with typical imagery. However, the object 
imagery scores provided by aphantasic participants were significantly lower than their 
spatial imagery scores. This finding has since been replicated in larger samples 
(Bainbridge et al., 2020; Dawes et al., 2020), which indicates that individuals with 
aphantasia have intact spatial imagery abilities. Moreover, Keogh & Pearson (2017) have 
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suggested that this preference may relate to the dissociation between the ventral and 
dorsal processing streams, and may also explain patient MX’s accurate performance 
within the mental rotation task. Conversely, object imagery scores, which refer to imagery 
of high-resolution and pictorial in nature (see, Blajenkova et al., 2006), have been shown 
to correlate to VVIQ scores (Bainbridge et al., 2020), suggesting they measure similar 
constructs.  
 
Although individuals with aphantasia are proposed to have intact spatial imagery, on the 
basis of their self-reports, the observation has yet to be objectively examined within tasks 
that assess visual and spatial imagery. However, previous research has indicated that it 
may be impossible to separate fully one construct from the other (e.g. Kosslyn, 2006; 
Kosslyn 1994). Evidence obtained from studies based on the congenitally blind indicates 
that it is possible for some tasks to be undertaken as accurately in the absence of the 
‘visual’ component (Carpenter & Eisenberg, 1978; Marmor & Zaback, 1976; Tinti et al., 
2018). Although object and spatial differences have been documented in a number of case 
studies of patients with brain injury (e.g. Corballis, 1997; Della Sala et al., 1997; Farah 
et al., 1988; Morris et al., 1995), exploration of the nature of aphantasia could provide 
another route to examine these differences within a population of individuals who are 
unaffected by brain trauma or changes in brain pathology. If visual and spatial processing 
differences exist between individuals with aphantasia and typical imagery, in line with 
their self-report measures, then it is necessary to investigate whether such differences can 
be objectively observed. However, presently, no study has investigated spatial and visual 
differences within behavioural tasks. 
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The relationship between visuospatial working memory and visual imagery remains 
unclear (Logie & Cowan, 2015). However, the examination of visuospatial working 
memory in a population who self-report the inability to use visual imagery could provide 
a unique opportunity to understand the relationship between the two processes. Until now, 
this relationship has been examined in a case study of an aphantasic participant, AI, who 
showed no significant difference to controls in an imagery condition. However, AI 
displayed impairments in the visuospatial working memory condition only when high 
precision working memory was required (Jacobs et al., 2017). The authors have 
speculated that AI may have adopted verbal or spatial propositional code (Jacobs et al., 
2017). Such findings could be explained by theoretical models of visuospatial working 
memory that claim the visual cache and the visual buffer are distinct (Andrade et al., 
2002; van der Meulen et al., 2009). This notion also supports the view that visuospatial 
working memory tasks can be undertaken using non-visual strategies (Pearson & Keogh, 
2019). Nevertheless, the findings discussed were based exclusively on one case study. 
Therefore a more in-depth examination of these processes in a larger sample is necessary 
to confirm the relationship existing between the two. 
 
The majority of studies have examined the imagery experience of individuals with 
aphantasia in the visual domain; nonetheless, few have explored such experiences across 
other sensory modalities. Although Zeman et al. (2015) reported that approximately half 
of their aphantasic sample experienced an absence of imagery in other sensory domains, 
no further information was provided. This has been examined more recently within larger 
samples, which indicate that not all individuals with aphantasia self-report a lack of visual 
imagery across all sensory domains (Dawes et al., 2020; Zeman et al., 2020). However, 
the extent of this variability still remains unclear; in particular, the extent or frequency 
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with which aphantasic individuals experience comorbid imagery impairments in multiple 
sensory domains or the neural underpinnings of such variations. Moreover, differences in 
self-report across all sensory domains have not been empirically examined. Therefore, 
the examination of non-visual sensory domains could be another way to examine the 
differences in visual imagery and spatial imagery among individuals with aphantasia. For 
example, it has been proposed that auditory imagery shares numerous similarities with 
visual imagery, such as, it has spatial characteristics similar to the visual domain 
(Halpern, 1988; Zatorre, Halpern, Perry, Meyer, & Evans, 1996) and a ‘what’ and ‘where’ 
pathway similar to the ‘what/where’ pathways described within the visual domain 
(Clarke, Bellmann, Meuli, Assal, & Steck, 2000; Warren, Zielinski, Green, Rauschecker, 
& Griffiths, 2002). No studies as yet have examined the performance of individuals with 
aphantasia within auditory imagery tasks. 
 
1.4.4. Hyperphantasia  
At the beginning of this thesis, aphantasia was the only identified extreme in imagery 
experience. However, research recently conducted has drawn attention to the opposite 
end of the vividness spectrum – i.e. to those who self-report a hyper-vivid imagery 
experience. (Zeman et al., 2020; Milton et al., submitted). Hyperphantasia is characterised 
by visual imagery that is as ‘vivid as real as seeing’ similar to photographic imagery 
(Zeman et al., 2020; Milton et al., submitted). It is regarded to have a prevalence of 11.2% 
in the general population and is identified by individuals who score between 75-80 on the 
VVIQ (Zeman et al., 2020). Individuals with hyperphantasia are more likely to recognise 
that their imagery experience is more vivid during early adulthood (which is earlier than 
those with aphantasia) (Zeman et al., 2020). Moreover, they are also more likely to report 
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synaesthesia4 and self-report visual dreams (Zeman et al., 2020). In a sample of 200 
individuals with hyperphantasia presented in a study conducted by Zeman et al. (2020), 
almost half of the participants reported that all their senses were hyper-vivid. This 
variation of vivid imagery across the other senses suggests that hyperphantasia is a 
heterogenous experience like aphantasia (Milton et al., submitted), but little is known as 
to what these variations may entail or why such variations occur. A recent fMRI 
(unpublished) study has shown that there exists stronger functional connectivity between 
prefrontal regions and the primary visual cortex among hyperphantasic individuals than 
individuals with aphantasia (Milton et al., submitted), but at present research on the 
imagery extreme is limited. Furthermore, self-reports of individuals with hyperphantasia 
may be more questionable – this is so, because although individuals may have a vivid 
imagery experience, it is considerably harder to quantify the strength of the ‘presence’, 
than that of the ‘absence.’ While the number of individuals with hyperphantasia is 
specified within subsequent Chapters, this experience is not the focus of this thesis.  
  
                                               
4 Although it has been documented that synaesthesia can occur within individuals with aphantasia, 
suggesting that visual imagery is not necessary for the experience of synaesthesia (Dance et al., 2021). 
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1.5. The current thesis and research questions 
Aphantasia is a newly identified variation of the human experience. Much of the early 
research establishing the existence of aphantasia has focused on the experience within the 
visual domain, explored primarily through case studies, or studies with unmatched 
samples (< 15). While more recent studies have examined the experience of aphantasia 
within larger samples, these studies have largely used self-report measures. Of the few 
studies that have examined aphantasics’ objective performance within tasks, these studies 
employ unmatched control samples. Broadly, this thesis examines the possible causes of 
aphantasia and the nature of the experience in visual and non-visual domains within larger 
matched samples, examined by participant group and considering individual variations in 
performance.  
 
This thesis will consider the following research questions: 
 
1. Chapter 2 research questions: interrogating the case studies in the literature 
The early published studies in aphantasia comprised of case studies or small sample 
sizes (n < 15). Can an experimental design replicate the findings obtained from self-
reports and from objective performance within visuospatial imagery and working 
memory tasks? 
Experiment 1 research questions: Examining self-reported imagery ability of 
individuals with aphantasia 
1. Can an experimental design replicate the study findings of Keogh & Pearson (2017) 
that indicate self-reported object imagery (in the Object-Spatial Imagery 
Questionnaire, OSIQ) might be lower in individuals with aphantasia compared to 
individuals with typical imagery? 
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2. Can an experimental design replicate the study findings of Keogh & Pearson (2017) 
and show aphantasic participants’ self-reported spatial imagery scores (in the OSIQ) 
might be similar to the spatial imagery scores provided by individuals with typical 
imagery? 
Experiment 2 research questions: Examining objective imagery and visuospatial 
working memory function in an experimental design  
1. Can an experimental design adopted by Jacobs et al. (2017) replicate the case study 
findings that suggest that individuals with aphantasia may have impaired 
visuospatial working memory but not imagery function?  
2. Can an experimental design replicate the case study findings of Jacobs et al. (2017) 
that suggest that individuals with aphantasia may have reduced metacognitive 
accuracy than control participants with typical imagery? 
 
2. Chapter 3 research questions: personality and cognitive profile  
Can aphantasia be explained through differences in personality or cognitive profiles?  
Experiment 3 research questions: Do personality differences explain aphantasia? 
1. Do individuals with aphantasia have different personality profiles compared to 
individuals with typical imagery? 
2. Is there a relationship between imagery vividness ratings and personality? 
Experiment 4 research questions: Do individuals with aphantasia perform 
differently in cognitive tasks? 
1. Do individuals with aphantasia perform differently to individuals with typical 
imagery in tasks exploring different aspects of cognitive function within 
standardised cognitive tasks? These tasks include: verbal memory (Verbal 
Recognition Memory, involving recall and recognition of words within short term 
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phonological memory), visual memory (Pattern Recognition Memory, involving 
the recognition of visuospatial images within short term memory), spatial working 
memory (Spatial Span, involving spatial representations/imagery) or executive 
function (One Touch Stockings of Cambridge task, a visuospatial working 
memory task requiring the maintenance and manipulation of both visual (colour) 
and spatial (location) information within working memory)? 
2. Are there variations of neuropsychological performance between the two 
participant groups? Individual differences in performance will be explored using 
multidimensional scaling (MDS). 
 
3. Chapter 4 research questions: Complex visuospatial performance in 
aphantasia  
How do individuals with aphantasia perform within complex visuospatial working 
memory tasks? 
Experiment 5: How do individuals with aphantasia perform within a mental 
rotation task? 
1. Do individuals with aphantasia perform differently to individuals with typical 
imagery within a mental rotation task? 
Experiment 6: How do individuals with aphantasia perform within a spatial 
perspective-taking task? 
1. Do individuals with aphantasia perform differently to individuals with typical 
imagery within a spatial perspective-taking task - is there a difference in 




4. Chapter 5 research questions: What vs Where pathways 
Is it possible to isolate visual imagery from spatial imagery? If this is not possible 
within the visual domain, are there other sensory domains where this can be examined? 
Experiment 7 research questions: Isolating ‘visual’ imagery function in the 
visual domain 
1. If individuals with aphantasia self-report impairments in object imagery, how do 
they perform within an imagery task that requires responses to statements 
relating to visual (colour and texture) and spatial (size and location) properties 
of everyday objects? 
Experiment 8 research questions: Non-visual self-reports in aphantasia 
1. How do individuals with aphantasia self-report imagery experience across the 
other sensory modalities compare to controls with typical imagery? 
 
5. Chapter 6 research questions: Auditory imagery performance in aphantasia 
In individuals with aphantasia who self-report an absence of auditory imagery, how do 
they perform within auditory imagery tasks that comprise of perceptual and spatial 
imagery components? 
Experiment 9 research questions: Pitch discrimination in imagery and perception 
1. How do individuals with aphantasia, who self-report an absence of auditory 
imagery, perform in an auditory imagery task involving the discrimination of 
pitches of lyrics within familiar music?  
2. How does this performance compare to a matching perceptual version of the 




Experiment 10 research questions: Categorical perception of voices in 
aphantasia  
1. Can individuals with aphantasia, who self-report an absence of auditory 
imagery, generate and synthesise internal auditory representations of voices of 
different speakers similar to individuals with typical imagery? 
2. Can individuals with aphantasia, who self-report an absence of auditory 
imagery, retrieved these internal auditory representations and use them to 
accurately identify the speakers of ambiguous voice syllables, similar to 








The early published studies investigating aphantasia include responses from self-reports 
or behavioural performance within single case-studies or small samples. Further 
replication of the results obtained within these studies are necessary to confirm whether 
or not the findings are robust. Keogh & Pearson (2017) found in their aphantasic sample 
(n = 15) a self-reported higher scores for spatial than object imagery. Experiment 1 
investigates aphantasics’ self-reported object-spatial imagery preferences within a larger 
sample (n = 114) and replicated findings showing that aphantasic participants scored 
higher for spatial imagery than object imagery. In contrast, controls self-reported the 
reverse relationship. Together these results indicate that experiences of visual and spatial 
imagery within individuals with aphantasia may differ to those who have typical imagery. 
In this Chapter, Experiment 2 applies the experimental methodology described in the 
single case study by Jacobs et al. (2017), to a group of individuals with congenital 
aphantasia. Contrary to Jacobs et al. (2017) Experiment 2 shows no difference in accuracy 
within the visuospatial working memory task between aphantasic (n = 20) and control 
participants (n = 20) but a significant difference in accuracy in the imagery condition. 
The results of this Chapter replicate previous findings suggesting that in a larger sample 
of aphantasic participants, spatial imagery remains in intact, but object imagery does not, 
which could explain the performance similarities exhibited within Experiment 2. These 
results further demonstrate the need to establish whether the findings of previous case 
study reports generalise to the wider aphantasic population.   
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General Introduction 
Although the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) has been used to 
identify individuals with aphantasia (Appendix 2.1), other self-report measures such as 
the Object Spatial Imagery Questionnaires (OSIQ, Appendix 2.2) have also been 
incorporated within published aphantasia research studies to gain further insight into self-
reported imagery experiences (e.g. Bainbridge et al., 2020, Dawes et al., 2020; Keogh & 
Pearson, 2017). This questionnaire challenges the notion that imagery is a unitary 
construct, and requires individuals to rate statements with regards to their preference of 
‘object’ (visual) and ‘spatial’ imagery. A double dissociation between object and spatial 
imagery has been proposed and supported by numerous patient studies (see Chapter 1, 
section 1.2.2 for a discussion).  
 
Individuals with aphantasia were shown to self-report a preference for spatial imagery 
compared to object imagery (Keogh & Pearson, 2017), and this has since been replicated 
within a larger sample of aphantasic participants (Dawes et al., 2020). Although the 
finding has been replicated within a larger sample, due to the subjective nature of self-
reports, it is necessary to further investigate how robust this finding is within a differing 
aphantasic sample. This is necessary because higher scores for spatial imagery have been 
shown to correlate to more accurate performance within spatial imagery tasks, such as 
mental rotation (Kozhevnikov et al., 2005). In terms of patient MX who had acquired 
aphantasia following surgery, this ability to use spatial imagery may explain MX’s 
accurate performance within a mental rotation task. As patient MX did not complete the 
OSIQ self-report, this correlation cannot be examined. It should also be noted that patient 
MX had acquired aphantasia following surgery, thus potentially may provide different 
OSIQ scores than individuals with congenital aphantasia. Nevertheless, the notion that 
 50 
individuals with aphantasia self-report relatively intact spatial imagery has also been 
shown (within a larger sample of congenital aphantasics) through other spatial sub-scales, 
such as, The Survey of Autobiographical Memory (Dawes et al., 2020). On this sub-scale, 
aphantasic participants’ scores for spatial navigation and naturalistic spatial memory did 
not differ to controls with typical imagery, suggesting that individuals with aphantasia do 
self-report intact spatial abilities (Dawes et al., 2020). However, the number of items on 
this subscale comprise six items, thus cannot be viewed as a comprehensive assessment 
of spatial abilities. 
 
It remains an open question whether self-reported object-spatial imagery discrepancy 
translates to an equivalent behavioural deficit measured in objective imagery tasks. These 
intact spatial abilities may in part explain why aphantasic participant AI performed as 
well as matched controls within an imagery task (Jacobs et al., 2017). However, AI 
performed worse during the most difficult trials of a visuospatial working memory task 
(Jacobs et al., 2017) and the authors suggested that this supported the idea that imagery 
plays a functional role within visuospatial working memory (for a discussion, see Chapter 
1 section 1.3.3.) as visuospatial working memory and visual imagery have been shown to 
share similar cognitive (Borst et al., 2012) and neural representations (Albers et al., 2013; 
Slotnick et al., 2012). These preliminary findings need to be replicated in an experimental 
sample. If there is evidence of object-spatial imagery dissociations within the literature, 
further exploration of object-spatial self-reported preferences is also needed to enable 
greater understanding of the type of imagery deficit present within aphantasia.  
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Considerable research has demonstrated the existence of distinct spatial and object 
imagery subsystems, which are neuro-anatomically distinct (e.g. Farah et al., 1988; 
Goodale & Milner, 1992; Kosslyn et al., 2001; Kosslyn, 1994; Levine et al., 1985; see 
also Chapter 1 section 1.2). Spatial imagery refers to the representation of spatial relations 
among objects and their parts, location in space, object movements and spatial 
transformations (Blajenkova et al., 2006). On the other hand, object imagery refers to the 
salient visual features present within images irrespective of their location, for instance, 
colour, brightness and vividness (Blajenkova et al., 2006). Blajenkova et al. (2006) 
created a questionnaire, the Object Spatial Imagery Questionnaire (OSIQ) to explore 
individual preference of these two subtypes. The premise of the OSIQ is that visualisers, 
who are more likely to process information visually (opposed to individuals who are 
verbalisers), can be characterised as either spatial imagers or object imagers (Blajenkova 
et al., 2006). For instance, Kozhevnikov et al. (2005) showed that spatial imagers were 
more accurate within spatial imagery tasks such as mental rotation, and were less accurate 
within object imagery tasks, such as a degraded pictures task (Blajenkova et al., 2006). 
Likewise, object imagers were more accurate during object than spatial imagery tasks 
(Kozhevnikov et al., 2005). Object imagery scores correlated highly to the VVIQ 
(Blajenkova et al., 2006). The OSIQ self-report measure supports the notion of a 
dissociation between spatial imagery and visual imagery (Farah et al., 1988; Levine et al., 
1985) and has been used within clinical populations, such as schizophrenia, to explore 
object and spatial imagery preferences (Aleman, de Haan, & Kahn, 2005).  
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Performance differences in object and spatial imagery tasks are evident in several case 
studies of patients with brain lesions (Carlesimo et al., 2001; Corballis, 1997; Farah et al., 
1988; Levine et al., 1985). For instance, in a case study, Levine et al. (1985) provided 
details of a patient with lesions in the temporal cortex who was impaired in spatial 
transformation imagery tasks, however, performed normally in tasks involving the 
identification of colours and details of objects. While on the other hand, another case 
study by Farah et al. (1998) reported a patient who performed poorly on object tasks, 
however, was unimpaired on spatial imagery tasks such as mental rotation. If this 
dissociation exists in individuals with aphantasia, this may provide a new understanding 
of the relationship between visual and spatial imagery experiences.  
 
Within the study undertaken by Keogh and Pearson (2017), aphantasic participants self-
reported a significantly higher preference for spatial imagery rather than object imagery 
in the OSIQ. The object imagery scores provided by aphantasic participants were 
considerably lower than the object scores provided by controls and had smaller variance. 
Considering the dissociation between spatial and object imagery, with aphantasic 
individuals self-reporting intact spatial imagery on other measures (Dawes et al., 2020), 
it is expected that they will show similar self-report of spatial imagery to controls with 
typical imagery on spatial OSIQ subscales. The object subscale refers to the pictorial 
nature of imagery, and it is expected that individuals with aphantasia will self-report 
lower scores on this scale, in line with their self-reported lack of visual imagery. For 
individuals with typical imagery, no distinct difference is expected between the object 
imagery and spatial imagery subscales. The findings of this self-report will add to the 
growing literature with regards to the relationship between self-reported visual and spatial 
imagery experiences within aphantasia.  
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2.1.2 Methods 
Defining aphantasia and typical imagery experiences  
Aphantasia is typically identified through the VVIQ, although there is no defined cut-off 
score for typical and atypical self-reports of imagery, with different researchers varying 
in the ways they use the VVIQ to define aphantasia. Similarly, the VVIQ was not 
developed as a clinical measure, and as such, there is limited normative data for ‘typical’ 
imagery experience. In published aphantasic research, there is variability in how 
researchers are defining ‘normal’ imagery experience (e.g. Zeman et al., 2015; Keogh & 
Pearson, 2017). Previous studies, however, have demonstrated that there are a cluster of 
individuals with aphantasia who experience no imagery, with VVIQ scores of 16. 
However, there are also individuals who self-identify as having aphantasia and score 
higher than 16 on the VVIQ. The amount of ‘minimal’ imagery within the classification 
of aphantasia has varied across researchers, and cut-offs or criteria are not always reported 
(see Table 2.1 for an overview of VVIQ criteria used within current studies).5 
 
Study/ title VVIQ scores for aphantasic and control 
participants  











Aphantasic participants (n =21), were split 
into:  
a) No imagery group (n = 12), VVIQ score = 
16. 
b) Minimal imagery group (n = 9), VVIQ 
scores ranging = 17-30, median 26. 
 
Two control groups were combined with a 
median VVIQ score = 59: 
a) 111 psychology control students, median 
VVIQ score = 58. 
b) 10 middle-aged male architects (matching 
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Aphantasic participant (AI) scored 16 on the 
VVIQ. 
 
Controls (n = 11), mean VVIQ score = 61.1, 
SD = 7.6 
Control subgroup (who matched AI in terms of 
IQ, n = 4), VVIQ scores = 59.8 (no SD 
provided). 
Single case study, 
















Aphantasic participants (n = 15) mean VVIQ 
score = 19, SD = 6.78. 
 
No indication of control VVIQ scores. 
No cut-offs 
provided to define 















Aphantasic participants (n = 267) mean VVIQ 
score = 17.94, no SD provided.  
 
From the graphs, it is assumed their cut-off 
was 32, with individual scoring higher than 
32 classified as typical imagers (controls). 
 
Controls (n = 203), mean VVIQ score = 
58.79, no SD provided. 
Within their 
criteria, the authors 
suggest ‘weak 
visual imagery is 
typically defined by 
scores of 32 or less 
on the VVIQ,’ 
suggesting their 
cut-off for 
aphantasic (< 32) 
and controls (> 32) 
participants 









The authors grouped their participants within 
the following VVIQ criteria: 
 
Aphantasic participants (n = 2000), scored 
between 16-23, mean VVIQ score = 17.06, 
SD = 1.98. 
Control ‘mid-
range’ VVIQ 
scores are in line 
with the meta-
analysis by 






Zeman et al., 
(2020) 
 
Controls ‘mid-range’ (n = 200), scores 51 – 
63, mean VVIQ score = 57.49, SD = 3.52. 
 
Hyperphantasic participants (n = 200), score 





for the aphantasic 
participant range 
(16-23) is not 
defined.  
The critical 









No descriptives provided, however, it is 
suggested: 
 
Aphantasic participants VVIQ scores ranged: 
16-32 (although in the graphs, they suggest 
aphantasics’ VVIQ scores < 30). 
Controls VVIQ scores ranged (as suggested in 





VVIQ < 32 and 








Milton et al 
(unpublished) 
Aphantasic participants (n = 24) VVIQ scores 
ranged: 16-23, mean = 16.92, SD = 1.47. 
 
Controls (n = 20): VVIQ score ranged 
between 55-60, mean = 56.95, SD = 2.93. 
 
Hyperphantasic participants (n = 25) VVIQ 




for the aphantasic 
participant range 
(16-23) is not 
defined. 
 
Table 2.1: Table to show a summary of VVIQ criteria for defining aphantasic and control 
participants, defined in the existing literature.  
 
It is also not yet known how much ‘limited’ imagery should be permitted within the 
classification of aphantasia. Within this thesis, individuals with aphantasia were 
identified by VVIQ scores ≤ 26. This cut-off (VVIQ ≤ 26) is in line with more recent 
papers that take a more conservative approach to classify aphantasia (e.g. Zeman et al., 
2020).  
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With regards to scores of ‘typical’ imagery experience, the majority of existing papers on 
aphantasia provide limited information on their definitions of ‘typical’ imagery (e.g. 
Keogh & Pearson 2017; see Table 2.1). In a meta-analysis of 1860 participants (who were 
mainly students), McKelvie (1995) calculated the mean VVIQ score as 59.2 (SD = 11.07), 
and also identified a ‘low imagery’ group with a mean VVIQ score of 49.6 (SD = 9.04). 
Several studies have adopted a wide ‘typical imagery’ VVIQ criteria, with scores ranging 
between 32-80 (e.g. Dawes et al., 2020, Wicken et al., submitted). The scores, which fall 
between 32-40 suggest that on the VVIQ, an individual could provide a mixture (on 
average) of 2s and 3s for each item, which equate to ‘fairly vivid or vague visual imagery.’ 
This arguably comprises of a ‘typical imagery’ experience, and participants who fall 
within this VVIQ range have been included in the typical imagery populations within 
aphantasic studies (e.g. Dawes et al., 2020, Wicken et al., submitted). Thus, within this 
thesis, individuals with typical imagery were identified by VVIQ scores > 33. 
Hyperphantasia, a recently identified experience for individuals who experience highly 
vivid photographic-like imagery, has been suggestive for individuals who score between 
75-80 on the VVIQ (Zeman et al., 2020). Within the current thesis, the number of 
hyperphantasic participants is identified within the participant sample. However, these 
individuals with hyperphantasia will be grouped within the sample of control participants 
given it constitutes a typical imagery experience.  
 
2.1.2.1. Participants 
All participants were over the age of 18 and in total there were, 231 completed OSIQ 
responses: 114 aphantasic and 117 control participants. Two controls were removed (their 
VVIQ scores were 33), and two aphantasic participants were removed (VVIQ scores were 
29 and 30). Through the VVIQ, 112 aphantasic participants (VVIQ ≤ 26) were identified 
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and had a VVIQ mean score of 16.81 (minimum = 16, maximum = 26, SD = 2.23). In 
contrast, 115 control participants (VVIQ > 33) were identified and had a mean VVIQ 
score of 59.54 (minimum = 346, maximum = 80, SD = 12.47). In the controls, 10 
participants self-reported as hyperphantasic (mean = 77.9, SD = 1.85) The protocol for 
the data collection was in accordance with the British Psychological Society guidelines 
and the ethical approval provided by the Psychology Department Ethics Committee of 
the University of Westminster, UK.  
 
2.1.2.2. Materials 
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire  
The VVIQ (Marks, 1973) comprises of 16 items and instructs participants to rate the 
vividness of various scenarios such as aspects of a person and several scenes (e.g. “think 
of some relative or friend whom you frequently see, but who is not with you at present, 
and consider… the exact contour of face, head, shoulders and body”). Participants are 
required to rate the vividness of their visual imagery on a scale from 1 (“No image at all, 
you only “know” that you are thinking of the object”) to 5 (“Perfectly clear and vivid as 
real seeing”). VVIQ scores are calculated by summing the scores from all the items, thus 
participants could score a minimum of 16 and a maximum of 80. In this thesis, the VVIQ 
is used as a diagnostic tool to identify aphantasic (scores: VVIQ ≤ 26) and typical imager 




                                               
6 Although this participant scored 34 on the VVIQ, it should be noted on the OSIQ, this participant scored 
highly on the object imagery subscale (3.13/5), and this was higher than their spatial subscale score 
(2.93/5). According to Blajenkova et al. (2006), this would suggest that this participant has imagery that 
is visual or pictorial in nature, despite providing a lower self-report for its phenomenological experience. 
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Object Spatial Imagery Questionnaire  
The OSIQ assesses individual preferences for object or spatial visual mental imagery. 
Within this questionnaire, 15 questions related to object imagery, e.g. “my images are 
very colourful and bright” and 15 questions related to spatial imagery, e.g. “I can easily 
sketch a blueprint of a building I am familiar with.” For all 30 questions, participants 
rated on a scale whether they 1 (‘totally disagree’) to 5 (‘totally agree’) and an average 
score (between 1-5) is calculated for each subtype.  
 
2.1.2.3. Procedure 
The data collected for the OSIQ was collated across several experiments: Experiments 2, 
3 and Experiment 8. For data collected in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, aphantasic and 
control participants were asked to complete the OSIQ and VVIQ consecutively. For data 
collected in Experiment 8, aphantasic and control participants were asked to complete the 
OSIQ and the VVIQ as well as two other questionnaires regarding non-visual sensory 
imagery (discussed in Chapter 5). All OSIQ data collection (in all of these Experiments) 
was conducted through the online survey platform, Qualtrics. Participants were sent a 
URL to the Qualtrics version of the questionnaires. Subsequently, participants completed 
each questionnaire and all 30 questions of the OSIQ.  
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2.1.3. Results 
2.1.3.1. Range of OSIQ responses 
A) Aphantasic participant distribution of object and spatial imagery scores: 
 
 
B) Control participant (individuals with typical imagery) distribution of object and 
spatial imagery scores: 
 
Figure 2.1: Frequency histograms to depict the number and distribution of scores for 
aphantasic (A) and control (B) participant in the OSIQ questionnaire. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of OSIQ scores for both aphantasic (A) and control 
participants (B). Object scores provided by aphantasic participants ranged from 1- 2.4 
while spatial scores ranged from 1.2 - 4.6. Two aphantasic participants scored higher on 
the object scale (mean = 1.73, SD = 0) than the spatial scale (mean = 1.6, minimum = 















































1.53, maximum = 1.67, SD = 0.10). Another two aphantasic participants self-reported the 
same score for both subscales (mean = 1.97, minimum = 1.53, maximum = 2.4, SD = 
0.62). The remaining 110 (96%) aphantasic participants self-reported higher spatial 
scores (mean = 2.75, minimum = 1.29, maximum = 4.60, SD = 0.67) than object scores 
(mean = 1.38, minimum = 1, maximum = 2.40, SD = 0.24). The mean difference in scores 
between the two subscales was 1.36 (minimum = 0.07, maximum = 3.18, SD = 0.69).  
 
Control object scores ranged from 1.8 – 4.8, and spatial scores ranged from 1.4 – 4.4. In 
total, 30 controls self-reported higher scores for the spatial subscale (mean = 2.64,  
minimum = 2.13, maximum = 4.4, SD = 0.54)  than the object subscale (mean = 2.58, 
minimum = 1.73, maximum = 3.73, SD = 0.49), the mean difference in scores (mean = 
0.55, minimum = 0.07, maximum = 1.8, SD = 0.46). The majority of controls (n = 79, 
68%) self-reported higher scores for the object subscale (mean = 3.60, minimum = 1.73, 
maximum = 4.73, SD = 0.45) than the spatial subscale (mean = 2.64, minimum = 1.33, 
maximum = 3.87, SD = 0.54), the mean difference in scores between subscales (mean = 
0.95, minimum = 0.07, maximum = 3.06, SD = 0.63) The remaining 6 controls self-
reported the same score for both subscales (mean = 2.84, minimum = 2.53, maximum = 
3, SD = 0.18). 
 
2.1.3.2. OSIQ Analysis 
The scores provided by aphantasic and control participants for each subscale (object and 





Figure 2.2: Bar chart to depict the mean and error bars (representing the standard 
deviation) of self-report scores of object and spatial imagery by aphantasic and control 
participants. 
 
The results of a two-way mixed measures ANOVA with factors participant group 
(aphantasic/ control) and subscale of the OSIQ (spatial /object) showed a significant main 
effect of subscale (F(1, 225) = 55.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .20) with higher mean scores for the 
spatial than object subscale. There was also a significant main effect of participant group 
with controls providing higher scores than aphantasic participants (F(1, 225) = 315.60, p 
< .001 ηp2 = .58). There was a significant interaction between the subscales and 
participant group (F(1, 225) = 293.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .57).  
 
Post-hoc independent t-test of object scores (t(148.50) = 28.06, p < .001, d = 3.72) 
indicated that the controls scored significantly higher than aphantasic participants on the 
object subscale, while they did not differ on the spatial scores (t(225) = 0.75, p = .45, d = 



























participants (t(111) = 19.09, p < .001, d = 2.51) scored significantly higher for the spatial 
subscale than the object subscale, and the reverse was found in control participants (t(114) 
= -6.36, p < .001, d = .81), who scored significantly higher for the object subscale than 
the spatial subscale. These results show that aphantasic participants self-report higher for 
spatial than object imagery, while control participants scored higher for object than spatial 
imagery. Both participants groups provided similar spatial scores. 
 
Self-reported object and spatial OSIQ scores for aphantasic and control participants were 
correlated with the VVIQ using a Spearman correlation. In controls, the results showed a 
significant positive correlation between the VVIQ and the object subscale (r = .60, p < 
.001), and no significant correlation (r = .17, p = .07) in the spatial subscale. In aphantasic 
participants, there was no significant correlation between the VVIQ and the object 
subscale (r = .14, p = .14) and the spatial subscale (r = - .03, p = .78). These results suggest 
the more vivid experience of visual imagery, the higher the scores provided for object 
imagery in the OSIQ. 
 
2.1.4. Discussion  
Consistent with the findings from previous research (Keogh & Pearson, 2017; Dawes et 
al., 2020), aphantasic participants scored significantly lower for object imagery compared 
to spatial imagery in the OSIQ. In contrast, individuals with typical imagery showed the 
reverse pattern. According to Blajenkova et al. (2006), the individuals with typical 
imagery within this Experiment are object imagers, thus construct colourful, high-
resolution, picture-like images of individual objects. However, aphantasic participants 
show a preference for spatial, over object imagery, with very little variation in object 
imagery scores. The spatial scores provided by aphantasic participants were not 
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significantly different from the spatial scores provided by individuals with typical 
imagery. According to Blajenkova et al. (2006), this would suggest that the majority of 
aphantasic participants in this sample are classified as spatial imagers, and are therefore 
more likely to construct schematic representations of objects, create accurate spatial 
relations among objects and are able to perform complex spatial transformations 
(Blajenkova et al., 2006).  
 
Although the majority of controls showed a significant preference for object imagery, 30 
controls within the sample rated their spatial imagery higher than object imagery. This 
suggests there is variation within typical imagery experiences of imagery. There was a 
subset of participants who scored the same score on both subscales. According to 
Blajenkova et al. (2006) individuals who show a preference for either object or spatial 
imagery in the OSIQ do so because they are visualisers and adopt a visualiser cognitive 
style (Blajenkova et al., 2006; Kozhevnikov et al., 2005). However, it is not clear why 
participants may score the same for each subscale, in other words, do not show a 
preference for either object/spatial imagery construct. One speculatively reason may 
because these participants prefer to adopt other cognitive styles (rather than visualise), 
such as verbal cognitive styles. However, this cannot be confirmed as it is not known how 
verbalisers would score on the OSIQ measure and no verbal scales were included. 
Alternatively, this may have been due to a sampling error. Blajenkova et al. (2006) does 
not state how common it is to have spatial or object imagery. However, individuals who 
work within scientific professions were more likely to be spatial imagers, while those in 
professions associated with the visual arts are more likely to be object imagers 
(Blajenkova et al., 2006).  
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The low self-reported object imagery within individuals with aphantasia may suggest a 
deficiency/ issue in the ‘what’ pathway or components of this pathway, such as the early 
visual cortex. As yet, no studies have investigated aphantasics’ performance within a 
purely visual imagery battery. This is potentially due to the difficulty of separating visual 
and spatial (see Kosslyn, 1996; and see also Chapter 1 section 1.2.1). If individuals with 
aphantasia self-report intact spatial abilities and show a preference for spatial imagery 
(over object imagery) in the OSIQ, this is suggested to be a predictor for performance 
within spatial tasks (Blajenkova et al., 2006; Kozhevnikov et al., 2005).  
 
It has been suggested that imagery plays a functional role within visuospatial working 
memory. However, it remains to be explored whether spatial imagery alone can account 
for performance within visuospatial working memory tasks. If imagery does play a 
functional role within visuospatial working memory, then examining this role within 
individuals with aphantasia is of interest. If imagery does play a functional role in 
visuospatial working memory tasks, then differences in performance would be expected 
compared to individuals with typical imagery. This was found within the case study of AI 
who performed worse within the most difficult trials of a visuospatial working memory 
task compared to controls with typical imagery (Jacobs et al., 2017). The authors 
suggested that this was evidence to show that imagery is functionally involved in 
visuospatial working memory. However, these results were based on a single case study. 
Experiment 2 examines how a larger sample of individuals with aphantasia perform 
within the visuospatial working memory and imagery experimental paradigm, as outlined 
in Jacobs et al. (2017). 
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Experiment 2: Examining objective imagery and visuospatial 




In a case study by Jacobs et al. (2017), aphantasic participant AI undertook a battery of 
tasks including a working memory capacity battery, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale-IV and a novel visual working memory and matched imagery paradigm. The 
authors concluded that AI had unimpaired working memory ability and in a novel working 
memory and matched imagery paradigm, they only observed impaired performance in 
the working memory task. These differences were most apparent at the highest level of 
difficulty (Jacobs et al., 2017). Moreover, AI had lower metacognitive accuracy in that 
she provided higher confidence ratings for incorrect trials compared to control 
participants (Jacobs et al., 2017). The authors of the case study describe their working 
memory task as a visual working memory task. While the task does involve the 
maintenance of visual information in the form of the location of a static shape and target 
dot in relation to one another, this arguably also involves the storage of spatial location 
within working memory, (Foster, Bsales, Jaffe, & Awh, 2017; McCants, Katus, & Eimer, 
2019). Therefore, it cannot be purely visual despite the presentation of a static visual 
shape during the task. While spatial and visual working memory may be defined within 
the literature as separate constructs, they are often connected to the multiple-component 
working memory model (Baddeley & Hitch 1974; Logie 1995; 2003, see Chapter 1 
section 1.3.3), which suggests there is a relationship between visual and spatial working 
memory. Thus, identifying tasks that assess and distinguish purely between both 
constructs is challenging. This is because the relationship between visual and spatial 
working memory remains unclear (Sima, Schultheis, & Barkowsky, 2013) and spatial and 
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non-spatial features tend to be integrated (Foster et al., 2017; Luck & Vogel, 1997; 
McCants et al., 2019) thus difficult to separate through the use of behavioural paradigms 
(McCants et al., 2019).  
 
Nevertheless, some tasks have been suggested to rely more heavily on either spatial or 
visual working memory. For instance, the Corsi Blocks task, which assesses spatial 
locations and the Visual Matrix Patterns, which assesses shape size and colours (Della 
Sala et al., 1999; Logie & Pearson, 1997). However, it is argued that rather than load 
more or less heavily on each construct, the difference between such tasks rather reflects 
differences in the attention and executive resources required (Awh, Vogel, & Oh, 2006; 
Owen et al., 1998). For instance, the Corsi blocks task involves more dynamic processes 
compared to the visual matrix, which involves static processes (Rudkin, Pearson, & 
Logie, 2007). On paper, tasks may be defined through the literature as either as ‘visual’ 
or ‘spatial,’ suggesting they load more heavily on one construct than the other. However, 
in practice, it is difficult to separate these tasks into uniquely visual and uniquely spatial 
tasks, as in real-world settings, visual and spatial information is intertwined.  
 
Moreover, referring to a task as either ‘visual’ or ‘spatial’ does not necessarily reflect the 
additional executive resources recruited during working memory processes (Rudkin et 
al., 2007). The consideration of these additional processes is in line with other theories of 
working memory, such as the continuum model (Cornoldi, Rigoni, Venneri, & Vecchi, 
2000).  Briefly, this model suggests that tasks are defined by the level of manipulation 
required (along a vertical continuum) with tasks that require low levels of manipulation 
described as ‘passive’ tasks and higher levels of manipulation described as ‘active’ tasks 
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(Cornoldi et al., 2000). It is also noted within this model that visual and spatial processes 
are closely associated with one another (Cornoldi et al., 2000). 
 
One way that visual working memory has been defined in the literature is the active 
maintenance of visual information to serve the needs of the ongoing task (e.g. Luck & 
Vogel 2013). This definition suggests that the information is experienced visually (i.e. 
manifests as visually presented within working memory) but arguably this combines both 
visual and spatial processes and features. The difficulty in teasing apart differences 
between visual and spatial working memory is further supported by evidence from 
individuals who are congenitally blind who perform similar to sighted individuals within 
adapted visuospatial working memory tasks (see Chapter 1 section 1.2.4 for a discussion). 
Thus, until a clear distinction can be clearly defined within the research, working memory 
tasks concerning visual and spatial information (that are presented visually) must be 
visuospatial in nature. 
  
Luck and Vogel (2013) argued that one key concept of visuospatial working memory is 
that for sighted individuals, the experience of maintaining information must be visual in 
nature (as a result of the combination of both visual and spatial features). If the 
information is stored in a non-visual way, such as verbally, this cannot be considered 
visuospatial working memory (Luck & Vogel, 2013). Individuals who have more vivid 
visual imagery are more likely to engage in visual imagery as a cognitive tool to undertake 
visuospatial working memory tasks (Keogh & Pearson, 2011, 2014; Pearson & Keogh, 
2019). However, forming internal visual representations is not the only strategy an 
individual can adopt (Berger & Gaunitz, 1979; Gur & Hilgard, 1975; Harrison & Tong, 
2009) as other non-visual strategies can be used to perform within visuospatial working 
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memory tasks (Berger & Gaunitz, 1979; Gur & Hilgard, 1975). For instance, individuals 
may encode the visual stimulus using either phonological or propositional strategies, and 
these abstract or verbal forms can be subsequently compared to the test array – this 
strategy does not involve the generation of an internal ‘visual image’. This is in line with 
the view of Pearson and Keogh (2019), who argue that visual working memory should be 
re-defined to take into consideration the ‘strategies’ adopted by participants during a task, 
with the type of strategy adopted dependent on the demands of the task (Pearson & 
Keogh, 2019). These different processes within tasks explain why in some studies there 
is such variation of neural activity within different brain regions between participants 
(Miller, Donovan, Bennett, Aminoff, & Mayer, 2012; Miller et al., 2002), with some 
studies showing completely different neural networks activated depending on the type 
(i.e. visual vs verbal strategy) used (Logie, Pernet, Buonocore, & Della Sala, 2011; 
Sanfratello et al., 2014). In the case study by Jacobs et al. (2017), the authors did not ask 
AI what strategy she was using but inferred that it might have been a propositional or 
spatial strategy. Asking participants with regards to the strategies assumes that 
individuals have insight into their strategies. Reporting one’s strategy or processes 
adopted within a task involves conscious introspection on one’s own processes, and as 
such it may be difficult to provide accurate responses that reflect the true processes 
involved in a task.  
 
There has been much debate with regards to the role of imagery within visuospatial 
working memory (see Chapter 1, section 1.3 for a discussion). Within the case study 
denoted by Jacobs et al., (2017), AI undertook a novel experimental paradigm comprising 
of a ‘visual’ working memory task and matched imagery conditions. AI performed worse 
in the ‘visual’ working memory condition with no differences in the imagery condition. 
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Based on the results of Experiment 1 whereby individuals with aphantasia self-report 
poor object imagery, if the working memory task described by Jacobs et al. (2017) truly 
is visual in nature, one would expect individuals with aphantasia to be significantly 
impaired in the working memory condition compared to individuals with typical imagery. 
Comparing the performance of individuals with aphantasia in this experimental paradigm 
should provide a clearer understanding of the relationship between visuospatial working 
memory and imagery. If visual imagery (i.e. imagery concerning the pictorial visual 
appearances of objects) plays a key role within the visuospatial working memory task 
than differences in performance are expected compared to individuals with typical 
imagery. However, if visual imagery does not play a functional role within visuospatial 
working memory, then no differences in performance are expected. By definition, 
individuals with aphantasia self-report the inability to generate visual imagery thus are 
expected to show significantly impaired performance in the imagery condition compared 
to individuals with typical imagery. If no differences in performance are evident within 
the imagery task, then it may suggest that the task can be undertaken using a different 
form of imagery or process.  
 
2.2.2 Current study: Design 
In the original case study by Jacobs et al. (2017), both the visuospatial working memory 
(VSWM) task and a matching imagery (IM) task comprised of 8 blocks each. The 
visuospatial working memory condition was undertaken in the first testing session and 
the imagery condition undertaken during the second testing session.  
 
This experimental design was adopted by Experimenter Z; however, a programming error 
was encountered, resulting in different length blocks for each participant group (see Table 
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2.2). Specifically, the control task comprised of 8 blocks, while the aphantasic version 
comprised of 3 blocks. Thus, a new sample of control participants was recruited by an 
MSc student, Experimenter E. Experimenter Z supervised Experimenter E to ensure the 
same experimental procedure was adopted. This control data (collected by Experimenter 
E) was then compared to the aphantasic data (collected by Experimenter Z, see Table 2.2). 
As a result of this programming error, the paradigm is no longer identical (it has a 
different experimental design) to the task described in the case study by Jacobs et al. 
(2017).  
 
Programming error: Number of blocks (total trials in the task) 
 Participant group VSWM Task Imagery Task 
Case study by Jacobs et al., 
(2017) 
Controls 8 (144) 8 (144) 
Aphantasic 8 (144) 8 (144) 
Experimenter Z  
error in programming* 
Controls 8 (144) 8 (144) 
Aphantasic 3 (54) * 3 (54) * 
Experimenter E Controls 3 (54) 3 (54) 
 
Table 2.2: Table to denote the programming error encountered in the VSWM and IM 
conditions. Experimenter E only collected control data, which was then compared to the 
aphantasic* data collected by Experimenter Z. Analysis within this Experiment is 
undertake with the aphantasic and control data highlighted in grey. 
 
All aphantasic and control participants undertook the visuospatial working memory 
condition (in the first testing session) and an imagery condition (in a second session one 
week after undertaking the first session). The visuospatial working memory condition and 
imagery condition each had three levels of difficulty (that were the same in each task). 
The dependent variable was: accuracy and confidence of response (rating 1 = low 
confidence to 4 = highly confidence).  
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2.2.3 Methods 
2.2.3.1 Participants  
Twenty aphantasic participants were recruited by volunteer sampling (VVIQ ≤ 26). Of 
these participants, 7 were males and 13 were females, with a mean age of 40y0m (SD = 
8.92y). On the VVIQ, aphantasic participants scored a mean of 16.65 (minimum = 16, 
maximum = 24, SD = 1.95). On the Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR, Wechsler, 
2001, see Appendix 2.3), which provides a reliable estimate of intelligence (Mathias, 
Bowden, & Barrett-Woodbridge, 2007), aphantasic participants scored a mean of 43.35 
(SD = 3.01, Full-Scale IQ (FSIQ) mean = 108, SD = 3.21, see Appendix 2.4 for a 
breakdown of WTAR scores and predicted FSIQ).  
 
Twenty control participants (VVIQ < 32), 9 males and 11 females were recruited through 
volunteer and opportunity sampling, with a mean age of 36y3m (SD = 15.06y). On the 
VVIQ, the control participants scored an average of 55.35 (minimum = 34, maximum = 
74, SD = 11.79). On the WTAR, control participants scored a mean of 42.80 (SD = 7.64, 
FSIQ mean = 108.55, SD = 8.88). A Mann Whitney test (U = 163, p = .31, r = .16) showed 
no significant difference in WTAR score between the aphantasic and control participants.  
 
The Psychology Department Ethics Committee University of Westminster, UK, gave 
ethical approval and written informed consent for these control participants were also 
obtained. 
 
2.2.3.2. Materials  
Weschler Adult Reading Test (WTAR) 
The Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR, see Appendix 2.3) comprises of 50 words 
that have atypical grapheme to phoneme translations. Participants are asked to read each 
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word aloud. WTAR scores are calculated by counting the number of correctly pronounced 
spoken words.  
 
Visuospatial working memory (VSWM) and imagery (IM) paradigm  
This task drew on the same methodology as Jacobs et al. (2017). During the VSWM 
condition, participants were shown one of three shapes and asked to recall the shape after 
a short delay. This condition acted as a training session for the IM condition, which was 
undertaken after a delay of one week following the VSWM condition. In this IM 
condition, participants were not shown the shapes but had to recall the shapes from long 
term memory from the previous session.  
 
In the VSWM condition, each trial began with the presentation of the name of a geometric 
shape (either a diamond, triangle or parallelogram), which was displayed for 500ms. 
Following the 500ms, the corresponding shape appeared in the centre of the screen for 
1500ms before it disappeared. This was followed by a square of visual noise that appeared 
on the screen for 200ms to prevent the generation of an afterimage. After a 4000ms delay 
period, a small (2 x 2 pixels) black dot appeared on the screen. In both conditions, 
participants were instructed to indicate by button pressing (left = ‘IN’ and right arrow = 
‘OUT’ keys), whether they thought the small dot appeared ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the 
boundary of the original geometric shape. After each trial, participants were asked to 
indicate the confidence in their response on a scale of 1-4 (1 = no confidence, 4 = high 
confidence). Three levels of difficulty were created by presenting the target dot at three 
different distances from the outer contours of the original shape stimulus.  
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The IM condition was identical to the VSWM condition (see Figure 2.3), except 
participants were only shown the name of the geometric shape (not the shape itself). The 
name of the shape appeared within the four placeholders that marked the area of the visual 
field where the stimuli would have typically appeared. There were 3 blocks within the 
VSWM and IM condition, each block comprising of 18 trials, with a total of 54 trials 
within the task. The VSWM began with a 9 trial practice block prior to the experimental 










Figure 2.3: Diagram to depict the visual working memory (VSWM) and imagery (IM) 
conditions, from Jacobs et al. 2017.  
 
2.2.3.3.   Procedure 
Participants who expressed an interest in the study were sent the information sheet, 
consent form and briefed by email regarding the nature of the study, and also asked to 
complete the VVIQ. Aphantasic data collected within this Experiment was part of a wider 
battery of tasks (described in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, see Figure 3.1 for an overview). 
Both aphantasic and control participants were invited to undertake the first testing 
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session, during which, participants provided written informed consent (see Appendix 2.5 
and Appendix 3.3). Subsequently, participants undertook the WTAR whereby they were 
asked to read the words aloud; at a pace they felt comfortable. Following the WTAR, 
participants undertook the VSWM condition. In the VSWM condition, participants were 
verbally instructed that they would be presented with a shape and a dot, and would have 
to determine if the dot fell inside or outside the boundary of the shape, as well as indicate 
their confidence. Participants first undertook the practice of the task, followed by the 
experimental trials. The task was undertaken in the dark (lights switched off), and the 
experimenter stayed in the room only for the practice block and left the room for the 
experimental trials. Participants returned one week following their first visit and during 
this second session undertook the IM condition. This task was also undertaken in the dark, 
and the condition instructions varied slightly between participants: aphantasic individuals 
were asked to ‘recall or retrieve the shape from memory’ whereas controls were asked to 
‘retrieve the shape from memory or imagine the shape.’ At the end of the second session, 
participants were thanked for their time and provided with a written debrief and a £20 
voucher as thanks for their participation. 
 
2.2.3.4.  Data transformations 
Throughout this thesis, the following data transformations are used (where stated) and 
this transformed data is used for subsequent statistical analysis. The mean differences 
provided in conjunction with post-hoc analysis reflect values from the non-transformed 






A Box-cox transformation is a power transformation used to modify the distributional 
shape of continuous positive data, necessary for statistical analysis, which require 
normality as an assumption, such as analysis of variance (ANOVA) (Box & Cox, 1964). 
In this transformation, the transformation parameter lambda (l) is estimated (in this case 
it is estimated on MATLAB between -5 minimum, and 5 maximum, in step sizes of .01) 
based on the lower and upper bound confidence intervals of the data using the formula: 
Data (l) = Datal - 1 
               l 
On a normality plot, the appropriate l is one that shifts the data distribution curve to a 
normal distribution. In this thesis, Box-cox transformations are used to transform non-
normally distributed data (e.g. reaction time data). 
 
Rationalised Arcsine transformation  
A rationalised arcsine transformation is used to transform non-normally distributed data 
for use in parametric statistical tests (such as ANOVA) (Studebaker, 1985). It is typically 
used on proportional data, whereby the range is bounded at 0 or 1. Undertaken on 
MATLAB, the arcsine transformation linearises the proportions and converts them to 
rational arcsine units (RAU). The effect of this transformation is that it ‘pulls out’ the 
ends of the distribution. Linear tests are performed on these RAU values. In this thesis, a 
rationalised arcsine transformation is used to transform the distribution of accuracy data 
that is bounded at 1. 
 
 
2.2.4. Results  
In instances where data is not normally distributed (e.g. Shapiro-Wilk < 0.05), data is 
transformed where stated. Where sphericity cannot be assumed, a Greenhouse-Geisser 
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correction is used. All t-tests are 2-tailed. A Bonferroni-Holm correction was used where 
stated for multiple tests and adjusted p-values are reported. 
 
2.2.4.1. Experimenter confounds and practice effects 
To address experimenter confounds (i.e. differences between data collected due to two 
different experimenters, Z and E), control participant performance was compared 
between the first three blocks of the data collected by Z to the performance of controls 
collected by E, see Table 2.3. 
 
 Accuracy and confidence for Experimenter: Z and E 
 Experimenter original: Z Experimenter MSc: E 
Condition Z: 8 blocks Z: 3 blocks E: 3 blocks  
VSWM Accuracy 0.87 (0.05) 0.85 (0.05) 0.85 (0.06) 
VSWM Confidence / 4 3.13 (0.32) 3.12 (0.37) 3.15 (0.46) 
IM Accuracy 0.86 (0.04) 0.85 (0.07) 0.86 (0.07) 
IM Confidence / 4 3.16 (0.35) 3.08 (0.40) 3.05 (0.43) 
 
Table 2.3: Table to show the comparison of control performance and confidence (out of 
4) within the first 3 blocks of the visuospatial working memory (VSWM) condition and 
the imagery (IM) condition between Experimenters Z and E. Average accuracy and 
confidence is also included for comparison for controls performance in the full 8 blocks 
(collected by Experimenter Z). 
 
To check for experimenter bias within the two condition, 3 block performance was 
compared (between Experimenters Z and E). A 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with factors 
condition (VSWM / IM) and experimenter (Experimenter E 3 blocks / Experimenter Z 3 
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blocks) showed no significant main effect of condition (F(1, 38) = 0.43, p = .52, ηp2 = 
.01) or experimenter (F(1, 38) = 0.07, p = .78, ηp2 = .002), and there was no significant 
interaction between the experimenter and condition (F(1, 38) = .07, p = .79, ηp2 = .002). 
This suggests that the effect of experimenter did not influence controls performance 
within the VSWM and IM conditions. 
 
To explore whether controls would perform better (due to more practice in the VSWM 
condition) with 8 blocks compared to 3 blocks (within the control data collected by 
Experimenter Z), a repeated measures t-test showed no significant difference in accuracy 
(t(19) = 2.03, p = .06, d = .40) in controls accuracy at block 3 and block 8. This suggests 
that in the data collected by Experimenter Z, whereby controls were presented with 8 
blocks within the VSWM condition, this additional practice in the task did not 
significantly improve accuracy.  
 
To explore whether the effect of additional practice on the IM condition (i.e. controls who 
experienced 8 blocks in the VSWM condition during the first week compared to controls 
who experienced 3 blocks), IM accuracy was compared (8 blocks collected by 
Experimenter Z compared to the three blocks as collected by Experimenter E). A 2 x 2 
mixed ANOVA with factors condition (VSWM / IM) and block length (Experimenter E 
3 blocks / Experimenter Z 8 blocks) showed no significant main effect of condition (F(1, 
38) = 0.02, p = .89, ηp2 = .001) or block length (F(1, 38) = .31, p = .58, ηp2 = .01) and no 
significant interaction between condition and block length (F(1, 38) = .88, p = .35, ηp2 = 
.02). This suggests that controls who were exposed to 8 blocks within the VSWM 
condition (therefore more practice within the condition), were not at an advantage during 
the IM condition compared those controls who only experienced 3 blocks. All further 
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analysis of this experimental paradigm will be carried out with the control data collected 
by Experimenter E. 
 
2.2.4.2. Accuracy 
Accuracy data for the visuospatial working memory and imagery conditions were 
transformed using an arcsine transformation (Studebaker, 1985). Mean accuracy in the 
two conditions (at the different levels of difficulty) were compared between aphantasic 
and control participants (see Figure 2.4).  
 
Figure 2.4: Line graph to depict the mean proportional accuracy and error bars 
(representing the standard deviation) of aphantasic and control participants in the 
visuospatial working memory (VSWM) and matched imagery (IM) condition. 
 
A 2 x 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA with factors participant group (aphantasic/ control), condition 
(VSWM / IM) and difficulty (easy/ medium/ hard) showed a significant main effect of 
difficulty (F(2, 76) = 114.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .75), with lower accuracy with increasing 

























level of difficulty. Post hoc tests using Bonferroni-Holm correction for multiple 
comparison, revealed a significant pairwise difference in accuracy between easy and 
medium difficulty with a mean difference in accuracy of 0.05 (p < .001), easy and hard 
difficulty with a mean difference in accuracy of 0.23 (p < .001) and medium and hard 
difficulty with a mean difference in accuracy of 0.18 (p < .001). There was no significant 
main effect of condition (F(1, 38) = 2.36, p = .13, ηp2 = .32) or group (F(1, 38) = 0.73, p 
= .40, ηp2 = .02). There was a significant interaction between condition and group 
(F(1,38) = 4.54, p =.04, ηp2 = .11), and no significant interaction between difficulty and 
group (F(2,76) = 2.72, p = .07, ηp2 = .07) no other interactions were significant (all p > 
.89). Breaking down the interaction between condition and group, post-hoc independent 
t-test of accuracy in the VSWM condition (t(38) = .22, p = .82, d = .07) indicated no 
differences in accuracy between the two participant groups, while in the IM condition 
(t(38) = 2.40, p = .02, d = .76) aphantasic participants were less accurate in the IM 
condition than control participants. A within-subjects t-test showed that aphantasic 
participants (t(19) = 2.25, p = .04, d = .32) performed significantly worse on the IM 
condition than the VSWM condition, there was no significant difference in performance 
between the conditions in control participants (t(19) = -.80, p = .44, d = 0.11). These 
results suggest that aphantasic participants were less accurate in the IM condition, with 
no differences in accuracy to controls in the VSWM condition. 
 
2.2.4.3. Confidence ratings 
Confidence data for the VSWM and IM conditions were transformed using a BoxCox 
transformation (Box & Cox, 1964). Confidence ratings provided in the two conditions (at 
the different levels of difficulty) were compared between aphantasic and control 
participants (see Figure 2.5).   
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Figure 2.5: Line graph to depict the mean confidence ratings and error bars (representing 
the standard deviation) of aphantasic and control participants in the visuospatial working 
memory (VSWM) and matched imagery (IM) conditions. Confidence ratings were on a 
scale of 1 (low confidence) to 4 (high confidence). 
 
A 2 x 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA with factors participant group (aphantasic/ control), condition 
(VSWM/IM) and difficulty (easy/ medium/ hard) showed a significant main effect of 
condition (F(1,38) = 11.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .24) with both participant groups more 
confident of their responses in the VSWM condition than the IM condition and a 
significant main effect of difficulty (F(2,76) = 74.0. p < .001, ηp2 = .66). Post hoc tests 
using the Bonferroni-Holm correction for multiple comparison, revealed a significant 
pairwise difference in confidence between easy and medium difficulty with a mean 
difference in confidence of 0.31 (p < .001), easy and hard difficulty with a mean 
difference in confidence of 0.59 (p < .001) and medium and hard difficulty with a mean 
difference in confidence of 0.28 (p < .001). There was a significant main effect of 
participant group (F(1,38) = 7.60, p = .009, ηp2 = .17) with aphantasic participants rating 





















lower confidence in their responses in both tasks compared to control participants. There 
was also a significant interaction between participant group, difficulty and condition 
(F(2,76) = 6.69, p = .002, ηp2 =.15). All other interactions were not significant (p > .19).  
 
To explore this interaction, the confidence ratings in the VSWM and IM conditions, at 
each level of difficulty were compared between aphantasic and control participants. In 
the VSWM, independent t-tests with Bonferroni-Holm correction for multiple tests, 
showed a significant difference in confidence at hard (t(38) = 3.62, p = .003, d = 1.03) 
and medium difficulty (t(38) = 2.23, p = .006, d = .70) and no evidence of a difference at 
the easy difficulty level (p > .43), suggesting that aphantasic participants were 
significantly less confident in their responses with increasing difficulty (where more 
precision is required) compared to controls. In the IM condition, independent t-tests with 
Bonferroni-Holm correction showed a significant difference during the easy level of 
difficulty (t(38) = 3.21, p = .009, d = .92), and hard difficulty level (t(38) = 2.30, p = 0.05, 
d = .73) and no significant difference at medium difficulty levels (p > .10). These results 
suggest that aphantasic participants were less confident in their responses in both tasks 
especially during the most difficult trials, compared to control participants. 
 
2.2.4.4. Metacognitive accuracy  
Metacognitive accuracy (i.e. the mean difference in confidence ratings7 provided during 
incorrect and correct trials) were calculated for both participant groups in the VSWM and 
IM conditions. This value shows the difference in confidence ratings when a participant 
is when making a correct and incorrect responses (Jacobs et al., 2017; see Figure 2.6).  
                                               
7 This is calculated by subtracting the confidence ratings provided during incorrect trials from the 
confidence ratings provided during correct trials. 
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Figure 2.6: Bar chart to show aphantasic and control participants’ mean metacognitive 
accuracy and error bars (representing the standard deviation) in the visuospatial working 
memory (VSWM) and matched imagery (IM) conditions. 
 
A two-way mixed measures ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser correction with factors 
participant group (aphantasic/ control) and condition (VSWM/IM) showed no significant 
main effect of condition (F(1,38) = .71, p = .40, ηp2 = .02) or participant group (F(1,38) 
= .74, p = .40, ηp2 = .03) and no significant interaction between participant group and 
condition (F(1,38) = 1.30, p = .26, ηp2 = .03). This suggests there is no difference in 
metacognitive accuracy in aphantasic and control participants within the two conditions.  
 
2.2.5. Discussion 
Experiment 2 investigated aphantasic participants’ performance within a visuospatial 
working memory and imagery paradigm with the purpose of understanding the 
relationship between the two functions. By testing individuals with aphantasia, who self-
report the inability to generate visual imagery, the findings suggest that a lack of visual 




























contradictory to the performance of participant AI (Jacobs et al., 2017). The results of 
Experiment 2 showed that within a larger sample of aphantasic participants, no 
differences in performance were apparent in the visuospatial working memory condition 
with differences apparent in the imagery condition. Aphantasic participants reported 
significantly lower confidence across both conditions than participants with typical 
imagery. This suggests that aphantasic participants’ experience of undertaking the two 
task conditions was different compared to controls. Furthermore, there were no 
differences in metacognitive accuracy, which also contradict the findings of Jacobs et al. 
(2017).  
 
Although these results show the reverse effect as reported by Jacobs et al. (2017), the 
number of trials within the current experiment were significantly less than that reported 
in the case study. The number of trials that the aphantasic participants were exposed to in 
the visuospatial working memory condition was significantly less than the number of 
trials that AI undertook. This means that the aphantasic participants within this 
Experiment had less training or exposure to the shapes presented within the visuospatial 
working memory condition. This lack of exposure or training may have influenced 
performance within the imagery condition and may be a reason as to why differences in 
accuracy were apparent within the imagery condition. On the other hand, it should be 
noted that there were no differences in control participants’ accuracy in the 3 block 
version compared to the 8 block version in either condition of the task (see Table 2.3). 
This might suggest that this lesser exposure during the VSWM condition (i.e. of only 3 
blocks) cannot account for the less accurate performance as exhibited by the aphantasic 
participants in the IM condition. Similarly, this lesser exposure within the visuospatial 
working memory condition may explain why the aphantasic participants reported 
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significantly lower confidence in their responses in the imagery condition (in line with 
lower confidence in the IM condition as provided by control participants at 3 blocks 
compared to 8 blocks, see Table 2.3). However, differences in block length cannot explain 
the reasons as to why the confidence ratings provided by aphantasics participants were 
also lower in the VSWM condition. Collectively, this may suggest that the design of the 
paradigm may influence performance to some extent in the IM condition, but it cannot 
fully explain the performance differences exhibited by aphantasic participants. 
 
The authors of the experimental paradigm referred to their task as a ‘visual’ working 
memory task (Jacobs et al., 2017). It was predicted, that if the task were indeed purely 
visual in nature, then it would be expected that individuals with aphantasia would perform 
poorly. This was expected due to the lower scores provided on the object imagery scale 
of the OSIQ in Experiment 1, which would predict poor performance in visual tasks. 
However, within the current experiment, no difference in accuracy was evident within 
the working memory condition, suggesting that the task cannot rely purely on object 
imagery, but is visuospatial in nature. Experiment 1 showed that individuals with 
aphantasia self-reported intact spatial imagery, and this has been documented within other 
studies (Dawes et al., 2020). Therefore, one possible speculation is that individuals with 
aphantasia may be using spatial imagery within the task, in the absence of a visual 
component. The use of spatial imagery within the task leads to accurate performance that 
is comparable to individuals with typical imagery.  
 
The visuospatial working memory task used within this experimental paradigm has a low 
working memory load and complexity, which may also explain why no differences in 
performance were apparent within this condition. During the task, participants have to 
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hold or maintain an outline of one of three shapes for less than five seconds, which 
requires no further manipulation of the stored information, but a response in terms of the 
location of a dot in relation to the shape. In terms of the revised visuospatial working 
memory model, this static information would be stored within the visual cache for use in 
the task when required (Logie, 1995). This task could also be described as a passive 
working memory task whereby task information needs to be recalled in the way in that it 
was presented (Vecchi, Richardson, & Cavallini, 2005). Due to the low working memory 
load of this task, for controls, they likely engage in visual imagery to maintain the shape 
visually in working memory. In the absence of any additional manipulation or secondary 
interference and limited working memory load, aphantasic participants can use spatial 
imagery. If individuals with aphantasia perform similar to controls within passive tasks, 
specifically tasks with low working memory load, it remains to be explored how 
individuals with aphantasia would perform within more complex visuospatial tasks that 
require active maintenance and manipulation of larger amounts of visuospatial 
information. Such tasks would test the nature of aphantasics’ internal representations, 
with the expectation of a difference in performance if aphantasic participants adopt 
different (non-imagery) processes within tasks compared to participants with typical 
imagery. Moreover, in terms of the multicomponent theory of working memory, it has 
been proposed that the maintenance of highly detailed visuospatial information may 
involve the repeat generation of the image within the visual buffer (Darling et al., 2009), 
a structure where images are thought to be consciously experienced (Pearson, 2001). As 
such, within tasks that require active maintenance and manipulation of larger amounts of 
visuospatial information performance differences may be expected between aphantasic 
and typical imagery individuals. 
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Within the imagery version of the task, there was a significant difference in performance 
between aphantasic and control participants, which is in contrast to the performance with 
participant AI (Jacobs et al., 2017). There are two differences between the imagery 
version of the task and the working memory version. Firstly, instead of being shown the 
image of the shape (as in the working memory version of the task), participants are shown 
only the name of the shape, i.e. ‘triangle’ (and must recall the shape in question) and base 
this representation on the positioning of the dot (either inside or outside the shape). 
Secondly, the recall is made more difficult owing to the length of time between the two 
tasks, with the imagery version of the task being undertaken one week after the working 
memory version. Thus the shapes presented from the first testing session need to be 
recalled from long-term memory within the second testing session (Brady, Konkle, & 
Alvarez, 2011; Cowan, 2009; Schurgin, 2018). If controls are engaging in visual imagery, 
recall of the shape is drawn from long-term memory, and this information is held in the 
visual buffer for subsequent inspection and transformation (Riddoch, 1990). In this case, 
the transformation would include comparing the spatial location of the visual dot to the 
mental representation of the shape. This is a conscious visuospatial experience, and a 
number of studies have shown that visual long-term memory can store objects in high 
detail (Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2008; Konkle, Brady, Alvarez, & Olivia, 2010; 
Spachtholz & Kuhbandner, 2017). Within trials of the hardest level of difficulty, the 
judgement of the position of the dot is more difficult as it appears closest to the boundary 
of the shape. Although spatial imagery is one possible option available to aphantasic 
participants, it is not known if they used this within the imagery condition. The results of 
the imagery condition would suggest, however, that the processes adopted by aphantasic 
participants are not conducive to scenarios where information has to be held over a longer 
period of time. As a result, aphantasic participants perform worse in the imagery 
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condition. Although, it should be noted that overall accuracy is high within the task (i.e. 
not at floor or below chance), suggesting the task can be undertaken in other ways or 
speculatively, they may be undertaking the task in the same way as typical imagers, but 
in a lesser capacity. 
 
This difference in processes and lack of internal visual representations may also explain 
why aphantasic participants self-reported to be less confident in both conditions 
compared to controls with typical imagery. The fact that aphantasic participants report 
significantly lower confidence ratings than control participants would suggest that their 
experience of undertaking the task is different to controls, yet accuracy within the 
conditions is similar. In terms of the imagery condition, controls who may experience 
recall of the shape from long term memory as a visual experience, may as a consequence, 
be more confident with regards to their responses than aphantasic participants. In 
addition, participant AI showed a lower metacognitive accuracy (Jacobs et al., 2017) 
suggesting differences in confidence for incorrect and correct trials. However, within a 
large sample, there were no differences in metacognitive accuracy between aphantasic 
and control participants with typical imagery. This further shows the importance of 
replication within behavioural studies. 
 
2.2.6. Chapter conclusion 
This Chapter examined two key findings; one finding from a published case study and 
another finding from a study comprising of a small aphantasic participant sample, to 
explore whether the results obtained could be replicated. Imagery questionnaires such as 
the OSIQ challenge the notion that visual imagery is a unitary construct, and explores 
individual self-reported preferences for object and spatial imagery. Experiment 1 showed, 
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that within a large sample, aphantasic participants self-reported higher spatial imagery 
scores compared to object imagery scores, suggesting their spatial imagery abilities are 
intact. Such a preference was not present in individuals with typical imagery, who showed 
a preference for object imagery (i.e. imagery that is highly pictorial and colourful) than 
spatial imagery. Although it should be noted there was variability within this sample, with 
a proportion of controls reporting a higher score for spatial imagery (than object imagery). 
This illustrates the variability of imagery within typical imagery experiences. Further, in 
control participants, a positive and significant correlation was evident between object 
subscale OSIQ and VVIQ scores, suggesting that these measure similar constructs.  
 
Experiment 2 adopted the experimental design as denoted in the case study by Jacobs et 
al. (2017) who showed that participant AI had impaired performance in the visuospatial 
working memory task. The results of Experiment 2 contradict these findings. In a larger 
sample, there was no difference in accuracy in the visuospatial working memory 
condition compared to controls with typical imagery. However, there was a significant 
difference in performance in the imagery version of the task. Confidence ratings provided 
by aphantasic participants were significantly lower in both conditions compared to the 
confidence ratings provided by participants with typical imagery. This suggests that the 
experience of undertaking the task was different; however, it did not result in vast 
differences in accuracy. Reasons for these differences were discussed in terms of 
differences in processes adopted by both participant groups. For controls, who have 
access to visual imagery, they are able to encode an accurate representation of the shapes 
in the task that are then recalled at a later date during the imagery condition. However, 
for aphantasic participants, their processes are not adequate over long periods of time. 
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Further exploration is required within visuospatial working memory and matched 
imagery paradigms. 
 
There are a number of outstanding questions remaining from these experiments. In the 
current experiment, individuals with aphantasia performed as well as individuals with 
typical imagery in the visuospatial working memory condition. However, this task 
comprised of a low working memory load and required little manipulation. Thus, it 
remains to be explored how individuals with aphantasia would perform in tasks that 
require the maintenance and active manipulation of large amounts of visuospatial 
information. In addition, if individuals with aphantasia self-report a lack of visual imagery 
in the VVIQ, and a preference for spatial imagery over object imagery, it also remains to 
be explored as to whether the reasons for such self-reports can be attributed to by 
variances in personality or different cognitive profile. The ability to introspect on one’s 
experiences is prone to error (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2011). Moreover, responses 
provided on self-report measures may also be mediated by other variables, such as 
personality traits (e.g. Buchanan, 2015). Similarly, high imagers and low imagers have 
been shown to have different cognitive profiles (Marks, 1973; McKelvie & Demers, 
1979). In the aphantasia literature, cognitive performance has only examined so far at a 
case study level (Zeman et al., 2010) and it is not yet understood whether congenital 
aphantasia is associated with a more general neuropsychological deficit. Whether 
individuals with aphantasia have a certain personality profile or general 
neuropsychological deficit that may explain their self-reported experience of a lack of 
visual imagery will be the focus of the following Chapter.  
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Chapter 3: Can aphantasia be explained through 
differences in personality or cognitive profiles? 
 
General Summary  
The Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) is typically used to identify 
individuals with aphantasia; however, introspection of imagery is difficult, and 
personality traits may modulate responses. It is also not clear whether individuals with 
aphantasia show broader cognitive deficits or differences within other memory domains. 
Similarly, no study has yet explored whether self-reported differences are linked to 
variances in personality or cognitive profiles (although see Milton et al., submitted). 
Experiment 3 examines the personality profiles of individuals with aphantasia (n = 20) 
through the Big Five Inventory (BFI), a measure for personality traits: extraversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism and openness. The results showed that 
aphantasic and control participants differed only in their levels of agreeableness, which 
might be accounted for by a recruitment bias. Experiment 4 explored cognitive 
performance within four tasks selected from the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test 
Automated Battery (CANTAB): Verbal Recognition Memory (VRM), Pattern 
Recognition Memory (PRM), Spatial Span (SSP) and One Touch Stocking of Cambridge 
(OTS). When compared by group, the results showed no differences in accuracy between 
aphantasic and typical imager participants. However, aphantasic participants took 
significantly longer to respond at more demanding levels of difficulty during the OTS. A 
secondary analysis examined individual profiles of cognitive performance and revealed 
four possible subgroups. In summary, these results suggest that the personality and 
cognitive profile of people without imagery do not greatly differ from those with typical 
imagery when examined by group. However, observed differences were apparent with 
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increased working memory load. Subgroups of aphantasia were identified, suggesting 
that some aphantasic individuals may experience more specific cognitive deficits. 
 
General Introduction 
The most significant findings of Chapter 2 stem from self-report measures. In the Object 
Spatial Imagery Questionnaire (OSIQ), aphantasic participants scored significantly lower 
on the object imagery than spatial imagery subscale. This finding suggests that their 
spatial abilities are similar to that of individuals with typical imagery, which may explain 
why aphantasic participants displayed normal performance within a visuospatial working 
memory task (Experiment 2). Although officially identified in 2015, there are still many 
questions about the underlying mechanisms of aphantasia. One possibility that has not 
yet been explored is whether the phenomena of aphantasia is linked with differences in 
other traits and processes that are not necessarily associated with imagery. De Vito and 
Bartolomeo (2016) suggested in their commentary that aphantasia had psychogenic 
origins, proposing a loss of visual imagery may be accompanied by psychiatric disorders 
such as, depression, anxiety or depersonalisation disorder. De Vito and Bartolomeo 
(2016) also detailed that prior to the onset of Monsieur X’s inability to visualise, he had 
experienced mental alienation or stress resulting in anxiety and low mood (see Chapter 
1, section 1.4.1). The current published aphantasia research studies document individuals 
who report a life-long inability (which is stable rather than variable) to form voluntary 
visual imagery, which would suggest that aphantasia is unlikely to have a 
psychopathological origin (e.g. Bainbridge et al., 2020; Dawes et al., 2020, Keogh & 
Pearson, 2017; Wicken et al., submitted; Zeman et al., 2016; Zeman et al., 2015). 
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Individuals with aphantasia self-report a difference in their conscious experience of visual 
imagery, but investigations have not yet established whether there is more than one 
aetiology that may account for this contrasting experience compared to individuals with 
typical imagery. This will be investigated by exploring group differences in personality 
and cognitive performance, as well as reviewing individual cognitive profiles. This 
Chapter therefore explores two possible, and so far, unexamined possibilities. The first is 
whether individuals with aphantasia have differing personality profiles (Experiment 3). 
The second, aphantasic participants may exhibit differing cognitive profiles and reveal 
impairments in cognitive processes (Experiment 4).  
 
In both Experiment 1 and 2 (and typically within the aphantasic literature, see Chapter 2, 
Experiment 1, Table 2.1), the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) was 
used to identify individuals with aphantasia. However, one of the main criticisms 
regarding the use of the VVIQ within studies is with regards to its validity, for example, 
participants may respond with the vividness that is most socially desirable instead of 
report their true ability (McKelvie, 1995; McKelvie & Rohrberg, 1978). Similarly, the 
process of introspection is prone to error (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2011), and it is highly 
subjective. Its subjectivity gives rise to the fact that responses may be mediated by other 
variables, such as personality traits. For instance, self-reported ‘problems’ correlate with 
the trait neuroticism (Buchanan, 2015). Similarly, many studies have suggested a 
correlation between vivid imagery and the trait extraversion (Gralton, Hayes, & 
Richardson, 1979; McDougall & Pfeifer, 2012; McLean, 1969; Morris & Gale, 1974; 
Riding & Dyer, 1980; Strelow & Davidson, 2002). Experiment 3 will examine whether 
individuals with aphantasia have differing personality profiles. 
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On the other hand, aphantasic individuals may have genuinely different visual imagery 
experiences because of variances in their underlying neuropsychology. Of course, it is 
not possible to establish a causal direction: are aphantasic individuals worse at memory 
tasks because they cannot hold an image in their mind? Or can they not hold an image in 
mind because they have impairments in their memory system? There is evidence to 
suggest that high imagers and low imagers have different cognitive profiles. Vivid 
imagers (those who have vivid imagery) are thought to have an advantage (compared to 
lesser vivid imagers) on visual and verbal memory recall tasks (Marks, 1973; McKelvie 
& Demers, 1979). So far, cognitive performance has only been examined at a case study 
level; for instance, with patient MX who performed normally on a range of executive 
function tasks (Zeman et al., 2010). Nevertheless, MX had acquired aphantasia, and his 
lack of imagery arose following coronary angioplasty. Thus, the origins of his loss of 
imagery are thought to be different from that of individuals with congenital aphantasia. 
It should be noted, however, that MX’s sudden loss of ability to generate visual imagery 
could not be explained through neurological assessments (which were normal) or 
apparent differences within structural MRI scans. Although MX had acquired aphantasia 
and performed normally within executive function tasks, no studies have explored how a 
larger sample of individuals with congenital aphantasia perform on a battery of cognitive 
tasks. Moreover, it is not known whether their absence of imagery is associated with any 
other general neuropsychological deficits. This will be explored in Experiment 4. If 
neuropsychological differences are apparent, this may help to understand why the 
subjective imagery experiences of individuals with aphantasia differ compared to those 
with typical experiences.  
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Experiment 3: Do personality differences explain aphantasia? 
 
3.1.1. Introduction 
The standard way of measuring an individual’s experience of visual imagery is through 
self-reports. These ask individuals to rate scenarios with regards to their own imagery 
experience. For instance, vividness - refers to the clarity and luminance of a mental image 
(Pearson, Beni, & Cornoldi, 2001) and can be measured specifically in the visual domain 
using the VVIQ (Marks, 1973). Although aphantasia is typically identified through the 
VVIQ, there is no defined cut-off score for typical and atypical self-reports of imagery 
(Zeman et al., 2015). There are arguably more objective methods for identifying 
individuals with aphantasia (Keogh & Pearson, 2017; Wicken et al., submitted). 
However, these methods are time-consuming to undertake and do not provide immediate 
feedback as to whether an individual has aphantasia, unlike the VVIQ. Imagery vividness 
as self-reported by the VVIQ has been shown to correlate with objective measures both 
behaviourally and through neuroimaging (Cui et al., 2007; Pearson, Rademaker, & Tong, 
2011), with high and low vivid imagers showing different patterns of brain activation 
(Fulford et al., 2018). 
 
While the VVIQ correlates to objective measures of visual performance (Cui et al., 2007; 
Fulford et al., 2018), its inherently subjective nature raises questions on its susceptibility 
to various mediating factors and influences. For example, participants may respond in a 
manner that is socially most desirable (McKelvie, 1995; McKelvie & Rohrberg, 1978). 
The relationship between personality and self-reported vividness has been documented in 
a number of studies (Gralton et al., 1979; Morris & Gale, 1974; Riding & Dyer, 1980; 
Strelow & Davidson, 2002). A recent study found a positive correlation between the 
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degree of extraversion and self-reports of the vividness of visual imagery; however, this 
did not translate to better performance on a recall task (McDougall & Pfeifer, 2012). 
McDougall and Pfeifer (2012) suggested these differences in self-reported visual imagery 
might be due to differences in impulsion between extroverts and introverts. Previously, 
differences in performance between extroverts and introverts were proposed to be due to 
the arousal theory (Eysenck, 1967; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985), with an enhanced cortical 
arousal in introverts who also scored high for the trait neuroticism (Eysenck, 1976). 
Neuroticism, in particular, is associated with more negative self-perceived health (Magee, 
Heaven, & Miller, 2013). Personality traits may thus modulate responses on self-report 
measures such as the VVIQ and thus influence the ‘identification’ of aphantasia. This is 
another relationship that remains to be explored. If personality traits modulate self-reports 
of aphantasia, then there will be differences in personality profiles between individuals 




Twenty aphantasic participants8 (VVIQ ≤ 26) recruited by volunteer sampling took part 
in the study (these are the same aphantasic participants as described in Chapter 2, 
Experiment 2 section 2.2.3.1). Briefly, 7 were males, and 13 were females, with a mean 
age of 40y0m (SD = 8.92y). On the VVIQ they scored a mean of 16.65 (SD = 1.95, lowest 
score = 16, highest score = 24). On the Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR), they 
scored a mean of 43.35 (SD 3.01,Full-scale IQ (FSIQ) mean = 108 (SD = 3.21). See 
Appendix 3.1 for the full WTAR predicted equivalence to FSIQ score by participant.  
                                               
8 As documented in Chapter 2, Table 2.1 the largest sample size of aphantasic participants detailed within 
published studies at the outset of this data collection was 15. A sample size of 20 aphantasics was chosen 
on the basis that aphantasia is a niche population and the requirements of the study (the design of 
involving two testing sessions and lab based) made it challenging to recruit larger samples. 
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Twenty control participants recruited by opportunity and volunteer sampling took part in 
the study. Of these participants, 8 were males, and 12 were females with a mean age of 
39y6m (SD 11.61). On the VVIQ, control participants (VVIQ > 33) scored an average of 
63.8 (SD 12.34, lowest score = 369, highest score = 80). Of the controls, 4 participants 
were hyperphantasic (defined as VVIQ scores between 75-80, see Zeman et al., 2020). 
On the WTAR, control participants scored a mean of 42.3 (SD 4.12, FSIQ mean = 106.6, 
SD = 4.42). An independent t-test (t(38) = -0.92, p = .36, d = .29) confirmed no significant 
difference in WTAR scores between aphantasic and control participants.  
 
The exclusion criteria for this study were two-fold; the first, if participants had a history 
of mental health conditions and the second if participants did not have a normal or correct-
to-normal vision.  
 
The protocol for the study was in accordance with the British Psychological Society 
guidelines and the ethical approval provided by the Psychology Department Ethics 
Committee of the University of Westminster, UK. At the end of the second session, 
participants were given a £20 love2shop voucher and asked to sign a declaration that they 
had received their payment for their participation in the study.  
 
3.1.2.2. Materials 
Big Five Inventory  
The Big Five Inventory (BFI, Digman, 1990; Goldberg, 1993) is a well-adopted method 
to assess personality  (Hendriks, Hofstee, & Raad, 1999; McCrae & John, 1992). The 
                                               
9 An additional analysis was undertaken with the removal of the control participant who scored 36 on the 
VVIQ. The removal of this participant did not change the significance of any of the results.  
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questionnaire comprises of 44 statements regarding five personality traits: extraversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism (emotional stability), and openness (e.g. 
‘tend to find fault with others’ or ‘generates a lot of enthusiasm’). For each statement, 
participants have to decide and rate on a scale of 1 (‘disagree strongly’) to 5 (‘strongly 
disagree’) with statements concerning themselves.  
 
3.1.2.3. Procedure 
Procedure overall design of the testing sessions 
This experiment was part of a wider testing session (see Figure 3.1). A recruitment poster 
of the study (see Appendix 3.2), and Qualtrics survey of the VVIQ was posted on a 
number of different social media platforms to recruit aphantasic participants: the 
Aphantasia forum (Aphantasia Forum), two Aphantasia groups on Facebook 
(‘Aphantasia non-imager/mental blindness awareness group’ and ‘Aphantasia!’) as well 
as posted on Twitter. Aphantasic participants were invited to participate if their VVIQ ≤ 
26. Individuals with typical imagery who scored VVIQ > 33, were recruited from the 
graduate and teaching population at Westminster University, and also recruited from 
social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. Control participants were age-





All tasks randomised 
  
 
Between testing sessions, 
all participants 
completed via Qualtrics: 
 
 
 Session Two: 
 
All tasks randomised. 
CANTAB tasks are 
randomised within the 
battery 
 
• Roadmap test 
 
• Mental Rotation 
Task (MRT Version 
A) 
 








• Wechsler Test of 
Adult Reading 
 
• Big 5 Inventory 













• Transpose Task 
 











• Verbal Recognition 
Memory (VRM) 
 
• Spatial Span (SSP) 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Diagram to show the overall design of data collected and described within 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Data were collected over two testing sessions, one week apart.  
 
Data collection from the BFI originated from the wider study (as shown in Figure 3.1) 
undertaken over two separate testing session (two hours for each session), at the same 
time of day, seven days apart. At the beginning of each session, participants were verbally 
briefed to the rationale of the study and asked to sign consent for their participation within 
the study (see Appendix 3.3). The tasks within each testing session remained the same, 
but within each testing session, tasks were randomised using a Latin square to prevent 
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order effects. This was except for the own body transformation task (Chapter 5, 
Experiment 6) and visuospatial working memory task (Chapter 2, Experiment 2) that 
were undertaken in the first testing session, with the corresponding transpose (a control 
task for the own body transformation task) and imagery task, which was always 
undertaken in the second session (see Figure 3.1). 
 
Procedure: Big Five Inventory (BFI) 
Participants were provided with all 44 statements of the BFI on an A4 piece paper (see 
Appendix 3.4). Participants were asked answer each statement regarding the five different 
personality traits and assign an appropriate number from 1 – 5 with regards how much 
they agreed or disagreed with each item. Once participants had assigned a number to each 




3.1.3.1. Big Five Inventory  
The Bonferroni-Holm correction was used for multiple tests and adjusted p-values are 
reported. The correlation between VVIQ scores and BFI personality traits was assessed 




Mean (SD) and t (test 
statistic) 
Personality traits by VVIQ score  
Control  Aphantasic Control Aphantasic 
Agreeableness 30.35 (5.93) 
t = 3.91 
36.40 (3.56) r = .13, p = .58,  
z = .13 
r = -.31, p = .18,  
z =-.32 
Conscientiousness 32.75 (3.84) 
t = 0.32 
33.25 (5.84) r = -.04, p = .87,  
z = -.04 
r = .31, p = .18,  
z = .32 
Neuroticism 24.20 (5.85) 
t = 1.59 
20.9 (7.20) r = .22, p = .36,  
z = .22 
r = .01, p = .96,  
z = .01 
Extroversion  29.6 (8.00) 
t = 2.05 
24.9 (6.42) r = .49, p = .03,  
z = .54 
r = -.23, p = .32,  
z = -.23 
Openness 36.65 (5.82) 
t = 0.10 
36.45 (6.61) r = .64, p = .003,  
z = .76 
r = -.08, p = .74,  
z = -.08 
 
Table 3.1: Table to denote the personality scores (in the BFI) of the two participant 
groups, including their mean scores, standard deviation and Pearson correlation of 
personality trait by VVIQ score. 
 
Independent t-tests comparing participant groups for each personality trait demonstrated 
a difference only for agreeableness scores (t(31.12) = 3.91, p = .005, d = 1.24) with 
aphantasic participants scoring higher (M = 36.40, SD = 3.56) than control participants 
(M = 30.35, SD = 5.93). All other traits were not significant (p > .18). Self-reported VVIQ 
scores for individuals with aphantasia and control participants were correlated separately 
using a Pearson correlation with the five personality traits. In controls, the results showed 
a strong positive correlation for the trait extraversion and openness and self-reported 
vividness of visual imagery (see Table 3.1 – this was further explored in a larger sample 
of controls, see Appendix 3.5). This suggests that in those who scored higher for 
extraversion and openness on the BFI also provided higher vividness ratings on the 
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VVIQ. In contrast, no significant correlations were found between VVIQ scores and 




Experiment 3 investigated whether individuals with aphantasia exhibited particular 
personality profiles. Our results suggest that individuals with and without aphantasia do 
not differ in their levels of conscientiousness, openness, extraversion or neuroticism. 
Aphantasic individuals did demonstrate higher levels of agreeableness. However, this 
could be explained by a recruitment bias. Although control and aphantasic participants 
were both volunteers in the study, they differed in their motivations and reasons to 
undertake the study. Aphantasic individuals who contacted the researcher offered their 
time so that researchers (and they themselves) could understand their experience and 
therefore potentially help not only the academic community but also other people who 
experience aphantasia. 
 
In looking at the relationship between personality traits and imagery, there were no 
significant findings in the aphantasic group. However, in the control group, there was a 
positive correlation between extroversion scores and VVIQ vividness ratings (this 
relationship was explored in a larger sample of controls, see Appendix 3.5). Previous 
research examining the relationship between extraversion and imagery vividness in non-
clinical populations have shown contradictory results. Several studies have documented 
that introverts report more vivid imagery than extroverts (Gralton et al., 1979; Riding & 
Dyer, 1980; Strelow & Davidson, 2002), whilst other studies have suggested that 
extroverts have higher levels of vivid imagery than introverts (McLean, 1969; Morris & 
Gale, 1974). Control participants in this experiment also showed a strong positive 
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correlation between openness and self-reported vividness of visual imagery. Higher 
scores in openness to experience have been linked to the personality profiles of 
individuals with synaesthesia (Banissy et al., 2013; Hossain, Simner, & Ipser, 2018; 
Rouw & Scholte, 2016). The control sample was not asked if they experienced 
synaesthesia; however, four control participants were hyperphantasic (indicated through 
their scores on the VVIQ), which is associated with an elevated rate of synaesthesia 
(Zeman et al., 2020, although see also Dance et al., (2021). It is important to note that our 
sample size is relatively small in the context of the personality literature. However, the 
findings of this experiment suggest that the self-reported scores on the VVIQ by 
aphantasic participants are unlikely to be modulated by differences in personality traits.  
 
If aphantasic individuals do not exhibit differences in personality traits, then a second 
question is whether individuals with aphantasia have any global neuropsychological 
deficits. In the case study of patient MX, who had acquired aphantasia, the authors 
reported no difference in executive function performance compared to individuals with 
typical imagery. However, as yet no studies have explored cognitive differences within a 
larger sample of individuals with congenital aphantasia. Earlier researchers have argued 
that high imagers and low imagers have different cognitive profiles (Marks, 1973; 
McKelvie & Demers, 1979), with vivid imagery a predictor for more accurate visual 
memory performance. If this pattern extends to individuals with no imagery, then we 
might expect to see differential cognitive profiles in aphantasic individuals compared to 
individuals with typical imagery. Thus, neuropsychological assessments could be used to 
highlight any underlying cognitive weaknesses, which may account for the lack of visual 
imagery as experienced by individuals with aphantasia (Experiment 4).   
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Experiment 4: Do aphantasic individuals perform differently 
in neuropsychological tasks? 
 
3.2.1. Introduction 
An open (and so far, unanswered) question regarding aphantasia is whether or not it is 
associated with more generalised impairments in cognitive function. This is also an 
important theoretical issue because it speaks to the question of what imagery is needed 
for – for example, for sighted individuals does visual imagery make a critical contribution 
to the holding and manipulation of items in working memory? Does voluntarily 
controlled visual mental imagery rely on executive functions? If not, what role does visual 
imagery play in human cognition? While cognitive performance in aphantasia has been 
assessed using various kinds of tasks (such as non-standardised memory tasks), the 
studies or case studies comprised of few participants and an unmatched control group 
(Keogh & Pearson 2017; Zeman et al., 2010). What is lacking within the literature is an 
assessment of these fundamental cognitive abilities in a large sample of aphantasic 
individuals using highly sensitive and standardised neuropsychological tests. This is 
important, both in terms of obtaining a more comprehensive picture of aphantasia and for 
determining whether it is associated with any specific cognitive deficits. Such deficits 
may reflect underlying differences in brain structure and function, although it is 
documented that congenital individuals with aphantasia lead full professional lives 
(Zeman et al., 2015). 
 
To address this issue, a battery of neuropsychological tasks was chosen to examine the 
differences in cognitive performance between individuals with aphantasia and those with 
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typical imagery, as defined by the VVIQ. The neuropsychological battery (from the 
Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery, CANTAB) comprised of tasks: 
Verbal Recognition Memory (VRM), Pattern Recognition Memory (PRM), Spatial Span 
(SSP) and One Touch Stocking of Cambridge (OTS). Although this is not a large 
cognitive battery of tasks, these tasks are clinically sensitive to variances in core cognitive 
processes such as working memory, visual and verbal memory, encoding, retrieval, recall, 
recognition. These processes are most likely to be relevant to the experience of visual 
imagery. If aphantasia is associated with other cognitive impairments within one or more 
of these processes, then this would suggest that the inability to generate visual imagery 
in aphantasia may be associated with more general neuropsychological deficits. This 
battery would also provide a clinically standardised measure of working memory 
capacity, which can help to contextualise the findings from Experiment 2. Differences 
within these cognitive processes would manifest as differences in performance (compared 
to individuals with typical imagery) within these four specific tasks.  
 
Verbal and visual memory depend on the ability to register, encode and retrieve verbal 
and visuospatial information (respectively), and can be assessed using CANTAB tasks 
such as the VRM and PRM. The VRM also comprises of a recall and recognition 
component, two memory processes that are suggested to be functionally dissociated 
(Holdstock et al., 2002; Staresina & Davachi, 2006). The tasks require the learning of 
either visual or verbal information, which is held in short-term memory (with no further 
manipulation) for immediate retrieval. The VRM and PRM tasks were chosen on the 
principle that if aphantasia impacts imagery without affecting other cognitive functions 
associated with visual or verbal memory (i.e. in encoding, retrieval, recall, or recognition) 
then no difference in the two tasks would be expected. If no differences in performance 
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are evident between individuals with aphantasia and individuals with typical imagery, 
then it suggests that aphantasia does not impact the cognitive processes associated with 
these two tasks. If, however, aphantasia impacts on broader cognitive function within 
these processes, then a difference in performance might be expected within these two 
tasks.  
 
Similarly, the Spatial Span (SSP) is a classic measure of working memory capacity 
(Levaux et al., 2007) and is visuospatial in nature (Kessels, van den Berg, Ruis, & Brands, 
2008; Woods, Wyma, Herron, & Yund, 2016). Studies have suggested that one main 
strategy to perform the SSP involves the generation of mental imagery by ‘making 
shapes’ from imaginary lines (Patt et al., 2014). Spatial span performance correlates 
highly with executive functioning (Ridgeway, 2006) and the strength of visual imagery 
correlates to visual working memory capacity (Keogh & Pearson, 2014). If differences in 
performance arise between individuals with aphantasia and typical imagery within the 
SSP, then it would suggest that visual imagery plays a role determining the amount of 
visuospatial information that can be stored and recalled within working memory. On the 
other hand, no differences were apparent in a visuospatial working memory task with low 
working memory capacity (Experiment 2). 
 
In contrast to the SSP, the One Touch Stocking of Cambridge (OTS) requires increasing 
amounts of visuospatial information to be maintained and manipulated, to calculate the 
minimum number of moves for each trial. Although this task assesses executive function, 
it also taps into processes associated with spatial planning as well as the maintenance and 
manipulation of increasing amounts of information within visuospatial working memory. 
This is arguably the most demanding of tasks within the battery, with large amounts of 
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manipulation necessary as working memory load increases. The manipulation of 
information within the OTS has been shown to engage mental imagery (Hodgson, Bajwa, 
Owen, & Kennard, 2000). If individuals with aphantasia perform similarly to individuals 
with typical imagery on the OTS, this would imply their differences in imagery 
experience are not associated with impairments in these cognitive processes. These four 
neuropsychological tasks are clinically sensitive to variances within the cognitive 
domains that are most likely to be relevant to the experience of visual imagery. If 
aphantasic individuals have different underlying cognitive profiles compared to 
individuals who have typical imagery, then this will suggest that aphantasia is associated 




The participants in this study were the same as described in Experiment 3, section 3.1.2.1. 
The exclusion criteria and ethics are also the same as described in this section.  
 
3.2.2.2. Materials  
Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB) 
Cognitive function was assessed using the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test 
Automated Battery (CANTAB) (Cambridge Cognition, Cambridge UK). From this 
battery four CANTAB Eclipse version tests 5.0.0 were chosen: ‘Verbal Recognition 
Memory (VRM),’ ‘Pattern Recognition Memory (PRM),’ ‘Spatial Span (SSP),’ ‘One 
Touch Stocking of Cambridge.’ This particular battery is highly sensitive to differences 
in neuropsychological function, particularly working memory, visual and verbal memory, 
encoding, retrieval, recall, recognition and used within a diverse range of patient 
populations. All CANTAB tests were administered on a Windows operating system on a 
 107 
15.6-inch touch-screen tablet computer by the researcher after undergoing training in the 
administration of CANTAB tests, and with strict adherence to version 5.0.0 (Cambridge 
Cognition Limited, 2012).  
 
CANTAB Randomisation 
The CANTAB battery was randomised into two different orders (O1 and O2). Prior to 
the battery, all participants undertook a brief Motor Screening (MOT) test, which 
involved participants touching the centre of a series of crosses shown in different spatial 
locations, to introduce participants to the concept of the touch-screen interface.  
 
Order 1 (O1): MOT, VRM, PRM, SSP, OTS 
Order 2 (O2): MOT, PRM, OTS, VRM, SSP 
 
Participants in each group alternated in the order they undertook the battery, e.g. 
participant 1, 3 and 5 undertook order O1 and participant 2, 4 and 6 undertook order O2. 
Participants were not told the order of these tasks but were briefed with what the task 
would entail before each task. Once all four tasks within the battery were finished, 




Verbal Recognition Memory (VRM) 
 
Figure 3.2: Diagram to show an example of the verbal recall condition (phase one) and 
recognition condition (phase two) of the Verbal Recognition Memory (VRM). 
 
Verbal Recognition Memory (VRM; see Figure 3.2) comprised of two phases. In the first 
phase, participants were shown a series of 12 words that appeared for 5 seconds, one-by-
one. Participants were instructed to say each word aloud verbally. Once the sequence of 
words had finished, participants were asked to turn 180° degrees from the screen and 
verbally recall as many words as possible from the list, and all words were noted. In the 
second phase of the task, participants were shown another sequence of (12) words. During 
this phase, participants had to indicate whether they recognised the word from the original 
list (presented in phase one). Outcome measures in the first phase were the number of 




Spatial Span (SSP) 
 
Figure 3.3: Diagram to show an example of a three-box trial in the Spatial Span (SSP). 
Participants were presented with a sequence of coloured boxes, and following the sound 
of a tone, selected the boxes as shown in the sequence.  
 
In the Spatial Span (SSP; see Figure 3.3), participants were shown a number of white 
squares on a black screen. These boxes changed colour one by one, and participants were 
asked to remember the sequence in which the various boxes changed colour. Participants 
were first shown the sequence followed by the sound of a three-second monotone tone 
that signalled the sequence had finished. Following the sound, participants were 
instructed to make their response. The task increased in difficulty, with an increasing 
number of boxes in the sequence, from two boxes at the start to a maximum of nine. 
Participants had three attempts at each level of difficulty, and the task stopped when the 
participant was incorrect on all three attempts at a particular level. Outcome measures 
were the span length (the longest sequence correctly recalled), number of errors and usage 
errors. The number of errors denotes the total number of times a participant pressed an 
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incorrect box. The usage errors denote the number of times an incorrect box is pressed 
per sequence. 
 
Pattern Recognition Memory (PRM) 
 
Figure 3.4: Diagram to show an example of the two phases of the Pattern Recognition 
Memory (PRM). A continuous stream of visual patterns was presented, following which, 
participants selected the pattern they recognised. 
 
In the Pattern Recognition Memory (PRM; see Figure 3.4), participants were asked to 
memorise a series of 12 visual patterns, which appeared in the centre of the screen in a 
continuous sequence one after the other. These patterns were novel and unfamiliar and 
comprised of lines that were designed so that they could not be given verbal labels, nor 
did they look like common objects. Following the sequence, participants were shown two 
options: one novel pattern and one pattern that had been presented during the continuous 
stream of patterns and asked to indicate the pattern that had been previously presented. 
In the second phase, the first phase was repeated with a new set of 12 visual patterns. 
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Each phase comprised of 12 trials each, and outcome measures were the total number of 
correct trials across the two phases (i.e. accuracy across 24 trials). 
 
One Touch Stocking of Cambridge (OTS) 
 
Figure 3.5: Diagram to show an example of a 2-move and 4-move trial in the One Touch 
Stocking of Cambridge (OTS). Participants needed to rearrange the bottom configuration 
of balls ‘in their head’ to match the top configuration and select the number referring to 
the minimum number of moves required. 
 
The One Touch Stocking of Cambridge (OTS; see Figure 3.5) is based on the Tower of 
Hanoi. Participants were shown two arrangements of three coloured balls, one set 
positioned at the top, the other at the lower half of the screen. Each stocking could hold 
three balls. Participants had to rearrange the balls at the bottom of the screen to match the 
arrangement at the top of the screen and calculate the minimum number of moves ‘within 
their head,’ and indicate their response. There were rules with regards to the way the balls 
could be moved. For instance, a ball would either sit at the bottom of the stocking or on 
top of another ball, and a ball that was beneath another ball could not be moved. Once 
decided on the minimum number of moves, participants had to touch the corresponding 
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number (1 - 7) at the bottom of the screen to indicate their response. Participants were 
informed not to use hand or head gestures (or any part of their body) to aid calculation. 
This is because hand gestures have been shown to aid cognitive processing and improve 
performance within a range of complex visuospatial tasks (Alibali et al., 2011; Chu & 
Kita, 2015; Eielts et al., 2020; Logan, Lowrie, & Diezmann, 2014). These body gestures 
are more likely to occur in tasks that have a high working memory load (Marstaller & 
Burianová, 2013). In the most difficult trials, the maximum number of moves to solve the 
task was always 6. The results for move one were discounted in any analysis owing to the 
fact the test administrator was explaining instructions during this trial; thus, it increased 
the reaction time response for this trial. Outcome measures were the mean number of 
responses to correct and reaction time (latency to correct). 
 
3.2.3.  CANTAB Results  
In instances when data is not normally distributed (e.g. Shapiro-Wilk < 0.05 for all 
variables), data is transformed. When sphericity was violated, a Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction is used. Where data is not normally distributed, nonparametric tests were used. 
All t-tests are 2-tailed. The results section will first explore group performance, followed 
by an individual difference examination of performance using multidimensional scaling 
(MDS) to explore the levels of similarity among performance.  
 
3.2.3.1. Results by participant group 
3.2.3.1.1. Verbal Recognition Memory (VRM)  
In the free recall phase, aphantasic participants (M = 7.4, SD = 1.7) recalled a similar 
number of words to control participants (M = 7.5, SD = 1.82). An independent t-test 
showed no significant difference in performance in the recall phase of the task (t(38) = 
0.107, p = .92, d = .02). In the recognition phase of the task, a Mann-Whitney test showed 
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no difference in the number of correctly recognised words (U = 190, p = .71, r = .06) 
between aphantasic (median = 12, range: 11 – 12) and control participants (median = 12, 
range: 11 – 12). The results suggest there is no evidence of a difference between 
aphantasic and typical imager participants on the VRM. 
 
 3.2.3.1.2. Pattern Recognition Memory (PRM) 
In the PRM, a Mann-Whitney test showed no significant difference in pattern recognition 
(U = 179.5, p = .57, r = .09) between aphantasic (median = 22 range: 19 – 24) and control 
participants (median = 22 range: 19 – 24). The results suggest there is no evidence of a 
difference between aphantasic and typical imager participants on the PRM. 
 
3.2.3.1.3. Spatial Span (SSP) 
In the SSP, a Mann-Whitney test showed no difference in memory spatial span (U = 
170.5, p = .39, r = .14) between control (median = 7, range: 6 – 8) and aphantasic (median 
= 7, range: 5 – 8) participants. Moreover, an independent t-test showed no significant 
difference in the total number of errors (the number of times an incorrect box was pressed 
across all trials) (t(38) = -.47, p = .63, d = .16) between controls (mean total error = 13.2, 
SD = 6.62) and participants with aphantasia (mean total error = 14.1, SD = 4.61). For 
total usage error, an independent t-test showed no significant difference in the number of 
times a box was selected that was not in the span sequence for the trial (t(38) = -.46, p = 
.65, d = .15 ) between controls (M = 1.9, SD = 1.2) and participants with aphantasia (M 
= 2.1, SD = 1.41). The results suggest there is no evidence of a difference between 
aphantasic and typical imager participants on the SSP. 
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3.2.3.1.4. One Touch Stocking of Cambridge (OTS) 
Both mean number of moves to correct (accuracy) and latency to correct (reaction time) 
responses were transformed using the Box-Cox transformation (Box & Cox, 1964) (see 
Chapter 2, Experiment 2, section 2.2.3.4) to permit a factorial ANOVA as the data was 
not normally distributed. 
 
OTS Accuracy: Mean Moves to Correct  
Mean moves to correct is defined by the number of attempts a participant takes to opt for 
the correct response. Accuracy for moves 2-6 of the OTS were compared between 
participant groups, see Figure 3.6. 
 
Figure 3.6: Bar chart to depict the mean number of moves to correct and standard 
deviation for control and aphantasic participants at each move (from move 2 – 6) in the 
OTS. 
 
Accuracy in the OTS was analysed for each number of moves, from 2 moves to 6 moves 
using a two-way mixed measures ANOVA with factors participant group 
(aphantasic/control) and the number of moves (2-6). There was no significant main effect 


























of participant group (F(1, 38) = 0.09, p = .76, ηp2 = .002), however, there was a significant 
main effect of number of moves (F(4, 152) = 36.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .49). Post hoc tests 
using the Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons revealed a significant pairwise 
difference in accuracy between all moves (p < 0.01) except (moves 1-2, 2-3, and 4-5 > 
0.09). There was no significant interaction between participant group and number of 
moves (F(4, 152) = 0.82, p = .52, ηp2 = .02). These results suggest that there is no 
evidence of a difference in accuracy between individuals with aphantasia and control 
participants, meaning they make the same number of responses (moves) to correct across 
all move trial-types.  
 
OTS Response Time: Mean latency to correct 
Mean latency to correct is defined as the amount of time taken for participants to respond 
correctly within each trial-type. Response time for moves 2-6 of the OTS were compared 
between participant groups, see Figure 3.7. 
 
Figure 3.7: Bar chart to depict the mean latency to correct and standard deviation 
(represented by error bars) for each move in the OTS between control and aphantasic 
participants at each move (move 2 – 6).  































Latency to correct was analysed using a two-way mixed ANOVA with Greenhouse-
Geisser correction. The results of the two-way mixed ANOVA with factors participant 
group (aphantasic /control) and number of moves (2-6), showed that there no significant 
main effect of participant group (F(1, 38) = 1.90, p = .18, ηp2 = .05) but a significant main 
effect of number of moves (F(2.80, 106.43) = 287.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .88). Post hoc tests 
using the Bonferroni correction for multiple comparison, revealed a significant pairwise 
difference in latency to correct between all moves 2-6 (p < .001). There was a significant 
interaction between participant group and the time taken across moves 2-6 (F(2.80, 
106.43) = 3.40, p = .023, ηp2 = .08). Subsequent independent t-tests showed a significant 
difference in latency at moves 5 (t(38) = -2.65, p = .012, d = .78) and move 6 (t(38) = -
2.62, p = .013, d = .76). All other moves (2-4) were not significant (p > .61). These results 
indicate that differences between groups in response time to correct only emerged at 
levels of greater difficulty such that participants with aphantasia were slower than 
controls at moves 5 and 6, but not at levels 2-4.  
 
3.2.3.1.5. Brief summary of group performance  
Four tasks (PRM, VRM, SSP and OTS) were chosen from the neuropsychological 
CANTAB battery, with the premise that if group differences in performance were 
apparent within these tasks, it would suggest that aphantasia is associated with more 
general neuropsychological deficits. Specifically, these tasks assessed a range of 
cognitive processes, such as working memory, visual and verbal memory, encoding, 
retrieval, recall, recognition – processes relevant to the experience of visual imagery. The 
results of the group analysis showed that across the four tasks, aphantasic participants 
performed as accurately as controls with typical imagery (i.e. their performance was 
normal). However, during the OTS task, particularly during the most difficult trials (i.e. 
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moves 5 and 6), which demanded a high working memory load, aphantasic participants 
took significantly longer to respond. While this analysis shows virtually no group 
differences between individuals with aphantasia and those with typical imagery, an 
important possibility is that there may be individuals within the aphantasic sample who 
show neuropsychological abnormalities. Although aphantasic participants report a 
difference in their conscious experience of visual imagery, it is possible that this may 
reflect different aetiologies that are not recognised when performance is analysed by 
group. In the next step, the performance of each individual is reviewed across all four 
tasks to establish whether there may be a subgroup with select neuropsychological 
deficits, which may not have been identified by the group analysis.  
 
3.2.3.3. Multidimensional scaling of neuropsychological performance 
Calculating z-scores  
For the SSP and VRM task, normative z-scores were provided by CANTAB. For the OTS 
and PRM task, z-scores were created by the following formula (see also, Faust, Ferraro, 
Balota, & Spieler, 1999). 
 
Z score = (X - µ) 
                 s 
 
Z-scores for aphantasic participants were calculated using the mean (µ) and standard 
deviation (s) from the control participants, therefore expressing the aphantasic test score 
(X) in relation to the control data. For the OTS and the PRM task, the data from the 
control sample acted as the ‘normal’ population from which, aphantasic participants’ 
performance was compared. Z-scores for accuracy were compared against psychometric 
conversion tables, see Appendix 3.6 (i.e. scores between -3 indicating profoundly 
impaired performance to +3 highly superior performance). For the OTS, z-scores for 
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accuracy and reaction time were also calculated using the above equation and were 
reverse-scored by multiplying the z-scores with -1. This ensured longer response times 
(than the mean control response time) were indicated by negative z-scores. Negative 
scores (in the OTS) reflected accuracy where more than one attempt was needed in a trial 
(i.e. the most accurate performance was if a participant selected the correct answer on the 
first attempt, and more than one attempt was suggestive of less accurate performance). 
For the SSP and VRM task, z-scores for the aphantasic and control participants were 
calculated using the norms obtained from CANTAB, see Appendix 3.7 for raw z-score 
data for each participant by participant group. Summary of the z-scores by participant 
group are shown in Table 3.2A and B. 
 
A) Summary of z-scores by participant group across all CANTAB measures: 
CANTAB z-score summary, Mean (SD) z-score, highest & lowest z-score:  Accuracy  
                                                                                                                          Reaction time 
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-3.22 -1.11 -1.25 -5.74 
Con 





















































1.74 1.53 1.44 2.88 



















B) Number of participants who display ‘impaired to profoundly impaired’ (z-scores < -
2.00) in the CANTAB tasks: 










Only impaired in 
one move 
Move 4 (n= 1) 
 
 
Move 4 (n = 1) 
Move 5 (n = 2) 
Move 6 (n = 2) 
 
Move 3 (n = 1) 
 
Move 6 (n = 1) 
Move 3 (n = 1) 
Impaired in two 
moves 
0 Moves 5 & 6  
(n = 5) 
 
0 0 




Moves 4, 5 & 6 
(n = 1) 
 
Moves 2, 3 & 5 
(n = 1) 
Moves 2, 3 & 4 
(n = 1) 
SSP: 




Total Correct n = 3 - 
 
n = 1 - 
 
Table 3.2: Summary tables to show A) Mean and range of z-scores of aphantasic (Aph) 
and control participants (Con) B) The number of participants who exhibit impairments in 
tasks (z-scores < -2.00) as determined by psychometric conversion tables (see Appendix 
3.6 and 3.7). Grey and turquoise highlighted participants are the same participants. 
 
Table 3.2A suggests that there are variations in task performance between aphantasic and 
typical imager participants. Specifically, aphantasic participants displayed a wider range 
of z-scores in tasks, such as SSP (spatial span), PRM (total correct) and OTS (reaction 
time for moves 4-6). Five controls displayed impaired performance, of which, four 
controls showed impaired performance on the OTS (as shown in Table 3.2B). Looking at 
this pattern, it appears likely that this is anomalous performance or measurement error as 
difficulties were not apparent on other tasks, arose for only one measure and most 
frequently during the easier levels of difficulty. In contrast, aphantasic participants 
displayed considerably lower or more impaired z-scores, with a larger number of 
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aphantasic participants exhibiting a consistent pattern of impaired performance across 
multiple and harder levels of difficulty (i.e. moves 4-6) of the OTS. These findings could 
suggest that some subgroups of aphantasia exhibit different patterns of performance. It 
may therefore be of interest to examine the variations in these z-scores. If there are 
subgroups of aphantasia with differing neuropsychological profiles, this may suggest that 
there is more than one underlying mechanism to account for the experience of a lack of 
visual imagery. 
 
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) 
MDS is a data visualising technique that groups participants’ performance dependent on 
the similarities or dissimilarities in performance across multiple tasks (Torgerson, 1952). 
Participants who exhibit similar performance (in the tasks) are clustered closest together 
within scatterplots, revealing potential clusters or subgroups of variations in performance. 
Aphantasic z-scores for measures: VVIQ score, recall and recognition VRM measures, 
average OTS accuracy across moves 2-6, OTS Move 6 reaction time, SSP Spatial Span 
and PRM total correct were included in the MDS model (created in MATLAB), and four 




Figure 3.8: Diagrams of the multidimensional scaling representation and hierarchical 
dendrogram with circled clusters of task performance: Subgroup 1 (SG1 = red), Subgroup 
2 (SG2 = yellow), Subgroup 3 (SG3 = green) and Subgroup 4 (SG4 = blue). 
 
These subgroups were plotted on a radar graph (Figure 3.9) to examine the relationship 
between subgroups for each of the CANTAB measures, see also Table 3.3 for z-scores.
 











SSP Spatial SpanPRM Accuracy
OTS Accuracy
OTS Move 6 RT
 Subgroup 1  Subgroup 2  Subgroup 3
 Subgroup 4 Controls
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Table 3.3: Table to show the mean z-scores of the four subgroups for each CANTAB 
measure. 
 
3.2.3.3.1. Multidimensional scaling interpretation 
MDS (Figure 3.8, Figure 3.9 and Table 3.3.) shows the variation in behavioural 
performance by aphantasic participants, with a few tentative ‘subgroups’ proposed. MDS 
remains a descriptive tool used to identify variations and further research is necessary to 
confirm the existence of these ‘subgroups.’ Nevertheless, the greatest variation between 
the ‘subgroups’ arise for reaction time within the OTS task during a trial associated with 
complex working memory manipulations and high working memory load. Specifically, 
two ‘subgroups’ exhibited difficulties for reaction time on the OTS task (i.e. subgroup 3 
who exhibited profoundly impaired performance for reaction time and subgroup 1, who 
also exhibited difficulties on the OTS task; however, at a lesser extent than subgroup 3). 
It should be noted that subgroup 3 also performed least accurately (compared to the 
remaining subgroups) on the VRM measures, however, further research would be needed 
to confirm whether this subset has verbal memory difficulties. While ‘subgroup’ 3 
displayed the most impaired performance for reaction time on the OTS task, there were 
no impairments in accuracy, suggesting that this subset were potentially using different 
processes in the task. In comparison, ‘subgroup’ 1 were the most accurate in the OTS task 
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potentially suggesting an accuracy-time trade-off in performance (with no other 
impairments evident in the other tasks). This slower response time in the OTS is in 
contrast to the two other subgroups (Subgroups 2 and 4) who displayed unimpaired 
performance and performed similar to individuals with typical imagery across all tasks. 
However, it should be noted that these subgroups had a wider range of variability in their 
spatial span measure, a spatial working memory task, which would require further 
investigation within a wider battery of spatial task. 
 
3.2.4.  Discussion  
The results of Experiment 4 showed no group differences in performance between 
individuals with aphantasia and typical imagery within a range of cognitive tasks. These 
tasks were sensitive to variances in core cognitive processes such as working memory, 
visual and verbal memory, encoding, retrieval, recall and recognition. It was 
hypothesised, that if aphantasia were associated with more general neuropsychological 
deficits, then performance differences would be evident within the tasks. When examined 
by group, the results showed that individuals with aphantasia were as accurate as 
individuals with typical imagery across all four cognitive tasks. However, during the most 
difficult trials of the OTS task, specifically during trials associated with high working 
memory load and manipulation of visuospatial information (i.e. at move 5 and move 6), 
aphantasic participants took longer to respond within the task compared to participants 
with typical imagery.  
 
In contrast, individual differences examination of the data using MDS revealed four 
subgroups, two of which exhibited unimpaired performance across all tasks, but displayed 
most variability in spatial span measures. Most notably, there was one subgroup who 
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displayed profoundly impaired response times on the OTS task at move 6 – this was not 
a universal impairment shown by all aphantasic participants, with another subgroup 
exhibiting difficulties in the OTS but not to the extent of the profoundly impaired 
subgroup. This suggests that aphantasia is not a homogenous experience, and these 
variations warrant further cognitive exploration. 
 
The VRM and PRM tasks are measures for verbal and visual memory respectively. They 
were chosen within the cognitive battery on the principle that if aphantasia impacts 
imagery without affecting other cognitive processes associated with visual or verbal 
memory, then no difference in the two tasks would be expected. The current experiment 
showed no differences in group performance within these two tasks between aphantasic 
and control participants. In terms of subgroup performance, it was suggested that there 
was some variability in terms of verbal memory, particularly recognition scores (i.e. 
subgroup 1 and 3 compared to subgroups 2 and 4) requiring a further exploration within 
a wider assessment of memory. Overall, however, the results from these tasks suggest 
that aphantasia does not impact on broader cognitive functions, specifically those 
associated with the recall and recognition of visual and verbal information.  
 
Unlike the VRM and PRM tasks, the SSP task requires the maintenance of increasing 
amounts of visuospatial information within working memory (it does not require active 
manipulation). Within the current experiment, no difference in spatial span was found 
between participant groups, suggesting that despite a self-reported lack of visual imagery, 
aphantasic individuals have similar visuospatial memory capacities to those with typical 
imagery. However, while the group analysis suggested that aphantasic participants 
performed similar to individuals with typical imagery on the SSP, individual differences 
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examination of performance offered some interesting insights. This approach revealed 
that there was some variation among spatial span performance (i.e. subgroup 2 and 4), 
with these subgroups displaying unimpaired performance on the remaining CANTAB 
tasks. These results should be viewed with some caution given the relatively low numbers 
and may simply reflect anomalies in the data. Nevertheless, it is also possible that this 
indicates that in some individuals, aphantasia is related to difficulties with working 
memory. If these subgroups have difficulties in working memory, then deficits in 
performance may be apparent within other working memory tasks (in Chapter 4). Spatial 
span performance has been shown to correlate highly with executive functioning 
(Ridgeway, 2006), thus suggesting for most aphantasic participants within this sample, 
they do not differ in terms of their executive functioning to individuals with typical 
imagery. This result is in line with the normal performance of MX within executive 
function tasks (Zeman et al., 2010). While visual imagery has been shown to correlate 
with visual working memory capacity (Keogh & Pearson, 2014), spatial imagery (thought 
to be intact in individuals with aphantasia, see Experiment 1 and Dawes et al., 2020) must 
play a role within working memory capacity limits. Patt et al. (2014) asked participants 
with regards to their strategy within a spatial span paradigm, and while the majority of 
participants self-reported the use of visual strategies, other participants reported using 
spatial verbal and motor strategies. This suggests that the SSP can be undertaken using 
different methods. The adoption of motor strategies within the task was prevented by 
asking participants to refrain from co-gesturing with their hands or other body parts. 
These movements have been shown to aid cognitive processing for complex and high 
cognitive load tasks (Alibali et al., 2011; Chu & Kita, 2015; Eielts et al., 2020; Logan et 
al., 2014; Marstaller & Burianová, 2013). 
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While the SSP does involve increasing amounts of visuospatial information sequentially, 
this differs to the OTS whereby visuospatial information needs to be both maintained and 
actively manipulated to calculate the minimum number of moves to respond in a trial. 
This active manipulation of information within the OTS involves the process of engaging 
mental imagery (Hodgson et al., 2000). Within trials in the OTS that have a high memory 
load, the group analysis suggested that aphantasic participants took significantly longer 
to respond compared to typical imager controls with no difference in accuracy. The 
significant differences in reaction time were evident during more complex trials (i.e. 
move 5 and move 6) associated with the manipulation of large amounts of visuospatial 
information. Individual difference examination of performance revealed a subgroup 
(subgroup 3) who showed a consistent pattern of impaired to profoundly impaired 
reaction times at move 6 of the OTS. On the other hand, two subgroups (subgroup 2 and 
4) exhibited unimpaired performance during these difficult trials and performed similarly 
to individuals with typical imagery across all tasks. These differing cognitive profiles 
suggest that these subgroups of aphantasic participants may have differed in their 
approach within the OTS task. 
 
The subgroup of aphantasic participants who exhibited significantly longer reaction times 
in the task show similar patterns of performance to those seen in congenitally blind 
participants in certain imagery tasks (Vanlierde & Wanet-Defalque, 2004). One might 
argue the processes adopted by this subgroup of aphantasic participants are effective to a 
certain level of performance but are insufficient when working memory load is increased 
(Cornoldi, Tinti, Mammarella, Re, & Varotto, 2009; Vecchi, 1998). In contrast, control 
participants in the task are more likely to have used visual imagery to solve the task 
(Hodgson et al., 2000), especially during the more demanding trials (move 5 and move 
 127 
6). The use of visual strategies has been suggested to depend on visuospatial working 
memory capacities, with lower visuospatial working memory capacities corresponding to 
the use of more verbal strategies (Alderson-Day & Fernyhough, 2015). Within the current 
experiment, there was no evidence to suggest that aphantasic and control participants 
have different visuospatial working memory capacities. However, it could be suggested 
that a subgroup of aphantasic participants use different representations such as spatial 
imagery alone (as demonstrated by a preference for spatial imagery in the OSIQ, see 
Chapter 2, Experiment 1) or verbal coding within the OTS task. On the assumption that 
visual image representations can be held and maintained in higher detail compared to 
other types of mental representations, on easy trials, non-pictorial representations would 
provide enough detail to perform in the task adequately. However, with increased 
working memory load and more complex manipulation required in the difficult trials of 
the OTS, these other types of representations would impact performance in the task in a 
negative way. For instance, perform worse, or result in participants taking longer to 
respond in the task. Thus, within this subgroup, despite no differences in accuracy 
between aphantasic and control participants, the use of a different strategy within the task 
would explain the difference in reaction time during the more complex and difficult 
moves. On the other hand, two subgroups showed unimpaired performance within all 
tasks within the CANTAB battery, and in the OTS were as accurate and showed similar 
reaction times akin to individuals with typical imagery. This could imply that these 
individuals are using the same processes as individuals with typical imagery (despite self-
reporting a lack of visual imagery), however, an examination of their performance within 
a wider series of tasks is necessary to draw further conclusions about this subgroup.  
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Together, the results of this experiment identify four potential subgroups of aphantasia. 
In brief, one subgroup showed significant impairments within their response times within 
the OTS task, despite these differences in reaction time, their accuracy in the task at the 
respective moves did not fall below average. Another subgroup also exhibited longer 
reaction times for the OTS task, but this was paired with greater accuracy, suggesting a 
time-accuracy trade-off.  The two remaining subgroups displayed variability in their 
spatial span measure. However, further examination within working memory tasks is 
required to confirm whether these subgroups have working memory difficulties. Both of 
these subgroups exhibited unimpaired cognitive performance on all of the other tasks 
within the CANTAB battery, and they performed similarly to individuals with typical 
imagery.  
 
Future research should examine these subgroups within a wider battery of cognitive tasks 
to provide a greater comprehensive picture of their cognitive profile. For instance, there 
may be other tasks that would reveal impairments in the subgroup who showed 
unimpaired performance in the current battery. At present, while the findings of this 
experiment do highlight potential differences in performance, the results do not account 
for the reason why individuals with aphantasia self-report a lack of visual imagery. If 
performance differences are apparent during complex visuospatial tasks, it remains to be 
investigated how individuals with aphantasia (and specifically these identified subgroups) 
would perform within a wider variety of visuospatial tasks. For instance, it may be the 
case that the impairments that arise within (some) individuals with aphantasia are evident 
within tasks involving complex manipulations. At present, aphantasics’ performance 
within a wider range of complex visuospatial transformation tasks remains unexplored. 
Complex tasks not only comprise of tasks that have a high working memory load but also 
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involve high active manipulation of shapes (such as mental rotation) and also those that 
require the transformation of perspectives. The performance of individuals with 
aphantasia within such complex visuospatial tasks shall be explored in the following 
Chapter. 
 
3.2.5. Chapter conclusion 
This Chapter examined whether the lack of self-reported visual imagery could be 
explained by personality variances or differences in fundamental cognitive processes. 
Personality profiles were explored within Experiment 3 through the BFI inventory, which 
examined traits: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism (emotional 
stability), and openness. The results showed significant differences in the level of the trait 
agreeableness, which was explained as being due to a recruitment bias, with no 
differences within the other personality traits. Control extraversion scores correlated 
highly with VVIQ scores. While it seems aphantasia cannot be linked to personality 
influences (although this was a very small sample for personality investigations), 
questions remained regarding whether cognitive differences could account for their self-
reported inability to generate visual imagery. Experiment 4 explored whether individuals 
with aphantasia have a more general cognitive deficit by examining performance within 
four standardised and sensitive cognitive tasks selected from CANTAB. The results of 
this experiment showed that at a group level, no differences were found in accuracy across 
all tasks. This initially suggested that the cognitive profile of aphantasic individuals does 
not differ to individuals with typical imagery. However, in the OTS task during difficult 
trials associated with high working memory load and a complex manipulation, aphantasic 
participants were significantly slower in responding to the task compared to controls with 
typical imagery.  
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Further examination of individual cognitive profiles revealed four potential aphantasic 
subgroups, two of whom showed specific and marked deficits on the OTS task. A more 
in-depth neuropsychological investigation is required to gain a greater understanding of 
individual differences in the cognitive capabilities of aphantasic individuals. Such an 
investigation may explain why they self-report a lack of visual imagery. One suggestion 
made is that the subgroup of aphantasic participants who displayed profound impaired 
response time in the OTS adopted different processes (such as verbal or spatial imagery) 
within the task. This pattern of performance (i.e. longer reaction times but no difference 
in accuracy) is similar to the performance of congenitally blind individuals in certain 
imagery tasks (Vanlierde & Wanet-Defalque, 2004). In contrast, the aphantasic subgroup 
who exhibited unimpaired performance on all of the tasks displayed reaction times in the 
OTS that were similar to that of individuals with typical imagery. 
 
 If aphantasic subgroups exist, with a large number of aphantasic participants displaying 
impaired performance within visuospatial task that involve the maintenance and active 
manipulation of large amounts of visuospatial information, then further investigation is 
required using a wider range of complex tasks. Moreover, investigation of their 
performance within a wider range of complex visuospatial tasks will also reveal whether 
the aphantasic subgroup who exhibited variability on the spatial span has working 
memory difficulties. This will be explored within the following Chapter. 
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During the One Touch Stocking of Cambridge (OTS), a significant difference in response 
time was evident between aphantasic and control participants during trials that required 
the manipulation of a large amount of visuospatial information (Experiment 3). 
Differences in performance were not evident within a low working memory load 
visuospatial working memory task (Experiment 2), suggesting that differences arose 
within the OTS tasks due to its increased complexity. Therefore, exploring visuospatial 
working memory in tasks that utilise different types of manipulation in visuospatial 
working memory may identify why differences arose within the OTS. This Chapter will 
explore performance within a wider variety of complex visuospatial working memory 
tasks: a mental rotation task (MRT) in Experiment 5 and an egocentric spatial 
perspective-taking task (Blanke et al., 2005; Gardner & Potts, 2011) in Experiment 6. 
Twenty individuals with aphantasia and 20 individuals with typical imagery undertook 
the mental rotation task (Experiment 5). Results showed no significant difference in 
accuracy or response time between aphantasic and control participants. Similarly, in 
Experiment 6, no differences in accuracy or reaction time were apparent in the spatial 
perspective-taking task and its corresponding control task. However, aphantasic 
participants displayed greater variability in reaction time for front and back orientations 
compared to participants with typical imagery. Together, these results suggest that within 
tasks that require complex visuospatial manipulation and transformations, despite self-
reporting a lack of visual imagery, aphantasic participants can perform just as well as 
individuals who have typical imagery.   
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General Introduction 
The results from Experiment 2 (Chapter 2) showed that within a visuospatial working 
memory task, no differences in accuracy were apparent between aphantasic and control 
participants with typical imagery. A reason for this observed similarity in performance 
was attributed to the fact that the task required little active manipulation. Thus, it remains 
to be explored how individuals with aphantasia would perform in more complex 
visuospatial working memory tasks. In the OTS task (Experiment 3) a complex 
visuospatial working memory task involving high levels of manipulation, aphantasic 
participants were significantly slower in their responses only during the hardest/most 
cognitively demanding trials of the OTS (moves 5 and 6). However, they were accurate 
as typical imagery controls. Therefore, it is of interest to further explore aphantasics’ 
performance within a wider variety of complex visuospatial working memory tasks that 
require higher levels of manipulation.  
 
Patient MX performed as well as individuals with typical imagery in a mental rotation 
task (Zeman et al., 2010). However, it is not known how a larger sample of individuals 
with congenital aphantasia would perform within this task. The mental rotation task 
(MRT) is a classic visuospatial imagery task and measure of spatial ability (Shepard & 
Metzler, 1971; Xue et al., 2017). It is used to explore spatial abilities within a range of 
clinical syndromes and individual differences in healthy populations (e.g. Courbois, 
Coello, & Bouchart, 2004; Jansen, Schmelter, Quaiser-Pohl, Neuburger, & Heil, 2013; 
Marmor & Zaback, 1976; Peters, Lehmann, Takahira, Cortex, & 2006). In typically 
sighted individuals, these spatial representations are thought to be acquired by visually 
perceiving individual parts, such as lines, corners or angles of the stimulus piece-by-
piece, to create an internal visuospatial representation of the whole stimulus from which 
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comparisons are based (Gill, O’Boyle, & Hathaway, 1998; Larsen, 2014; Noton, 
American, & 1971). Eye fixation studies that track eye-movements during mental rotation 
further support the notion of this piece-by-piece strategy (Just & Carpenter, 1985; Xue et 
al., 2017), with eye movements playing a role in the acquirement of spatial information 
(Just & Carpenter, 1976; Xue et al., 2017). Behavioural and neuroimaging evidence 
proposes that mental rotation transformations occur on these visuospatial representations 
(e.g. Borst et al., 2011; Carpenter, Just, Keller, Eddy, & Thulborn, 1999; Shepard & 
Metzler, 1971; Xue et al., 2017). However, it has also been argued that the representations 
involved in mental rotation rely not on visual, but rather spatial representations (Liesefeld 
& Zimmer, 2013). This is supported by studies within the literature on individuals who 
are congenitally blind (i.e. in individuals who have no more than light/shade vision from 
birth) who perform similar to sighted individuals on adapted haptic versions of the task. 
This suggests that visual representation is not crucial to carry out mental rotation tasks 
(Cattaneo et al., 2008; Marmor & Zaback, 1976).  
 
Spatial representations are influenced by the frame of reference adopted by an individual. 
A frame of reference can be defined as the “particular perspective from which the 
observation of a spatial variable (position of an object, its velocity etc.) is made” 
(Cattaneo & Tomaso, 2011, pg 115). The comparison of the spatial positions of objects 
relative to one another and independent of the subject’s viewpoint (as in the MRT) is 
referred to an object-centred or allocentric frame of reference. Typically, a linear 
relationship between response time and angle is evident within MRT, which reflects 
longer response time with an increased level of transformation or manipulation required 
in the task (Borst, Kievit, Thompson & Kosslyn, 2011). Although mental rotation can be 
discussed in terms of an allocentric framework, studies have shown that mental rotation 
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is also associated with embodied cognition (i.e. an egocentric framework) (Liesefeld & 
Zimmer, 2013; Shenton, Schwoebel, & Coslett, 2004). For instance, the mental rotation 
of human avatars involves a form of mental self-rotation (Deroualle, Borel, Devèze, & 
Lopez, 2015; Hegarty & Waller, 2004) or spatial perspective-taking (Böffel & Müsseler, 
2019), an egocentric process involving the alignment of one’s own body to that of an on-
screen avatar. This egocentric perspective involves spatial representations in reference to 
the imagined movement of one’s point of view or body position in relation to another 
object or objects (e.g. Kozhevnikov, Motes, Rasch, & Blajenkova, 2006; May, 2004; 
Wang & Spelke, 2000) and require kinaesthetic and somatosensory representations 
(Gardner & Potts, 2010; Kaltner, Riecke, & Jansen, 2014). These mental simulations stem 
from vestibular information, which is not necessary for object mental rotation (Deroualle 
et al., 2015; Falconer & Mast, 2012; Gardner, Stent, Mohr, & Golding, 2017).  
 
Egocentric frameworks fall in line with the embodied theories of mental imagery, which 
suggest that mental representations are closely linked to a combination of perceptual, 
cognitive and motor components (see Chapter 1, section 1.1.3). In a study by Amorim, 
Isableu and Jarraya (2006), participants took an embodied approach within a MRT when 
abstract cube-like stimuli contained additional body characteristics, such as a head or 
hands, compared to when the stimuli were abstract cubes. The authors suggest that this 
facilitated the mapping of one’s own body onto the abstract shape (Amorim et al., 2006). 
Several studies have also shown, that when an embodied approach is taken within the 
mental rotation task (containing body limbs), performance is faster compared to an 
allocentric approach (Amorim et al., 2006; Jansen, Lehmann, & Van Doren, 2012; 
Suggate, Lehmann, Stoeger, & Jansen, 2019). This suggests that embodied objects are 
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processed more easily (Suggate et al., 2019), although the exact reasons for this remain 
unclear.  
 
One way to explore embodied transformations is through spatial-perspective taking tasks 
such as the Own Body Transformation task (OBT) that require egocentric processes 
(Experiment 6). Although, participants have been shown to adopt an allocentric frame of 
reference within spatial perspective-taking transformation tasks (Martin et al., 2019). As 
such, the distinction between allocentric and egocentric spatial representations is difficult 
to distinguish, and the use of either framework is not within conscious control (Eardley 
& van Velzen, 2011). This is especially difficult to distinguish through behavioural tasks 
whereby individuals greatly differ or adopt the use of either frame of reference (Ekstrom, 
Arnold, & Iaria, 2014). It should be noted that while object MRT and OBT tasks have 
been discussed in terms of allocentric and egocentric processes, it is acknowledged that 
both tasks can adopt either framework, thus it is not suggested that the tasks mentioned 
are purely viewed in the context of either reference.  
 
Although tasks within this Chapter both deal with spatial representations and share 
common processes, such as, the ability to encode or assume a visuospatial image and 
maintain these representations (Kosslyn, 1996), they differ in the type of spatial 
transformation required. These transformations are more advanced and require more 
active manipulation than the visuospatial task described in Experiment 2. In terms of the 
revised visuospatial working memory model, this information would be stored within the 
visual cache and its contents rehearsed by the inner scribe (spatial store), with active 
manipulation involving the central executive (Logie, 1995). These tasks arguably involve 
the processes associated with the central executive more than the visuospatial memory 
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task described in Experiment 2. Understanding how individuals with aphantasia perform 
within visuospatial tasks, which are underpinned by more complex manipulation, may 
provide insight into whether the differences exhibited by individuals with aphantasia in 
the OTS were due to the level of manipulation required within the task. In addition, it will 
further enhance the understanding of spatial imagery abilities within aphantasia.  
 
Experiment 5: How do individuals with aphantasia perform 
within a Mental Rotation Task? 
 
4.1.1. Introduction 
In a case study of acquired aphantasia (following coronary angioplasty), patient MX self-
reported the sudden inability to generate visual imagery (Zeman et al., 2010). On standard 
visual imagery questionnaires, he rated himself as having no imagery. Despite this self-
reported inability, patient MX performed as accurately as neurotypical controls in a MRT, 
although his performance within the task was significantly slower (Zeman et al., 2010). 
the authors argued that differences in response time in the mental rotation task were 
suggestive that MX was using a different strategy, although the authors do not explore the 
type of strategy that might have been used (Zeman et al., 2010). MX’s apparent normal 
performance (in terms of accuracy) in the MRT may be interpreted as the experience of 
visual images is not necessary for equivalent performance within the task. This notion is 
supported in studies with congenitally totally blind or early blind (with no more than 
diffuse light/shade vison), who are able to perform similarly to sighted individuals on 
imagery tasks such as mental rotation (e.g. Carpenter & Eisenberg, 1978; Kerr, 1983; 
Zimler & Keenan, 1983). For example, in a MRT, although blind individuals were slower, 
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the number of errors made by blind participants was similar to that of sighted participants 
(Carpenter & Eisenberg, 1978). This suggests that they can manipulate information that 
is analogous (picture-like) in nature (Afonso et al., 2010; Marmor & Zaback, 1976). 
Vecchi (1998) suggested that in the case of individuals who are congenitally totally blind, 
differences in reaction time are attributed to the fact that the blind have a lower 
visuospatial processing capacity compared to sighted individuals (Vecchi, 1998; Vecchi, 
Monticellai, & Cornoldi, 1995).  
 
Similarly, a replication of Kosslyn’s well known mental scanning study found a linear 
relationship between time and distances, although blind participants were slower (Kerr, 
1983; Roeder & Rösler, 1998). The research suggests that the congenitally blind are able 
to do these tasks by accessing information through non-visual perceptual or verbal 
modalities (Aleman et al., 2001; Kaski, 2002; Vecchi et al., 2004). Although vision can 
provide a comprehensive level of spatial information from the external world, the fact 
that individuals who are blind lack this input yet still perform well in spatial tasks (such 
as mental rotation), suggest that spatial processing is also based on input from all sensory 
modalities such as touch, audition and proprioception (Millar, 1994). These modalities 
provide rich spatial representations. 
 
Typically within MRT, the more complex and larger the angle of rotation (thus, 
manipulation needed within visuospatial working memory), the longer the response time 
(Borst, et al., 2011). MRT may also comprise more than one rotation axis (Shepard & 
Metzler, 1971), which further adds to the complexity of the task. In Experiment 2, the 
visuospatial working memory task involved little manipulation, which was one 
speculation as to why no differences in performance were apparent between aphantasic 
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and control participants with typical imagery. Differences in performance were apparent 
in Experiment 4 in the OTS, a complex visuospatial task, but only during difficult trials 
involving high levels of manipulation. It should also be noted that not all aphantasic 
participants exhibited performance differences in the OTS, with some aphantasic 
participants performing similar to controls even at the harder difficulty levels. If 
differences in performance are apparent within a MRT, then it would suggest that 
aphantasics’ lack of visual imagery affects their ability to manipulate a large amount of 
visuospatial information in working memory. If differences in reaction time are apparent 
between individuals with aphantasia and typical imagery, then this pattern of performance 
is comparable to the performance shown by congenitally blind, thus suggesting that 
aphantasia may be associated with a lower visuospatial processing capacity (Vecchi, 
1998; Vecchi et al., 1995).  
 
On the other hand, the results of Experiment 1 showed that within the OSIQ, a self-report 
measure, individuals with aphantasia did not differ in their spatial imagery scores to 
individuals with typical imagery, suggesting that their spatial imagery remains intact. 
Individuals with aphantasia have self-reported intact spatial imagery abilities (Dawes et 
al., 2020). Higher spatial scores reported on the OSIQ have been shown to correlate to 
performance in the mental rotation (Kozhevnikov et al., 2006), suggesting its close 
association with the ability to form spatial representations and undertake mental 





Aphantasic and control participants were the same participants as outlined in Chapter 3, 
Experiment 3, section 3.1.2.1. The ethics are also the same as described in these sections. 
Participant demographic information is summarised briefly below. See Chapter 2, 
Experiment 1, section 2.1.2 for the aphantasia diagnostic criteria.  
 
Twenty aphantasic participants (VVIQ ≤ 26), 7 males and 13 females with a mean age of 
40y0m (SD = 8.92y) and a mean VVIQ score of 16.65 (SD = 1.95). Twenty control 
participants (VVIQ > 32), 8 males and 12 females with a mean age of 39y6m (SD 11.61y) 
and a mean VVIQ score of 63.8 (SD 12.34).  
 
4.1.2.2. Materials 
Mental Rotation Task (MRT): Creating and piloting the MRT 
Adapted from the classic Shepard and Metzler mental rotation experiment, stimuli were 
acquired from the Mental Rotation Stimulus library (Peters & Battista, 2008). These 
stimuli comprised of images of 10 cubes glued together in different orientations. From 
the Mental Rotation Stimulus library, 138 white-cubed stimuli of angles that allowed a 
full view of the stimulus shape were selected, rotating around the x-axis. Each stimulus 
was individually super-imposed on a black background for the task. 
 
Based on the remaining angles, 6 levels of difficulty were chosen relative to 0°: 40°, 85°, 
130°, 175°, 220°, 265°). Following a pilot of 12 participants, angle rotations of 130°, 175° 
and 265° were excluded because the accuracy was at ceiling. As a result, three levels of 
difficulty were selected; these were rotation angles: 40°, 85°, and 220°. The task 
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comprised of two blocks of 48 trials, thus 96 trials experimental trials in total (split across 
two testing sessions and described as MRT Version A and MRT Version B in Figure 3.1, 
Experiment 3, Chapter 3). One block each was included in each testing battery, carried 
out one week apart. The MRT was undertaken in two parts because it is a cognitively 
demanding task, and it was decided it was best for it not to dominate in one testing session. 
The two blocks were matched in terms of difficulty, with 16 trials per difficulty level in 
each block (see Figure 4.1 for an example of a trial). In each block of 48 trials, 24 stimuli 
were the same, and 24 were different. Across the two blocks of ‘different’ trials, 23 were 
mirror images, while 25 trials comprised of different images. Data from the two blocks 
were combined (i.e. all 96 trials), and mean accuracy and response time was calculated 
for each angle of rotation. All participants also undertook a practice of 25 trials (only) on 
their first visit prior to starting MRT Version A (in the first testing session, i.e. there was 
no practice during the second session). The task was programmed on E-prime version 2 
and outcome measures of performance were response time and accuracy.  
 
Figure 4.1: Diagram of an example trial of a ‘same’ response within the MRT. 
Participants have to rotate one shape or the other and determine whether the two shapes 
are the same or different.  
 
4.1.2.3. Procedure 
Participants undertook the MRT in both of the two testing sessions. In the first testing 
session, all participants had to undertake a practice where they were verbally instructed 
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to mentally rotate the shapes and determine whether the two shapes were the same or 
different (Shepard & Metzler, 1971). Participants were asked to respond by pressing 
either ‘1’ or ‘2’ (on a QWERTY keyboard), for ‘same’ or ‘different’ responses 
respectively. All participants were asked to respond as quick but as accurate as possible. 
Upon completion of the practice, the experimental block began (i.e. MRT Version A on 
the first visit and MRT Version B on the second visit). During the second visit, all 
participants undertook the experimental version (i.e. the practice was not repeated). Trials 
appeared sequentially one-by-one once participants had responded in a trial. The MRT 
was complete once all 48 trials (of each version) were complete.  
 
4.1.3. Results 
In this section, in instances when data is not normally distributed (e.g. Shapiro-Wilk < 
0.05 for all variables), data is transformed where specified. Where sphericity cannot be 
assumed, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction is used. All t-tests are 2-tailed unless 
otherwise stated. 
 
4.1.3.1. Mental Rotation Task: Accuracy 
The accuracy of mental rotation performance was first examined across the angle of 
rotations and compared between aphantasic and control participants (see Figure 4.2) 




Figure 4.2: Bar chart to depict the mean proportional accuracy and error bars 
(representing the standard deviation) in the MRT across all angles of rotation for 
aphantasic and control participants.  
 
Data was first transformed using a rationalised arcsine transformation (Studebaker, 
1985), as appropriate for proportion correct data (see Chapter 2, Experiment 2, section 
2.2.3.4). The results of the two-way mixed ANOVA with between-subject factor of group 
(aphantasic/ control) and within-subject factor of angle of rotation (40°, 85°, and 220°), 
showed no main effect of group (F(1, 38) = 0.76, p = .39, ηp2 = .02) but a significant main 
effect of angle of rotation (F(1.70, 64.7) = 29.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .440). Post hoc tests 
using the Bonferroni-Holm for multiple comparisons revealed a significant pairwise 
difference in accuracy between the angle of rotations 40° - 85° (p = .04) and between the 
angle of rotations 85° -220° (p < .001). There was no significant interaction between the 
angle of rotation and group (F(1.70, 64.7) = .29, p = .72, ηp2 = .008). These results suggest 
































4.1.3.2. Mental Rotation Task: Response Time  
Response time data for the MRT was transformed using the Box-Cox transformation 
(Box & Cox, 1964) as the data violated normality (see Chapter 2, Experiment 2, section 
2.2.3.4). Response time data was analysed across all angles of rotation (40°, 85°, and 
220°) and compared between aphantasic and controls participants (see Figure 4.3). 




Figure 4.3: Bar chart to depict the mean MRT response time and error bars (representing 
the standard deviation) in seconds across all angle of rotation, for aphantasic and control 
participants. 
 
The results of the two-way mixed measures ANOVA with between-subject factor group 
(aphantasic/control) and within-subject factor angle of rotation (40°, 85°, and 220°), 
showed no significant main effect of group (F(1, 38) = 3.62, p = .07, ηp2 = .087) but a 


























.001, ηp2 = .64). Post hoc tests using Bonferroni-Holm for multiple comparisons revealed 
a significant pairwise difference in response time between the angle of rotation 40° - 85° 
(p < .001) and between angles 85° - 220° (p = .008). Overall, there was no significant 
interaction between angle of rotation and group (F(1.65, 62.86) = .45, p = .60, ηp2 = .012). 
These results suggest that despite self-reporting a lack of visual imagery, participants with 
aphantasia take the same amount of time to respond within the MRT across all angles of 
rotation similar to participants with typical imagery.  
 
4.1.4. Discussion 
This Experiment explored the performance of individuals with congenital aphantasia 
within a MRT. The results show that there was no significant group difference in accuracy 
between aphantasic and typical imagery control participants, similar to the performance 
of patient MX (Zeman et al., 2010). Further, there was also no significant group difference 
in response time, although the means and standard deviations for the aphantasic group 
were higher than the control group. This suggests there was considerable variation within 
task performance amongst aphantasic participants. If individuals with aphantasia display 
significant differences on the OTS (Experiment 4), but not the MRT, what are the 
differences between the two tasks? While both of these tasks involve complex 
manipulation, the more cognitively demanding trials of the OTS were also associated 
with a high working memory load of visuospatial information. The MRT may have been 
less cognitively demanding with one shape acting as a reference and crucially remaining 
on the screen for the duration of the trial, from which, the second shape was to be rotated.  
 
A possible reason for no differences in performance between aphantasic and typical 
imager participants is because the MRT is viewed to load more heavily on spatial 
imagery, with individuals with aphantasia self-reporting intact spatial imagery abilities 
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within self-reports (Experiment 1, see also Dawes et al., 2020). Evidence from the 
congenitally blind suggests that the MRT can be undertaken as accurately as sighted 
individuals using spatial imagery (Carpenter & Eisenberg, 1978; Marmor & Zaback, 
1976). The response times of both aphantasic and control participants with typical 
imagery increased proportionally with the angle of rotation, which is in support of 
depictive theories, in particular the use of analogue mental rotation process similar to that 
of a physical rotation (Just & Carpenter, 1976; Kosslyn, 1994; Shepard & Metzler, 1971). 
While differing angles of object rotation add to the complexity of the task, the mental 
rotation of objects can be argued to draw on more allocentric or object-centred references 
frames and processes. It remains unknown how individuals with aphantasia would 
perform in tasks that involve egocentric process, such as spatial perspective-taking tasks. 
These tasks involve mental-self rotation, which has been suggested to be cognitively 
different from the processes involved in object rotation (Hegarty & Waller, 2004; Zacks 
& Michelon, 2005). This is supported by neuroimaging studies that provide further 
evidence for different cognitive processes involved in object rotation and spatial 
perspective-taking, with parietal areas associated with body schema activated during 
spatial perspective-taking tasks (Arzy, Thut, Mohr, Michel, & Blanke, 2006; Keehner, 
Guerin, Miller, Turk, & Hegarty, 2006; Zacks & Michelon, 2005). This will be explored 
in Experiment 6.  
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Experiment 6: How do individuals with aphantasia perform 
within a spatial perspective-taking task? 
 
4.2.1. Introduction 
Spatial perspective-taking involves making an embodied transformation that relies on 
internal representations of the body schema and its movements within space (Blanke et 
al., 2005; Kessler & Thomson, 2010; Michelon & Zacks, 2006). These representations 
are associated with both the motor and somatosensory system, and integration of 
information from the vestibular information is also key for efficient perspective-taking 
(e.g. Deroualle et al., 2015; Falconer & Mast, 2012; Gardner & Potts, 2010; Gardner et 
al., 2017; Kaltner et al., 2014). Typically, during a spatial perspective-taking task, 
individuals are asked to adopt or alter their perspective to that of a third party, by mentally 
rotating themselves to emulate the orientation of the figure (e.g. Arzy et al., 2006; Blanke 
et al., 2005; Kozhevnikov et al., 2006). This transformation is also argued to involve a 
pre-planning stage whereby individuals first need to mentally assume the starting posture 
from which, rotation to the target position can occur (Amorim et al., 2006). This involves 
more pre-planning then object rotation (such as the MRT as described in Experiment 5) 
and is complex given the additional need to transform perspective to a different 
orientation. This involves egocentric processes, and as yet it has not been examined how 
individuals with aphantasia would perform within such a task. 
 
A spatial perspective-taking paradigm used widely within the literature is the OBT task 
(e.g. Blanke et al., 2005; Mohr, Blanke, & Brugger, 2006), which involves participants 
adopting the perspective of an on-screen avatar to make laterality judgements. This task 
should evoke a mental self-rotation, in that participants imagine their own bodies rotating 
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to the same orientation and degree as an on-screen avatar, and subsequently respond by 
making ‘left or right’ judgements. However, it has been reported that the OBT can also 
be undertaken through disembodied strategies, in that participants may learn to transpose 
their response when presented with front-facing figures (Gardner, Brazier, Edmonds, & 
Gronholm, 2013). The performance within this task is compared to that of the transpose 
task, which is a disembodied spatial control task for the OBT, where an embodied 
approach is not required (Gardner & Potts, 2011). The transpose task is matched to the 
OBT in terms of difficulty and spatial positions.  
 
Experiment 5 demonstrated equivalent performance of aphantasic and typical imager 
control participants on an object-centred rotation task. This experiment will examine 
performance on a spatial transformation task that requires embodied or egocentric 
transformations. This will be compared to the performance of an equivalent control task 
that requires an allocentric transformation. Although spatial perspective-taking is a form 
of self-mental rotation, it does comprise of different cognitive processes compared to 
object rotation. Spatial-perspective taking is associated with internal representations 
relating to body schema and spatial movements (e.g. Gardner & Potts, 2010; Kaltner et 
al., 2014). If the task can be undertaken using spatial processes (in line with aphantasic 
participants’ self-reported intact spatial abilities see Chapter 2, Experiment 1), no 
difference is expected within the task. No difference in performance is expected within 




Aphantasic and control participants were the same participants as outlined in Chapter 3, 
Experiment 3 section 3.1.2.1 and are summarised above in Experiment 5, section 
4.1.2.1. The ethics are also the same as described in these sections.  
 
4.2.2.2. Materials 
Own-Body Transformation and Transpose Task 
The tasks were created using E-Prime 2.0 experiment generator software. In the OBT 
condition (Blanke et al., 2005; Gardner, Brazier, Edmonds, & Gronholm, 2013; Gardner 
& Potts, 2011), a two-dimensional (2-D) line-drawn figure or avatar was presented to  
participants. The avatar was holding a ball in each hand– one white and one black (see 






A) OBT condition   B) Transpose condition 
 
Figure 4.4: Diagram from Gardner et al. 2017 to show stimuli presented as part of the A) 
Own body transformation (OBT) showing ‘left’ as the correct response for back-view and 
front view stimuli B) Transpose condition showing ‘left’ as the correct response in each 
trial for cue-absent and cue-present stimuli. 
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The outlined shape of the avatar was identical in both back and front orientations. The 
way to identify the avatar was front-facing was by the presentation of simple facial 
features and buttons on the chest, while for back-facing orientation, there were no 
identifying markers. The avatar was randomly tilted at 10° increments anticlockwise or 
clockwise, through a range of -50° to +50°. Angles for anticlockwise or clockwise were 
averaged together (Kessler & Thomson, 2010; Michelon & Zacks, 2006; Preuss, Harris, 
& Mast, 2013) providing an overall response for front-view and back-view orientations. 
When the figure was presented in back-view, the on-screen location of the black ball was 
compatible with the location of the correct response. However, when the figure was 
presented in front-view, the on-screen location of the black ball was contralateral to the 
correct response (see Figure 4.4). Participants were informed to transform their 
perspective to the figure and respond to the hand that held the black ball. In the first 
testing session, participants undertook a practice for the OBT condition comprising of 44 
trials followed by the experimental version of the OBT, which contained 132 trials split 
over four experimental blocks (33 trials per block). In all experimental trials, 50% were 
shown in the back-facing and 50% front-facing. 
 
The transpose condition (Gardner & Potts, 2011), is a spatial control task for the OBT  
and was matched to the OBT condition in terms of difficulty, except for the absence of 
an avatar. Instead, the stimuli comprised of two balls, one black and one white, which 
appeared in parallel in the centre of the screen at any of the five angle orientations as in 
the OBT. The two balls were of the same size and angular separation as in the OBT 
condition and could be presented either alone (cue-absent) or with a visual cue (cue-
present). This visual cue comprised of the facial features and buttons that were present in 
the OBT (non-embodied stimuli) presented in a fixed jumbled fashion, between the two 
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balls. When this visual cue was presented, participants had to transpose their response 
(e.g. select the contralateral response to the location of the black ball). However, for cue-
absent stimuli, participants had to select the ipsilateral response to the on-screen location 
of the black ball (see Figure 4.4). Participants undertook a practice of the transpose task, 
which comprised of 44 trials followed by the experimental version of the transpose 
condition, which comprised of 136 trials split over four experimental blocks (34 trials per 
block). In 50% of trials, the visual cue was present, as in the OBT. Outcome measures for 
both the OBT and transpose tasks were accuracy and reaction time. 
 
4.2.2.3. Procedure 
All participants undertook the OBT condition in the first testing session, and the transpose 
condition in the second testing session (see Chapter 3, Experiment 3, Figure 3.1). In the 
OBT condition, participants were verbally asked to assume the perspective of the figure 
on the screen by making a mental transformation and respond to ‘which hand’ the figure 
was holding the black ball. In the transpose task, participants were verbally told to 
transpose their response only when presented with the visual cue. For both the OBT and 
transpose task, all participants were asked to rest their index fingers on top of the ‘A’ key 
(to denote left) and ‘L’ (to denote right) on a QWERTY keyboard and asked to respond 
as quickly as possible without sacrificing accuracy. In both tasks, each trial began with a 
black fixation cross against a white background for 1400ms. This was followed by the 
stimulus (either the human avatar as in the OBT or two balls as in the transpose task), 
which was displayed until a participant had made a response, after which the next trial 
appeared. For all trials in both tasks, participants were provided with visual feedback 
(shown for 1500ms) with regards to their response. Participants undertook the practice, 
followed by all four blocks of either the OBT condition (in the first testing session) and 
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four blocks of the transpose condition (in the second testing session). The task was over 
when all trials had been completed. 
 
4.2.3. Results 
In this section, where sphericity is violated, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction is used. All 
t-tests are 2-tailed unless otherwise stated.  
 
 
4.2.3.1. OBT and Transpose Tasks: Accuracy 
Both aphantasic and control participants exhibited accuracy that was exceptionally high 
(97-99%) within both tasks (as shown in Table 4.1). Due to the near ceiling effect from 
both aphantasic and control participants in both tasks, no other analysis will be undertaken 
with this data. 
 OBT task  Transpose Task  
Group Front Back Cue present (transpose) Cue absent 
Control 0.97 (0.37) 0.97 (0.04) 0.98 (0.04) 0.98 (0.02) 
Aphantasic 0.97 (0.42) 0.99 (0.15) 0.99 (0.01) 0.99 (0.01) 
Table 4.1: Table to denote the mean proportional accuracy and standard deviation of 
aphantasic and control participants in the OBT and transpose tasks at the different 
orientations.  
 
4.2.3.2. OBT and Transpose Tasks: Reaction Time 
Reaction time in the OBT and transpose was examined across the two orientations and 
compared between aphantasic and control participants (see Figure 4.5) using a three-way 
mixed measures ANOVA.  
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Figure 4.5: Line graph to depict the mean reaction time in milliseconds and standard 
deviation (represented by error bars) of aphantasic and control participants in the OBT 
and transpose tasks at front and back orientations. In the transpose task, cue present trials 
are equivalent to OBT front condition and require participants to transpose their 
responses.  
 
A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with group (aphantasic/controls) as a between-subject factor, 
and within subject factors of condition (OBT and transpose) and orientation (front and 
back / cue present ‘front’ and cue absent ‘back’) showed a significant main effect of 
condition (F(1,38) = 32, p < .001 ηp2 = .46) with responses quicker in the transpose 
condition than the OBT condition. There was a significant main effect of orientation 
(F(1,38) = 135.34, p < .001 ηp2 = .78) with participants responding to back facing 
orientations quicker than front facing orientations and no significant main effect of group 
(F(1,38) = 0.30, p = .59, ηp2 = .01). There was a significant interaction between 
orientation and group (F(1,38) = 6.13, p = .02,  ηp2 = .14), see Figure 4.6.  




















Front = cue present
Back = cue absent
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Figure 4.6: Line graph to show the orientation and participant group interaction 
(orientation is collapsed across the task to create ‘front’ and ‘back’ mean. Front mean: 
averaged response time for OBT front and cue present ‘front’; back mean: averaged 
response time for OBT back and cue absent ‘back’). 
 
No other interactions were significant (p > .47). To examine the orientation interaction, 
orientation was collapsed across task (to create front and back orientations). An 
independent t-test with Bonferroni-Holm correction for multiple tests was carried out to 
compare participant groups for each orientation. No significant difference between 
groups were found in front (t(38) = -1.11, p = .54, d = -.36) or back orientations (t(38) = 
0.25, p = .80, d = .08). To explore differences between the two orientations for each 
participant group, a within-subjects t-test with Bonferroni-Holm correction for multiple 
tests for each participant group showed that both aphantasic (t(19) = 10.87, p = .002, d = 
4.89) and control (t(19) = 6.04, p = .002, d = 2.77) participants responded significantly 
faster in back facing transformations compared to front-facing transformations. These 


























on front/back orientation. However, aphantasic participants showed a larger difference in 
front-back orientation reaction times, suggesting they were slower making these more 
complex transformations. Overall, the reaction times of individuals with aphantasia did 




Experiment 6 explored aphantasic participants’ performance within a spatial perspective-
taking and corresponding spatial control task. The results show no significant difference 
in accuracy or reaction time compared to individuals with typical imagery in the OBT, 
which required an embodied spatial transformation of perspective. As expected, no 
differences were found in the transpose condition (a spatial control for the OBT), which 
did not require an embodied transformation. Both aphantasic and control participants 
exhibited longer response times within the OBT than the transpose condition, which is 
consistent with the findings from previous studies (Gardner, Sorhus, Edmonds, & Potts, 
2012). The significant interaction between orientation (front/back) and participant group 
was explained that aphantasic participants showed greater variability in reaction time for 
front and back orientations, compared to control participants with typical imagery. 
Aphantasic participants also exhibited a larger variation in reaction time in the MRT 
(Experiment 5).  
 
Although there were significant differences in reaction time between the two condition 
(i.e. the OBT/transpose conditions), suggestive that different cognitive approaches were 
adopted, there were no significant groups differences. Aphantasic participants’ identical 
pattern of performance to controls participants further suggests that their reported lack of 
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visual imagery does not hinder their ability to perform within spatial perspective-taking 
tasks. A possible reason for this is because the OBT loads more heavily on spatial imagery 
and also involves both the motor and somatosensory systems to create mental 
representations of the body (e.g. Deroualle et al., 2015; Falconer & Mast, 2012; Gardner 
& Potts, 2010; Gardner et al., 2017; Kaltner et al., 2014). This body schema is argued to 
be constructed from spatial and biomechanical representations as a result of multisensory 
integration (Falconer & Mast, 2012), thus does not rely on visual imagery alone. 
 
Both participant groups were quicker at making back-facing transformations compared 
to front-facing transformations, which is consistent with the findings from the literature 
(Blanke et al., 2005; Gardner et al., 2012; Gronholm, Flynn, Edmonds, & Gardner, 2012; 
Jola & Mast, 2005; Parsons, 1987; Steggemann, Engbert, & Weigelt, 2011). However, it 
should be noted that aphantasic participants exhibited greater variability in front-back 
orientations than control participants with typical imagery. Figures in the front view are 
thought to require an additional and more difficult transformation (Gardner & Potts, 2011; 
Jola & Mast, 2005). However, the OBT can be undertaken through disembodied 
strategies, in that participants may learn to transpose their response when presented with 
front-facing figures (Gardner et al., 2013). While studies have shown faster responses 
when an embodied approach is adopted for the mental rotation of body limbs (Amorim 
et al., 2006; Jansen et al., 2012; Suggate et al., 2019), in the case of the OBT, a 
disembodied or allocentric approach within the task is quicker. This ‘short-cut’ strategy 
is less cognitively demanding compared to the transformation of one’s perceptive. The 
use of this strategy would also manifest longer response times for front-facing figures 
(similar to when an embodied approach is taken) compared to back-facing figures due to 
stimulus-response incompatibility (May & Wendt, 2013). It has been widely documented 
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that responses are faster when there is a greater spatial correspondence between the 
location of the stimulus and location of response (Gardner & Potts, 2011; May & Wendt, 
2013). This suggests that spatial compatibility effects influence laterality judgments with 
regards to back-facing figures (May & Wendt, 2013), which may explain why additional 
time is needed to make left-right judgements when a figure is front-facing.  
 
A study by Gardner et al. (2013) reported that in the OBT, a large majority of participants 
(59% of their participant sample) used a disembodied spatial transposing strategy in the 
OBT. This shows that it is a common strategy that yields accurate performance. The 
influence of participants adopting this strategy within both tasks was prevented by 
ensuring all participants undertook the transpose condition within the second testing 
session. This prevented participants carrying-over this disembodied transposing strategy 
and subsequently using it within the OBT. The experiments in this Chapter have shown 
that there is wide variability in response time measures amongst individuals with 
aphantasia. In Experiment 4 (Chapter 4), two subgroups were identified who displayed 
variability in the spatial span. It is therefore of interest to examine how these participants 
perform within the visuospatial tasks as outlined in this Chapter, and if other subgroups 
that showed profound difficulties in the OTS, also display difficulties within these 
complex visuospatial tasks involving the manipulation of information. 
 
Multidimensional scaling of all behavioural tasks  
 
4.3.1. Multidimensional scaling  
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a data visualisation technique that examines the level 
of similarity or dissimilarity in performance across an array of measures (e.g. Torgerson, 
1952, see Chapter 3 Experiment 4, section 3.2.3.3). Individual differences exploration in 
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Chapter 3, Experiment 4 revealed several potential subgroups. Accuracy and reaction 
time measures for the MRT and front/back orientation reaction time for the 
OBT/transpose were converted to z-scores (as described in Chapter 3, Experiment 4, 
section 3.2.3.3 and see Appendix 4.1 for raw z-scores for participant groups). MDS 
incorporated the measures included in Experiment 410, and also included front and back 
reaction time for the OBT/transpose, and MRT accuracy and reaction time measures (that 
were both averaged across all angles of rotation). These were included in the MDS model 
(see Figure 4.7). 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Diagrams of the multidimensional scaling representation and hierarchical 
dendrogram with circled aphantasic subgroups. 
  
                                               
10 The measures included in the MDS analysis for Experiment 4 were: VVIQ score, recall and recognition 
VRM measures, average OTS accuracy across moves 2-6, OTS Move 6 reaction time, SSP Spatial Span 
and PRM total correct 
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The z-scores for the four subgroups identified in Figure 4.7 were examined, with z-scores 
for each measure detailed in Table 4.2 and radar graph of these differences displayed in 
Figure 4.8.  
 


























































































































Table 4.2 Table to denote the mean z-scores and standard deviations for each subgroup 





Figure 4.8: Radar graph of subgroups identified during multidimensional scaling.  
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4.3.2. Multidimensional scaling interpretation 
In Experiment 4, four tentative subgroups were identified (as shown in Figure 4.8 and 
Table 4.2). While in this context they are classed as ‘subgroups’, ultimately MDS is a 
descriptive tool used to identify variations within the data. Thus, further research is 
necessary to confirm the existence of such subgroups and additional caution in terms of 
the interpretation of these subgroups is necessary given the small sample sizes. 
Nevertheless, this technique demonstrates variation within behavioural performance, 
with a number of aphantasics participants exhibiting more impaired performance in 
selective tasks (such as the most difficult level of the OTS) compared to other aphantasic 
participants. It should also be noted that, ‘subgroups’ who showed difficulty in the OTS 
did not show corresponding difficulties in spatial transformation tasks such as the OBT 
or MRT. While these ‘subgroups’ (and their respective performance) may be considered 
anomalous performance or ‘noise’ within the data, almost half of the aphantasic 
participants showed slower or impaired reaction times for cognitively demanding trials 
involving complex manipulations for the OTS (with no impairments in accuracy). This 
might suggest that within the sample of aphantasic participants, they are adopting 
differing processes (i.e. they are not all using the same process or strategy) such as using 
spatial imagery or verbal code, which might explain for this variation. For instance, 
‘subgroup 3’ displayed profoundly impaired reaction times on the OTS for move 6, and 
showed variability in verbal memory scores, however, showed no impairments in the 
visuospatial working memory tasks as outlined in Experiments 5 and 6. This suggests that 
the impairments subgroup 3 had were selective to the nature of the OTS task. Aphantasic 
participants in this subgroup were further suggested to have used an alternative strategy 
(spatial imagery or verbal code) in the task, and this pattern of performance was similar 
to that exhibited by congenitally blind individuals in imagery tasks (e.g. Carpenter & 
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Eisenberg, 1978; Kerr, 1983; Zimler & Keenan, 1983). Slower response times in the OTS 
task at move 6 were also evident in ‘subgroup 1,’  however, at a lesser extent than 
subgroup 3. This group performed most accurately in the OTS, potentially suggesting an 
accuracy-time trade-off, and showed unimpaired performance to either the mental 
rotation or OBT/transpose tasks.  
 
In Experiment 4, two ‘subgroups’ (subgroups 2 and 4) were suggested to have similar 
patterns of performance, with unimpaired performance across all tasks. However, it was 
observed that both of these groups had larger variability in the spatial span measure . The 
results of Experiments 5 and 6 suggest that ‘subgroup 2’ showed slower response times 
in the MRT and also the front and back orientations of the OBT/transpose tasks. This 
suggests that this subgroup of participants may have difficulties with working memory. 
However, this would not account for why they showed unimpaired response times on the 
OTS, given the complexity of the manipulation involved in the task. This might suggest 
that their difficulties are related to the processes surrounding the mental rotation and 
front/back orientations in the OBT and transpose conditions, such as the ability to 
undertake spatial transformations. There remains, however, a subset of aphantasic 
participants (subgroup 4), who show unimpaired performance across all 
neuropsychological and visuospatial working memory tasks. A speculative explanation 
for this subgroup may be that participants within this subgroup have the ability to generate 
visual imagery; however, have no conscious access to this imagery. This would explain 
their similar performance to individuals with typical imagery on the OTS, especially 
during the more demanding trials. 
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In summary, while MDS is an exploratory and descriptive technique the examination of 
individual differences across a range of behavioural tasks suggests there are variations in 
aphantasic performance. This variation is not evident when performance is analysed by 
participant group. While further research is necessary to explore the traits of each 
subgroup, the differing performance each subgroup suggests that aphantasia is not a 
homogenous population.  
 
4.3.3. Chapter conclusion 
The results of Experiment 2 showed no differences in performance between aphantasic 
and control participants with typical imagery in a visuospatial working memory task 
involving little manipulation. However, within a complex visuospatial working memory 
task in Experiment 4, significant differences in reaction time were evident between 
aphantasic and control participants with typical imagery in trials requiring complex 
manipulations (One Touch Stocking of Cambridge, OTS). Thus, it remained to be 
explored how individuals with aphantasia would perform within more complex 
visuospatial working memory tasks involving the active manipulation of visuospatial 
information. This Chapter investigated aphantasic participants’ performance within two 
Experiments involving a wider variety of complex visuospatial working memory tasks. 
In Experiment 5, aphantasic participants’ performance was examined in a MRT, which 
required increasing angle object rotation. In Experiment 6, complex visuospatial 
performance was examined through a spatial perspective-taking and spatial control 
paradigm (Blanke et al., 2005; Gardner & Potts, 2011). These two tasks, as outlined in 
the two experiments in this Chapter, required different approaches. Mental rotation 
involved the complex manipulation of object rotation, requiring an allocentric approach. 
Whereas in the OBT, participants are required to make an embodied response and 
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transform their mental image of body position to that of an avatar (at various manipulated 
positions). Despite a reported lack of visual imagery, aphantasic participants were as 
accurate as control participants within the MRT (Experiment 5) with no differences in 
response time in the task with increasing angle of rotation. Similarly, in the OBT task 
(Experiment 6), individuals with aphantasia were as accurate as control participants with 
typical imagery in a task requiring spatial perspective-taking. No group differences were 
evident for reaction time in the two conditions. However, aphantasic participants showed 
greater variability than typical imagery controls in their response times for front-back 
orientations.  
 
Individual differences examination of aphantasic performance by MDS identified four 
tentatively proposed ‘subgroups’ of aphantasic performance. Briefly, the subgroups 
identified were: a subgroup who exhibit profoundly impaired reaction time on complex 
trials of the OTS (move 6); a subgroup who also display difficulties in the OTS, but this 
was coupled with superior accuracy, suggesting an accuracy-time trade-off; a subgroup 
who exhibited difficulties for reaction time measures in the MRT and front/back 
orientations of the OBT/transpose task; and a subgroup who performed similarly to 
participants with typical imagery across all behavioural tasks (Experiments 4-6). 
Although this was a small sample, these differences warrant further exploration within a 
larger battery of tasks and suggest that aphantasia is not a homogenous experience. 
 
At a group level, however, aphantasic participants performed as well as controls with 
typical imagery in visuospatial tasks requiring complex manipulation. This suggests that 
aphantasic participants’ self-reported lack of imagery does not impact performance 
within tasks requiring high levels of manipulation. The tasks within this Chapter, 
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although they both deal with visuospatial information, load more heavily on the use of 
spatial imagery, for instance, making spatial transformations. Aphantasic participants 
self-report intact spatial imagery abilities (see Experiment 1), and evidence from the 
congenitally blind, suggests that these tasks can be undertaken as accurately in the 
absence of a ‘visual’ component (Carpenter & Eisenberg, 1978; Marmor & Zaback, 1976; 
Tinti et al., 2018). Individuals with aphantasia self-report low for object imagery, which 
concerns the pictorial presentation of visual imagery (Blajenkova et al., 2006), and as yet, 
aphantasics’ performance within an isolated ‘visual’ task remains to be explored. 
However, such a task is argued to be difficult to construct (see Kosslyn 1994). Blajenkova 
et al. (2006) argues that object imagery concerns the visual features of objects, such as 
colours, brightness and vividness. If a task could probe these features for common 
everyday objects, and compare performance to spatial features (i.e. size and location) of 
common objects, this will provide an indication into the ‘visual’ abilities of individuals 
with aphantasia. This will be explored in the next Chapter. 
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Chapter 5: What vs Where pathways 
 
General Summary 
Individuals with aphantasia self-report intact spatial imagery abilities (Experiment 1). In 
line with this, no group differences were found in performance on both simple 
(Experiment 2) and complex visuospatial imagery tasks (Experiment 5 and 6). These self-
reported differences were not due to variances in personality or obvious 
neuropsychological differences (Experiments 3 and 4). It could be argued that the tasks 
undertaken thus far within this thesis could be undertaken through the use of spatial 
imagery in the absence of a ‘visual’ component. Therefore, it remains to be examined 
how individuals with aphantasia would perform within a task that probes ‘visual’ imagery 
alone. If aphantasic individuals cannot access visual imagery to answer questions relating 
to visual details, this might manifest as differences in performance between spatial and 
visual questions. In Experiment 7 ‘visual’ and ‘spatial’ statements were created to probe 
imagery of everyday or common objects (e.g. ‘spinach is darker than celery’ and ‘a 
grapefruit is larger than an orange’). The results show no significant difference in 
accuracy and response time between aphantasic and control participants across visual and 
spatial traits. If visual-spatial distinctions are difficult to distinguish in the visual domain, 
it is of interest to explore if visual-spatial differences can be explored within other sensory 
modalities. However, little is known as to how specifically individuals with aphantasia 
self-report their imagery across other senses and the extent of this variation. Experiment 
8 examined self-reports of individuals with aphantasia within other senses. The results of 
these questionnaires suggest, that while there is some variation within aphantasic 
experiences, the majority of aphantasic participants reported the inability to form imagery 
within others sensory modalities. This finding warrants objective exploration (see 
Chapter 6).  
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General Introduction 
Keogh and Pearson (2017) first documented that individuals with aphantasia self-report 
a preference for spatial imagery compared to object imagery, suggesting they have intact 
spatial imagery abilities. Briefly, spatial imagery concerns imagery relating to object 
relations (to one another), sizes, spatial locations and orientations. While object imagery 
(synonymous with visual imagery) concerns visual details such as colours and textures, 
texture could also be answered using either visual or tactile imagery11 (Eardley & Pring, 
2014). This self-reported preference for spatial imagery has since been replicated within 
a larger sample within Chapter 2, Experiment 1 and the underlying meaning of these 
differences have been explored behaviourally through the medium of a drawing paradigm 
(Bainbridge et al., 2020). In this study, participants were shown three real-world scenes 
and subsequently asked to draw these from memory. Aphantasic participants were shown 
to draw fewer objects, used less visual detail such as colour and more text (e.g. writing 
the word ‘chair’ compared to drawing a chair) than control participants (with typical 
imagery). The number of objects or visual details used also correlated significantly to the 
object subscale of the OSIQ. Although object and spatial differences have been 
documented in a number of case studies with patients with brain injury (e.g. Corballis, 
1997; Della Sala et al., 1997; Farah et al., 1988; Morris et al., 1995), exploration of the 
nature of aphantasia may provide another route to examine these differences in a 
population of individuals who are unaffected by obvious brain trauma or changes in brain 
pathology. If there are visual and spatial processing differences between individuals with 
aphantasia and typical imagery, this should be investigated through additional means.   
                                               
11 within this Chapter texture is grouped with visual details, however, it is not viewed as a 
purely visual feature such as colour. 
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Aphantasics’ intact spatial abilities could explain why their performance is similar to 
typical imagers within visuospatial tasks (Experiment 2, 5 and 6). If aphantasic 
participants are using spatial imagery alone to perform within previous visuospatial tasks, 
then questions remain with regards to how individuals with aphantasia would perform in 
tasks that specifically probe ‘visual’ details (require visual imagery). While it may be 
easier to define spatial and visual in the literature, in practice, however, this division is 
challenging to examine behaviourally in the visual domain. It may be possible, however, 
to explore visual-spatial differences within other sensory modalities. Equivalent to vision, 
audition has been suggested to have dissociated equivalent what and where pathways 
(which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6). However, it can be argued that these 
other senses are more difficult to examine behaviourally as they are often experienced in 
a multi-modal capacity (Bertelson & de Gelder, 2004; Eardley & Pring, 2006). 
 
The leading imagery theory in neurotypical sighted individuals is Kosslyn’s ‘theory of 
mental imagery,’ (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.1) also suggests a distinction between spatial 
and visual mental images in terms of the content they represent and anatomical location 
(Kosslyn, 1994; Kosslyn et al., 2006). According to the theory, it is assumed that both 
spatial mental images and visual mental images are spatio-analogical, while both 
representing different types of information. Specifically, it suggests spatial mental images 
can contain information with regard to size and location, while visual mental images 
contain information on shape, colour and depth. This means that the identification of a 
purely visual task is challenging as visual tasks will most often have a spatial component 
and are in fact ‘visuospatial’. For example, a classic ‘visual’ tasks often considered in the 
literature is that of an Object Form Task (Mehta, Newcombe, & De Haan, 1992), which 
can be haptically adapted (to be undertaken by non-visual means) so that it can be used 
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within other populations, such as the congenitally totally blind (Noordzij, Zuidhoek, & 
Postma, 2007; Peelen, He, Han, Caramazza, & Bi, 2014). In the visual version of this 
task, participants are asked to mentally compare the outline of three common objects (that 
are read verbally from a card) and need to determine the odd-one-out. For individuals 
with typical imagery, retrieval of representations of objects occurred from long-term 
memory and represented retinotopically within early visual areas (or Kosslyn’s visual 
buffer) for inspection of perceptual characteristics (Slotnick et al., 2005; see also Chapter 
1 section 1.2). It could be argued, however, that the shape of an object can be recognised 
on the basis of the spatial relationships between their component parts (Biederman, 1987), 
which would suggest this task is ‘visuospatial.’ More recent neuroimaging has suggested 
that occipitotemporal areas responsible for visual representations of object shape also 
represent non-visual representations of the object (Peelen et al., 2014). This provides 
further evidence for the intertwined nature of visual and spatial representations.  
 
Published studies examining performance within aphantasia have focused primarily on 
the visual domain. Nevertheless, in a small sample of 21 aphantasic respondents, 
approximately half self-reported a lack of imagery in the other senses (Zeman et al., 
2015). Similarly, in their larger aphantasic sample (n = 2000), over 50% of their sample 
reported a lack of imagery across all modalities with approximately 25% reporting an 
absence in ‘some but not all’ modalities (Zeman et al., 2020). In both studies, no formal 
scales of sensory imagery were incorporated, and participants only commented on 
whether they had experiences of mental imagery in the other senses or not. A recent study 
proposed that 66 aphantasic participants (out of a total sample of 267) self-reported ‘no 
imagery’ across all sensory modalities on a validated non-visual questionnaire (Dawes et 
al., 2020). This Chapter will first examine the performance of individuals with aphantasia 
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in a task where ‘visual’ aspects of visual imagery are isolated (Experiment 7), followed 
by an exploration of aphantasic participants’ self-reports within non-visual imagery 
questionnaires (Experiment 8). Together, this will provide a greater understanding of the 
‘visual’ deficit (or not) present within aphantasia, and add to further knowledge of 
aphantasic experiences in other sensory domains. Insight into how individuals with 
aphantasia self-report on sensory questionnaires offer a possibility to further explore 
visual-spatial differences within other sensory domains. 
 
Experiment 7: Isolating ‘visual’ imagery function 
 
5.1.1. Introduction 
One way in which visual-spatial differences could be investigated in the visual domain is 
through written statements with regards to spatial and visual properties of common 
everyday objects (e.g. Eddy & Glass, 1981; Howard et al., 1998; Policardi et al., 1996). 
Within the series of experiments investigating the effects of imagery in sentence 
comprehension, Eddy and Glass (1981) devised an experiment comprising of two types 
of sentences (requiring true or false responses). One type of sentence was termed ‘high-
imagery questions’ and required the engagement of imagery (e.g. “Tractors have two 
very large wheels in the back/front”) and the other ‘low-imagery questions’ (e.g. “there 
are seven days in a week”). The authors subsequently recorded how quickly and 
accurately it took participants to respond to these sentences when participants read the 
questions, compared to when participants listened to questions that were verbally 
presented. The high-imagery questions involve both visual knowledge and image 
generation (Goldenberg, 1992) whereas the ‘low-imagery questions’ could be argued to 
be ‘no-imagery’ questions and are answered with semantic knowledge (without engaging 
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visual imagery- e.g. “middle-age comes before old age”) and participants were able to 
answer low-imagery questions faster than high-imagery questions (Eddy & Glass, 1981). 
Within their study, the authors showed that the visual processing (i.e. reading) of a 
sentence selectively interfered with the comprehension of high-imagery sentences (Eddy 
& Glass, 1981). From this, the authors further suggested that imagery plays a significant 
role in the comprehension of high-imagery sentences compared to low-imagery sentences 
(Eddy & Glass, 1981). This is in line with other studies documenting that concrete words 
are better recalled than abstract words (Altarriba, Bauer, & Benvenuto, 1999; Alvio, 
Adric, & Smythet, 1971; Begg, 1973; Sadoski, Willson, Holcomb, & Boulware-Gooden, 
2004).  
 
Patient MX answered these high-imagery questions (but not the low imagery questions as 
described by Eddy & Glass, 1981) and his accuracy in answering these questions was at 
ceiling level (Zeman et al., 2010). It is possible that rather than engage in an imagery 
strategy, patient MX was relying on semantic memory. If this were the case, differences 
in performance might be expected. However, patient MX undertook these questions 
administered in paper versions, and while there were no differences in accuracy, there 
was no indication of his response times (Zeman et al., 2010). If individuals with 
aphantasia are not engaging visual imagery to answer such statements (like those with 
typical imagery), then this might manifest as differences in performance. Evidence for 
this stem from neuropsychological case studies. For instance, a loss of visual imagery is 
evident within some patients with cortical-blindness (Policardi et al., 1996) (although not 
in all cases, e.g. see Zago et al., 2010). In one particular case study, patient TC (with 
cortical-blindness) exhibited profoundly impaired accuracy on colour imagery test that 
probed the colour similarities, and a structural comparison task probing spatial features 
of common objects compared to controls (Policardi et al., 1996). The authors suggested 
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that patient TC had a generational deficit that prevented him from converting visual 
knowledge to visual images (Policardi et al., 1996). This impairment suggested that TC 
was not using a semantic strategy in the task (Policardi et al., 1996). Another case study 
described a patient who following a left posterior cerebral artery infarction exhibited 
impairment of object colours (Goldberg, 1993). The patient showed significantly lower 
accuracy on high-imagery sentences relating to colour compared to controls, but 
conversely showed unimpaired performance within mental rotation tasks (Goldberg, 
1993). Similarly, studies using high-imagery statements with regards to whether one 
object is darker in colour than another object have also been used within non-clinical 
populations (Howard et al., 1998). The authors stated that colour is encoded visually, and 
participants adopt an imagery strategy to perform within such tasks (Howard et al., 1998).  
 
Individuals with aphantasia do not exhibit impairments with knowledge regarding the 
appearance or attributes of objects (Zeman et al., 2010) and show intact spatial imagery 
abilities (Experiment 1). Hypothetically, imagery statements relating to spatial properties 
of objects, such as size, location and shape may be answered spatially by their structural 
components (Biederman, 1987). Further, tactile representations of texture can be obtained 
through the haptic exploration of materials and objects, a technique commonly used by 
individuals who are congenitally blind and in sighted individuals (Lederman & Klatzky, 
1993; Thompson, Chronicle, & Collins, 2003). However, questions may become more 
challenging to answer for visual properties, such as colour, which do not have a spatial 
form, therefore cannot be answered using spatial imagery. If individuals with aphantasia 
self-report a lack of visual imagery, then it can be assumed that they may find questions 
with regards to visual traits, such as colour problematic to answer. For instance, for 
sighted individuals with typical imagery, the comparison of colour shades of different 
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objects would involve the conscious retrieval of object (visual) representations from long-
term memory, and subsequent comparison of the perceptual features (i.e. colour) (Chang, 
Lewis, & Pearson, 2013). This process is unavailable to individuals with aphantasia. As 
a result, they may use a different process within the task, which may manifest as 
differences in response time. This may be similar to the performance exhibited by 
individuals who are congenitally blind who use alternative (non-visual) strategy to 
undertake imagery tasks (e.g. Carpenter & Eisenberg, 1978; Kerr, 1983; Zimler & 
Keenan, 1983).  
 
Within the current experiment, the performance of individuals with aphantasia will be 
examined in a series of ‘visual’ and ‘spatial’ statements with regards the properties of 
everyday common objects. If aphantasic participants cannot form visual representations 
of colour, then they might be expected to perform differently on the task compared to 
individuals with typical imagery. Whereas within spatial statements (i.e. relating to width, 
size and location), and in line with their self-reported intact spatial imagery abilities, no 
differences are expected between aphantasic and control participants with typical imagery 
in the task. Ultimately, if visual-spatial differences are found within the task, it will 
provide a further understanding with regards to the nature of the type of imagery deficit 




Thirty aphantasic participants12 (VVIQ ≤ 26) were recruited by volunteer sampling. They 
were recruited mainly through social media platforms: the Aphantasia forum (Aphantasia 
                                               
12 Three of these aphantasic participants had undertaken the experiments outlined in Chapters 2 – 4. The 
remaining aphantasics (n = 27) had not undertaken any previous tasks/experiments as outlined in the 
thesis. 
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Forum), two Aphantasia groups on Facebook (‘Aphantasia non-imager/mental blindness 
awareness group’ and ‘Aphantasia!’) as well as advertised on Twitter and aphantasia 
forums on Reddit. Thirty control participants (VVIQ score > 33) were recruited through 
a combination of opportunity and volunteer sampling: from University of Westminster 
campuses, advertised on the website Call for Participants and across social media 
platforms, such as Twitter. Control participants were age-matched and location matched 
based on the regions of England where they attended Primary School (see Chapter 6, 
Experiment 10), to aphantasic participants (see Appendix 5.1 for the recruitment posters). 
 
Aphantasic participants (VVIQ ≤ 26) comprised of 10 males and 20 females, mean age: 
38y0m (SD = 10.98y). On the VVIQ, aphantasic participants scored a mean of 17.6 
(minimum = 16, maximum = 26, SD = 2.88). Control participants comprised of 10 males 
and 20 females with mean age: 39y1m (SD 10.27). An independent t-test (t(58) = 0.38, p 
= .70, d = .10) confirmed no significant difference in age between aphantasic and control 
participants. On the VVIQ, control participants scored an average of 62.14 (minimum 
score = 41, maximum = 80, SD 8.90). Three controls within the sample had VVIQ scores 
(between 75-80, mean = 77.3) suggesting they had hyperphantasia.  
 
The exclusion criteria for this study were individuals with: impaired hearing, colourblind 
and individuals who were born outside of the UK, due to the number of potentially 
culturally-specific references made within the Visual-Spatial task (as well as the English 
accents within the Voice discrimination task, see Chapter 6, Experiment 10). The protocol 
for the study was in accordance with the British Psychological Society guidelines and the 
ethical approval provided by the Psychology Department Ethics Committee of the 
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University of Westminster, UK. At the end of the study, participants were given a £10 
Amazon voucher as a thank you for their participation within the study.  
 
5.1.2.2. Materials 
Piloting and creating the Visual-Spatial task 
To create a task probing visual (colour and texture) and spatial (size and location) 
properties of everyday common objects, first, a number of true-false statements were 
chosen (n = 26 ), adapted or modernised from previous studies (Eddy & Glass, 1981; 
Policardi et al., 1996), see Appendix 5.2. A series of 60 new statements in line with the 
statements used in the previous studies were also created, resulting in a total of 86 
statements. Of these, 44 referred to spatial properties and 42 to visual properties of the 
items in question. Spatial imagery statements referred to statements regarding the 
structure/feature or location of objects (e.g. “a £1 coin is larger than a 2p coin” and “a 
wardrobe is more wide than tall”) whereas visual imagery statements referred to 
statements regarding the colour (e.g. “spinach is darker than celery”) and texture (e.g. 
“a brick is smoother than a tangerine”) of various objects. 
 
To determine how difficult the statements were to answer (and whether individuals could 
answer the questions accurately), all 86 statements were uploaded onto Qualtrics and 
circulated to individuals who had typical visual imagery. Individuals were asked to 
answer the statement, e.g. “A ladle is larger than a tablespoon,” and determine if the 
statement was true or false, followed by how difficult the statement was to answer (easy, 
moderate, hard). 175 responses were received, with 138 valid and fully completed 
questionnaires. Based on this data, 16 statements were excluded if they were rated: 
‘moderate – hard’; more than a quarter of responses (~ 35) answered incorrectly, or the 
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statements were ambiguous resulting in an equal number of true and false responses. This 
resulted in 70 statements for the experiment, 41 items were spatial, and 29 items were 
visual. 
 
Prior to undertaking the experimental version of the task, all participants completed a 
practice of the task, which comprised of 10 trials. This included two trials each for traits: 
colour (e.g. “the EU flag is navy and white”), texture (e.g. “foil is smoother than 
ribbon”), size and location (e.g. “the number four can be written using four lines”) and 
width-height properties (e.g. “a bar of soap is more wide than tall”). For each statement, 
participants responded by pressing ‘T’ for ‘true’ (positioned over the letter ‘S’ on a 
standard QWERTY keyboard) and ‘F’ for ‘false’ (positioned over the letter ‘I’ on the 
keyboard). For each trial during the practice, participants received feedback for their 
responses. A list of all the items presented in the task was printed on A4 paper so that 
participants could highlight any items they were not familiar (see Appendix 5.3). The task 
was programmed on E-prime version 3. 
 
5.1.2.3. Procedure  
General procedure for the testing session  
This Experiment was part of a wider batch of testing (see Figure 5.1), which also 
incorporated the Experiments 9 and 10 (see Chapter 6). The whole testing session lasted 
approximately 90 minutes. At the beginning of the testing session, participants were 
verbally briefed and were encouraged to ask any questions throughout the testing process. 
Following informed consent, participants completed the VVIQ, provided demographic 
information (see Appendix 5.4), followed by the Goldsmith Musical Sophistication Index 
(see Appendix 6.1) and the Bucknell Auditory Imagery Scale (Appendix 5.5). The visual-
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spatial task was one of four computer tasks carried out within the testing session (see 
Figure 5.1 and for details of the other tasks, see Chapter 6). The order of computer tasks 
within each session was randomised to control for order effects. At the end of the study, 
participants were provided with a debrief sheet and provided payment for their 
participant. 
 
Figure 5.1: Diagram overview of the testing session. The questionnaires were completed 
in the same order as denoted above. The other three tasks are described in Chapter 6. 
 
Procedure: Visual-Spatial task 
All participants were informed they would be presented with a series of statements with 
regards to everyday common-object and would have to determine if the statement was 
‘true or false’. Participants were told that the statements would relate to a feature of a 
certain property, namely colours, textures, spatial locations or orientations and 
dimensions. Participants were shown the keys to press and were instructed to rest their 
index finger on each key and asked to respond as quickly as possible without sacrificing 
their accuracy. All participants first undertook a practice version of the task, comprising 
of 8 trials (i.e. two trials per feature) and participants received feedback for their 
responses. Following the practice, all participants began the experiment version 
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(consisting of 70 trials). These trials were split depending on the characteristic into four 
separate blocks were presented in a fixed order with a break between the blocks: colour 
(20 trials), texture (9 trials), spatial location and size (21 trials), height and width (20 
trials). Trials within the block were randomised for each participant. No feedback was 
provided during the experimental trials. Between each block, participants were given the 
opportunity to have a short break before continuing with the next block within the 
experiment. At the end of the task, participants were shown a list of items/objects that 
had appeared in the task, presented to them on an A4 piece of paper, and were asked to 
circle any of the items that were unfamiliar. Any unfamiliar items were noted, and trials 
where an unfamiliar item was identified, were excluded from subsequent analysis. 
 
5.1.3. Results 
Out of 60 participants, 7 participants identified one item each that they reported as 
unfamiliar (terracotta (3), tankard (2) woodlouse (1) and scouring pad (1)). These trials 
were excluded from these participants from the analysis. For data that is not normally 
distributed (e.g. Shapiro-Wilk < 0.05), data is transformed where stated. Greenhouse-
Geisser correction is used where sphericity is violated.  
 
5.1.3.1. Visual-Spatial Statement Task: Accuracy 
Accuracy in the task was examined at each property and compared between the two 




Figure 5.2: Bar chart to depict the mean proportion accuracy and standard deviation 
(represented by error bars) of aphantasic and control participants at the different 
properties within the visual-spatial task. 
 
Data was first transformed using an arcsine transformation, as appropriate for proportion 
correct data (Studebaker, 1985) (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.4 for overview of this 
transformation). The accuracy of responses across the four different properties were 
compared between aphantasic and control participants using a 2 x 4 mixed ANOVA with 
factors participant group (aphantasic /controls) as a between-subject factor, and within 
subject factors of task of property (colour / texture/ size & location/ tall vs wide). The 
results showed a significant main effect of property (F(3,174) = 15.83, p < .001, η2 = .21). 
Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction for multiple comparison, revealed a 
significant pairwise difference in accuracy between size & location and colour (p < .001), 
tall vs wide and texture (p < .001) and texture and colour (p < .001), and no significant 
pairwise difference in accuracy between tall vs wide and size & location (p = .39), colour 
and size & location as well as colour and tall vs wide both (p = 1). There was no 
significant main effect of group (F(1, 58) = 0.26, p = .61, η2 = .005), and no significant 





















interaction between property type and group (F(3, 174) = 0.55, p = .65, η2 = .009). These 
results suggest that individuals with aphantasia perform as accurately as control 
participants (with typical imagery) on this task. 
 
5.1.3.2. Visual-Spatial Statement Task: Response Time (seconds) 
Response times in the task was examined at each property and compared between the two 
participant groups (see Figure 5.3). Response time data were transformed using the Box-
Cox transformation (Box & Cox, 1964) as the data violated normality. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Bar chart to depict the mean response time (in seconds) and the standard 
deviation (represented by error bars) of aphantasic and control participants in the visual-
spatial task. 
 
Response times between aphantasic and control participants were analysed using a 2 x 4 
mixed ANOVA with factors participant group (aphantasics /controls) as a between-
subject factor, and within subject factors of task of property (colour / texture/ size & 

























location/ tall vs wide). There was a significant main effect of property (F(3, 174) = 9.45, 
p < .001, η2 = .14). Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction for multiple comparison, 
revealed a significant pairwise difference in response time between size & location and 
texture (p < .001), size & location and colour (p = .002) and tall vs wide and texture (p = 
.01) and no significant pairwise difference in response time between size & location and 
tall vs wide (p = .24), texture and colour (p = .79) and tall vs wide and colour (p = 1). 
There was no significant main effect of group (F(1, 58) = 0.75, p = .39, η2 = .01) and no 
significant interaction between participant group and property (F(3, 174) = 1.19, p = .32, 
η2 = .02). These results suggest no difference in response time between individuals with 
aphantasia and control participants (with typical imagery) on this task. 
 
5.1.4. Discussion 
This experiment was designed to require responses to written statements regarding 
specific spatial and visual properties of everyday objects. Specifically, statements 
regarding spatial properties concerned features such as size, location, width and height 
while visual properties concerned features such as colour and texture (although texture 
can also be answered through tactile imagery). It was expected that on statements relating 
to colour, an attribute that does not have a spatial form, individuals with aphantasia would 
use different processes in the task that may manifest as differences in response time. The 
results of this experiment suggest there were no differences in accuracy or response time 
between aphantasic and control participants across the various properties. 
  
For individuals with typical imagery, the statements about visual and spatial properties 
likely involved the generation of imagery representations of objects from long-term 
memory, from which subsequent inspection of the perceptual features occurred (e.g. 
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Chang et al., 2013; Howard et al., 1998). Neuropsychological case studies further support 
the use of imagery within these statements. These case studies show that in patients who 
have an impaired ability to generate imagery also show corresponding deficits when 
responding to high-imagery statements (Goldenberg, 1992; Policardi et al., 1996). 
However, the results of this experiment suggest that aphantasic participants, who self-
report the inability to generate visual imagery, perform similar to individuals with typical 
imagery. This similarity is evident within the statements relating to the visual perceptual 
attributes of objects. Beauvois and Saillant (1985) suggested that colour knowledge stems 
from the contribution of both visual and verbal processes, and these processes may be 
difficult to distinguish within tasks that probe colour comparisons within sentences. 
Furthermore, it is also suggested that tasks that use statements to probe object details in 
imagery can be performed using semantic object knowledge or propositional code rather 
than generating imagery (Chang et al., 2013; McNorgan, 2012). Although comparison 
statements relate to a particular feature of an object, it is argued that the imagery generated 
as a result of that object contains other information such as shape, surface texture, 
luminance and colour (Chang et al., 2013). Thus, high imagery sentences do not examine 
one feature independently within an object representation.  
 
A meta-analysis investigating the neural correlates of imagery across all sensory 
modalities showed activation of colour selective visual cortex in area V4 (McNorgan, 
2012). This activation was evident within seven studies (comprising of 76 participants) 
that examined colour imagery (McNorgan, 2012). However, the studies reviewed within 
the meta-analysis for colour imagery did not include studies that used colour imagery 
comparison statements. Thus, it is not known whether such tasks typically activate V4. 
In the study by Howard et al. (1998), no activation was evident within area V4. The 
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authors interpreted this as area V4 irrelevant to visual imagery (Howard et al., 1998). On 
the other hand, Chang et al. (2013) interpreted this lack of activation (during colour 
imagery comparison tasks involving statements) suggestive that they can be undertaken 
without the generation of visual imagery. Future research should investigate the type of 
mental representations (i.e. visual or semantic) formed within high-imagery statements 
for visual details. Colour is suggested to comprise of three dimensions: hue, luminance 
and saturation, which are features that can be examined independently (Wantz, Borst, 
Mast, & Lobmaier, 2015). In particular, V4 is activated within an object mental hue 
comparison task (Rich et al., 2006). Investigating the type of neural activations for visual 
comparison statements (e.g. for colour, probing features such as hue) would provide 
further information about the underlying processes adopted by the two participant groups.  
 
This experiment set out to investigate visual and spatial imagery differences by probing 
features of common objects. Although no differences were apparent between participant 
groups and features, studies have alluded to a possible object imagery deficit within 
individuals with aphantasia (Bainbridge et al., 2020 ; Keogh & Pearson, 2017). It may be 
the fact that presenting written statements and examining subsequent responses is not an 
effective way to investigate spatial and visual imagery differences. Further that isolating 
and investigating the two imagery constructs is not possible within the visual domain. It 
may also be the case that the current experiment was too easy, with differences in 
performance evident within tasks with a high working memory load (see Chapter 3, 
Experiment 4). Consistent with previous findings within this thesis (Experiment 2, 5, 6 
and 7), there remains a discrepancy between aphantasic participants’ subjective 
experience of imagery compared to their behavioural performance within imagery tasks. 
If differences exist, further research is required to explore visual and spatial imagery 
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differences within behavioural tasks. Although this may be difficult to examine in the 
visual domain, it could be possible within other sensory modalities. If other sensory 
domains are to be considered, it remains to be examined as to how individuals with 
aphantasia self-report within other sensory domains.  
 
Experiment 8: Non-visual self-reports in aphantasia 
5.2.1. Introduction  
Although it is known that mental imagery is not restricted to the visual modality (e.g. 
Andrade, May, Deeprose, Baugh, & Ganis, 2014; Betts, 1909), the majority of research 
has focused on vision, often with the term ‘mental imagery’ used synonymously to 
describe visual imagery (e.g. Bartolomeo, 2008; Ganis & Schendan, 2011; Kosslyn, et 
al., 2001; Kosslyn, Behrmann, & Jeannerod, 1995). So far, studies have examined 
aphantasics’ deficit in imagery experience but largely only examined the visual domain 
(with the exception of Dawes et al., 2020). Numerous studies in individuals who are 
congenitally blind (who have a total lack of vision) have shown they have enhanced 
imagery within non-visual modalities, in line with enhanced perception within non-visual 
domains (e.g. Noordzij et al., 2007; Voss et al., 2004). In a study by Kerr and Johnson 
(1991) involving the imageability of nouns, individuals who were congenitally blind were 
said to rate items as having ‘visual’ qualities despite having no visual memory of the 
items. The rating of such nouns having visual qualities in the absence of visual memory 
may be due to the use of verbal or semantic processes, or that images are not developed 
within one sense alone, but are in fact multi-modal. This shows that non-visual imagery 
is as imageable as visual imagery (Eardley & Pring, 2014). Specifically, in individuals 
who are congenitally blind, images generated as a result of visual, auditory and tactile 
words were associated with two more non-visual modalities (Eardley & Pring, 2014). 
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This suggests that mental imagery is experienced in a multi-modal capacity (Eardley & 
Pring, 2006; Nanay, 2017, 2018), For instance, in sighted individuals, a mental image 
(e.g. an olfactory image) can be triggered by corresponding sensory stimulation within 
the same (e.g. olfactory) or a different modality (e.g. visual) (Nanay, 2018). A number of 
studies have shown that our senses interact with each other (Bertelson & de Gelder, 2004; 
Vroomen, Bertelson, & de Gelder, 2001), and these interactions are not necessarily 
conscious (O’Callaghan, 2008). 
 
Although a mental image can generate imagery in more than one sensory domain, 
research into sensory modalities generally tend to examine each modality unimodally and 
compare the independent experience of one sense in relation to another. For instance, 
sensory questionnaires tend to examine each of the sensory domains separately by asking 
participants to rate the vividness of familiar items within one particular sensory domain 
at a time (Andrade et al., 2014; Betts, 1909; Sheehan, 1967). This involves the 
construction of internal representations of items from long term memory (Lacey & 
Lawson, 2014). Subsequent judgements are based on how vivid this representation is 
compared to perception (Andrade et al., 2014; Marks, 1973). The vividness of an image 
is suggested to reflect the experience within working memory (Baddeley & Andrade, 
2000), but vividness is arguably a feature of imagery experience that is easier to answer 
relating to the visual domain. For instance, visual images tend to be rated most vivid 
compared to the vividness of olfactory images (Arshamian & Larsson, 2014). Vividness 
is not the only property to be examined within non-visual questionnaires.  
 
The Bucknell Auditory Imagery Scale (BAIS; Halpern, 2015) is a questionnaire specific 
to the auditory domain. The questionnaire asks individuals not only to rate the vividness 
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of an image but also the ‘ease of change’ (BAIS-C scale) of how difficult it is to transition 
from one feature of an auditory image to another (Halpern, 2015). This scale has been 
shown to correlate significantly with performance on a pitch discrimination task 
(Gelding, Thompson, & Johnson, 2015; Pfordresher & Halpern, 2013). Judging the ease 
of transition between two different sounds is an additional way to evaluate one’s auditory 
imagery experience and reflects a process-orientated aspect beyond the vividness of an 
image (Zatorre, Halpern, & Bouffard, 2010).  
 
Zeman et al. (2015) asked aphantasic participants within their sample (of 21 participants) 
whether or not they experienced imagery in other sensory domains. Half of the aphantasic 
participants in their sample self-reported that they had an absence of imagery in the other 
senses (Zeman et al., 2015). However, no formal sensory scale was included to 
specifically examine this variation within their small sample (Zeman et al., 2015). 
Similarly, in their considerably larger aphantasic sample (n = 2000), over 50% of their 
sample reported a lack of imagery across all modalities with approximately 25% reporting 
an absence in ‘some but not all’ modalities (Zeman et al., 2020). The lack of formal 
sensory scale within these studies was addressed in a very recently published study by 
Dawes et al. (2020) by using a validated unisensory scale. The study showed that a quarter 
of their aphantasic sample (n = 267) reported a total absence of sensory imagery (Dawes 
et al., 2020). The authors commented that the remainder of the aphantasic sample did 
report a degree of non-visual imagery that was significantly lower (i.e. experienced as 
low and dim imagery) than the ratings provided by participants with typical imagery in 
their study (Dawes et al., 2020). However, in this study, the aphantasic sample was 
examined by participant group. While these studies suggest that imagery deficits are not 
restricted to only the visual domain, what is missing within the literature is an 
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examination of individual differences of self-report measures. In particular, the frequency 
of imagery deficits and comorbidities across the sensory domains. While Zeman et al., 
(2020) asked the aphantasic participants in their sample to indicate if their imagery was 
affected in ‘all modalities’, ‘some but not all’, ‘no others’ and ‘unsure’, there is little 
research exploring the extent of this variation. For instance, whether there are certain 
domains (other than the visual domain) that are most likely to be self-reported as affected 
- there could be a number of ways aphantasia presents. In the case of individuals with 
uni-spatial neglect, neglect can either be comorbid with several sensory domains or arise 
within only one sensory domain (Brozzoli, Demattè, Pavani, Frassinetti, & Farnè, 2006). 
Thus, it is necessary to explore how aphantasic individuals self-report their imagery 
across the other sensory modalities, and how this may (or may not) differ to individuals 
with typical imagery. Moreover, the inclusion of self-report scales such as the BAIS will 
provide insight into process-orientated imagery within the auditory domain, which has 
yet to be examined within aphantasic populations. 
 
5.2.2. Method 
5.2.2.1. Participants  
All data was collected via Qualtrics, an online survey. Individuals with aphantasia were 
recruited via forums and through social media platforms: the Aphantasia forum 
(Aphantasia Forum), two Aphantasia groups on Facebook (‘Aphantasia non-
imager/mental blindness awareness group’ and ‘Aphantasia!’) as well as through 
advertisements on Twitter. Individuals with typical imagery were recruited from the 
University of Westminster population and through social media platforms, such as 
Twitter. The questionnaires were also uploaded on the University of Westminster 
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Psychology Research Participation Scheme (RPS), which enables Psychology 
undergraduate students to participate in the study in exchange for course credit. 
 
In total, 246 responses were received in Qualtrics and were downloaded into a SPSS file 
and 78 responses were excluded from the analysis. These were either empty responses or 
were partly complete. Two aphantasic participants were removed who scored 29 and 30 
on the VVIQ. Another 5 controls were removed because despite self-reporting vivid 
imagery on the VVIQ, they self-reported no imagery (Psi-Q scores < 1) on at least one 
scale of the Psi-Q. This resulted in 161 valid responses: 91 aphantasic and 70 control 
participants. Aphantasic participants were defined by VVIQ scores ≤ 26, and scored a 
mean of 16.95 (minimum = 16, maximum = 26, SD = 2.25). Controls were defined by 
VVIQ scores > 33 and scored a mean of 61.79 (minimum = 3613, maximum = 80, SD = 
9.92). Six controls had imagery scores above 75 (mean = 77) suggesting they were 
hyperphantasic (see Figure 5.4 for distribution of VVIQ scores for the entire sample).  
 
Figure 5.4: Histograms to show the frequency distribution of VVIQ scores within 
aphantasic and control participants.  
                                               
13 There were three control participants who scored under 40 in the VVIQ. On the VVIQ, they rated 3+ for 
half of the items within the VVIQ, suggesting that their imagery for some items was more vivid than for 
other items.  
 187 
The study was carried out in accordance with the British Psychological Society ethical 
guidelines, and ethical approval provided by the Psychology Department Ethics 
Committee of the University of Westminster, UK.  
 
5.2.2.2. Materials 
One online questionnaire was created through the Qualtrics platform, comprising of the 
following measures. 
 
Bucknell Auditory Imagery Scale (BAIS) 
The BAIS (Halpern, 2015) comprises two subscales: a vividness (BAIS-V) and a control 
subscale (BAIS-C) for auditory imagery (see Appendix 5.5). The vividness subscale 
comprises of 14 imagined sounds that vary in their nature, from voices to musical 
instruments, and participants have to rate the vividness of each sound (e.g. “consider 
attending a choir rehearsal, the sound of an all children’s choir singing the first verse of 
a song”). The control subscale comprises of 14 pairs of imagined sound, which require 
participants to manipulate the sound and rate ‘the ease of change’ or transition between 
the two examples (e.g. the first part: “the sound of a saxophone solo,” and the second 
part: “now the saxophone is accompanied by a piano”). The control and the vividness 
scale use the same Likert scale from 1 (no image present at all) to 7 (as vivid as actual 
sound). Scores are calculated by the mean response of the 14 questions for each separate 
subscale.  
 
Plymouth Sensory Imagery Questionnaire (Psi-Q) 
The Psi-Q (Andrade et al., 2014, see Appendix 5.6) probes the experience of seven 
modalities, and each sensory modality comprises of five questions (35 questions in total). 
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The sensory modalities are: visual (e.g. “imagine the appearance of a cat climbing a 
tree”), auditory (e.g. “imagine the sound of the mewing of a cat”), olfaction (e.g. 
“imagine the smell of a rose”), gustation (e.g. “imagine the taste of toothpaste”), tactile 
(“imagine touching warm sand”), kinaesthetic (e.g. “imagine the bodily sensation of 
walking briskly in the cold”) and emotions (e.g. “imagine feeling relieved”). Individuals 
are asked to rate the vividness of their sensory experience on a Likert scale from 0 (no 
imagery at all) to 10 (as vivid as real life). The overall Psi-Q score are calculated by taking 
a mean score of all responses across the seven senses. Scores for each modality are 
calculated by taking the mean score of each of the five questions for all seven modalities.  
 
5.2.2.3. Procedure 
All data was collected via an anonymous link to an online questionnaire and provided 
with instructions. Participants were asked to provide informed consent prior to 
completing the questionnaires (see Appendix 5.7). Participants then undertook the VVIQ, 
BAIS, Psi-Q and OSIQ (OSIQ data are detailed in Chapter 2, Experiment 1). When all 
tasks were completed, participants were thanked for their participation and debriefed (see 
Appendix 5.8) with regards to the nature of the study. 
 
5.2.3. Results 
In instances when data is not normally distributed (e.g. Shapiro-Wilk < 0.05 for all 
variables), data is transformed where stated, or non-parametric test is used. When 
sphericity is violated, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction is used. All tests are 2-tailed.   
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5.2.3.1. Psi-Q: Range of responses and number of sensory domains affected in 
aphantasia  
Aphantasic participants were defined as having imagery within a domain (albeit if it was 
dim or vague) if the overall score for that domain had the mean score > 1. This meant that 
at least one question had to be rated ‘2’ or above (the maximum score that could be 
provided was 10). Aphantasic participants who scored a mean rating ≤ 1 for a sensory 
sub-scale (suggesting they had rated all the items as ‘1’ or at least one items as 0) were 
classed as having no imagery for that subscale. For the visual subscale, one aphantasic 
participant scored 1.33 on the subscale (their VVIQ score was 24), and this participant 
was removed from the analysis. All aphantasic participants scored less than 1 on the 
visual subscale, indicating an absence of visual imagery. Therefore, this subscale is 
removed from the analysis and subscale comparisons. 
 
Frequency and comorbidity of an absence of imagery across sensory domains 
 
Out of the sample of 91 aphantasic participants, 52 (57%) self-reported an absence of 
imagery across all the six sensory domains of the Psi-Q (audition, olfaction, gustation, 
tactile, kinaesthetic and emotion, see Figure 5.5A). The majority of these aphantasic 
participants (n = 45) also scored 16 on the VVIQ. When measures for kinaesthesia and 
emotion were excluded, an additional 15 aphantasic participants were identified as self-
reporting a lack of imagery across senses: audition, olfaction, gustation and tactile, see 
Figure 5.5B. In total, 67 aphantasic participants (74%) self-reported a lack of imagery 
across the non-visual sensory domains (audition, olfaction, gustation, tactile).  
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B) Number of sensory domains affected on the Psi-Q excluding kinaesthetic and 
emotion measures 
 
Figure 5.5: Bar charts to depict the frequency of the self-reported number of sensory 
domains affected by individuals with aphantasia (excluding the visual domain) in A) all 
measures of the Psi-Q B) In only senses*: audition, olfaction, gustation, tactile.  
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To examine the comorbidity of the experience of a lack of imagery in more than one 
sense, the number of aphantasic participants who self-reported a lack of imagery across 
more than one domain (audition, olfaction, gustation, tactile) was examined. Table 5.1 
suggests that aphantasic participants are more likely to self-report a lack of imagery of at 
least three sensory domains. However, there remains a subset who self-report a lack of 
imagery within one-two sensory domains other than visual domain.  
 
Number of domains affected Domains affected Frequency 
Only visual imagery affected  
(n = 5) 
- 5 
Only one other domain other than 
visual (n = 5) 
Olfaction  2 
Taste 1 
Tactile  2 
Two domains other than visual  
(n = 6) 
Olfactory & Taste 5 
Olfactory & Tactile 1 
Three domains other than visual  
(n = 8) 
Olfactory & Taste & 
Tactile 
6 
Auditory & Olfactory & 
Taste 
2 
All domains affected 
plus visual (n = 67) 
Audition, Olfaction, 




Table 5.1: Table to show the number of sensory domains that aphantasic participants self-
report a lack of imagery (other than the visual domain) considered only within audition, 
olfaction, gustation, tactile domains.  
 
The frequency of vivid (Psi-Q > 1) sensory imagery experience  
Of the subset of aphantasic participants (n = 39) who self-reported a more vivid imagery 
experience within at least one other sensory domain (Psi-Q > 1), Figure 5.6 suggests that 
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aphantasic participants self-reported imagery experience most frequently in kinaesthetic 






















Figure 5.6: Histogram of the number of aphantasic participants and summary table of 
their scores (mean, standard deviation and median scores) for these participants (Psi-Q 
> 1) who self-report an experience of imagery within non-visual sensory domains on the 
Psi-Q. Control mean (standard deviation) scores are also included for comparison.   
Psi-Q scores provided by aphantasic participants who experience 
imagery across the senses (Psi-Q > 1) 
















Audition 5.64 (2.69) 
7.68 (1.54) 
6 1.4 10 
Olfaction 4.06 (2.92) 
6.55 (2.08) 
3 1.4 10 
Gustation 3.78 (2.63) 
6.83 (2.11) 
2.5 1.4 8.8 
Tactile 5.92 (2.16) 
7.49 (2.04) 
6 1.4 9.4 
Kinaesthetic 4.38 (2.50) 
7.08 (1.77) 
5 1.2 8.8 
Emotion 5.29 (2.33) 
7.09 (2.08) 
6 1.4 9 













   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   















5.2.3.2. Psi-Q Analysis 
A) Overall analysis by participant group 
Total Psi-Q scores were calculated by the mean scores provided across the sensory 
subscales (see Table 5.2). 
 All aphantasics 
(n = 91) 
All Controls 
 (n = 70) 

























Overall Psi-Q score 







Table 5.2: Table to depict the mean and standard deviation of all scores by aphantasic 
and control participants on each of the Psi-Q sensory subscales and the Psi-Q overall 
(which also included the visual subscale). 
 
Overall, aphantasic participants scored low on the Psi-Q with a median of 0.17 (range: 0 
– 7.77) compared to controls who scored a median of 7.23 (range: 3.43 – 10). A Mann-
Whitney test showed a significant difference (Mann-Whitney U = 93.50, p < .001, r = 
.84) in overall Psi-Q scores14 between aphantasic and control participants.  
  
                                               
14 This analysis also included the responses for the visual subscale of the Psi-Q. 
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B) Participant group analysis by all sensory domains of the Psi-Q 
Mean scores for each subscale were calculated by averaging the scores across the five 
items for each sensory subscale (excluding the visual subscale) for each participant group 
(as denoted in Table 5.2).  
 
Auditory imagery 
Aphantasic participants scored a median of 0, range: 0 – 10 compared to controls who 
scored a median of 8.2, range: 3 – 10. A Mann-Whitney showed a significant difference 
(Mann-Whitney U = 470.50, p < .001, r = .75) in Psi-Q auditory imagery scores between 
aphantasic and control participants. 
 
Olfactory imagery 
Aphantasic participants scored a median of 0, range: 0 – 10 compared to controls who 
scored a median of 6.8, range: 2 – 10 on the olfactory subscale. A Mann-Whitney showed 
a significant difference (Mann-Whitney U = 165, p < .001, r = .86) in Psi-Q olfactory 
imagery scores between aphantasic and control participants. 
 
Gustatory imagery 
Aphantasic participants scored a median of 0, range: 0 – 8.80 compared to controls who 
scored a median of 7.1, range: 2 – 10. A Mann-Whitney showed a significant difference 
(Mann-Whitney U = 137.50, p < .001, r = .86) in Psi-Q gustatory imagery scores between 
aphantasic and control participants. 
 
Tactile imagery 
Aphantasic participants scored a median of 0, range: 0 – 9.40 compared to controls who 
scored a median of controls median: 7.7, range: 2.6 – 10. A Mann-Whitney showed a 
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significant difference (Mann-Whitney U = 329.50, p < .001, r = .79) in Psi-Q tactile 
imagery scores between aphantasic and control participants. 
 
Kinaesthetic imagery 
Aphantasic participants scored a median of 0, range: 0 – 8.80, compared to controls who 
scored a median: 6.9, range: 2.6 – 10. A Mann-Whitney showed a significant difference 
(Mann-Whitney U = 370.50, p < .001, r = .77) in Psi-Q kinaesthetic imagery scores 
between aphantasic and control participants. 
 
Emotion  
Aphantasic participants scored a median of 0, range: 0 – 9, compared to controls who 
scored a median of 7.2, range: 1.5– 10. A Mann-Whitney showed a significant difference 
(Mann-Whitney U = 637, p < .001, r = .70) in Psi-Q emotion scores between aphantasic 
and control participants. 
 
Together these results suggest that when examined by group, aphantasic participants do 
self-report statistically lower imagery ratings across sensory domains. However, 
variations in self-report responses are apparent, and not all aphantasic participants self-
report a lack of imagery across all of the sensory modalities. 
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5.2.3.3. Bucknell Auditory Imagery Scale (BAIS): Range of responses  
 
Figure 5.7: Histogram to show the distribution of BAIS-V responses for all aphantasic 
and control participants. 
 
Figure 5.7 shows the mean distribution of scores on the BAIS-V subscale by aphantasic 
(n = 91) and control participants (n = 70). The majority of aphantasic participants (n = 
71) scored BAIS-V ≤ 2; however, there were a subset of aphantasic participants (n = 20) 
who scored above 2 indicating a more vivid auditory imagery experience. From this 
subset, 18 also reported vivid auditory imagery on the Psi-Q scale (the other 2 aphantasic 
participants from this subset self-reported 0 on the Psi-Q auditory scale, despite a mean 
of 2.68 on the BAIS-V), see Table 5.3. 
 
Controls scored BAIS-V ≥ 3 (n = 63), however, there were 7 controls who scored BAIS-
V < 3 (mean = 2.57, SD = 0.26). These 7 controls had a mean VVIQ score of 52 (SD = 
13.74). 
  
















   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   















(BAIS-V > 2) 
All aphantasics  
(n = 91)  
All Controls  
(n = 70) 
BAIS-V 1.15 (0.23) 4.34 (1.89) 1.90 (1.63) 4.54 (1.20) 
BAIS-C 1.27 (0.61) 4.65 (2.14) 2.07 (1.92) 4.85 (1.08) 
 
Table 5.3: Table to denote the mean and standard deviation of low and high auditory 
imagery aphantasics, all aphantasic (i.e. combined low and high imagery aphantasic 
participants) and control participants in the BAIS. 
 
5.2.3.4. BAIS Analysis 
To examine differences in scores between participant groups (i.e. all control and all 
aphantasic participants, see Table 5.3), data was first transformed using a Box-Cox 
transformation (Box & Cox, 1964) to address issues in normality (see Chapter 2, 
Experiment 1, section 2.2.3.4). A two-way mixed measures ANOVA with Greenhouse-
Geisser correction with factors group (aphantasic/ control) and subscale of the BAIS 
(vividness/ control) showed a significant main effect of subscale (F(1, 159) = 7.62, p = 
.006, ηp2 = .05), with participants scoring significantly higher on the BAIS-C subscale 
than the BAIS-V. There was a significant main effect of participant group (F(1, 159) = 
181.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .53) suggesting controls scored significantly higher in both 
subscales compared to aphantasic participants. There was no significant interaction 
between the BAIS subscales and participant group (F(1, 159) = 1.62, p = .21, ηp2 = .01) 
indicating that there was no evidence of a difference in performance on the two subscales 
between groups. These results suggest that the experience of auditory imagery is different 
between the two groups, and participants found it easier to manipulate aspects of the 
auditory image than rate the vividness.   
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Self-reported BAIS-V scores for aphantasic and control participants were correlated 
using a Spearman correlation to the auditory subscale of the Psi-Q. In controls, the results 
showed a significant strong positive correlation (r = .61, p < .001), with a significant 
stronger positive correlation (r = .76, p < .001) evident within the aphantasic group. This 
suggests that scores provided on one type of auditory measure were similar to the scores 
provided on the other auditory measure. 
 
5.2.4. Discussion 
Experiment 8 examined how individuals with aphantasia self-report their imagery across 
other sensory domains. Specifically, this experiment examined in detail the individual 
variation within aphantasic participants’ self-reports within non-visual sensory domains. 
The majority of aphantasic participants (57%) within the sample self-reported a lack of 
imagery across all of the seven sensory domains shown in the Psi-Q, which is in line with 
the findings of Zeman et al., (2020). Aphantasic participants who self-reported one to 
three domains as being affected most frequently self-reported the domains of olfaction, 
taste and tactile as absent. Few aphantasic participants self-reported intact imagery 
abilities across the non-visual senses, suggesting their aphantasia was not confined to the 
visual domain. Over a third of aphantasic participants self-reported vivid imagery 
experiences in at least one sensory modality. They also provided higher ratings for 
auditory, tactile and the emotion imagery, indicative of more vivid imagery in these 
domains. However, this group provided lower scores on gustation and olfactory domains 
suggesting that of the aphantasic participants who did experience imagery in these 
domains, the experience was more vague and dim compared to other senses. While this 
group of aphantasic participants self-reported a more vivid imagery experience, the mean 
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ratings provided for each domain were not as high as the ratings provided by the control 
participants with typical imagery.  
 
Similarly, in the BAIS questionnaire, the majority of aphantasic participants self-reported 
a lack of auditory imagery and provided low scores in both BAIS subscales. The scores 
were significantly higher in the BAIS-C subscale, suggesting that despite an absence of 
auditory imagery, aphantasic participants found it somewhat easier to manipulate and 
adjust features of the auditory experience. Less than a quarter of aphantasic participants 
self-reported vivid auditory imagery experience and the mean ratings provided were 
similar to the mean ratings of controls. Together, this suggests that there is much 
variability in the way that individuals with aphantasia can present with their imagery 
deficits. Further research should examine the profile of these subgroups of imagery 
experience in more detail. 
 
The lowest scores provided by both aphantasic and typical imagery participants were for 
olfactory and gustatory imagery. A study by Schiffersten (2009) asked participants to 
rank imagery vividness across all sensory domains and showed that participants ranked 
olfactory and gustatory imagery as the lowest, suggesting it was more difficult to generate 
a vivid quality image for these senses. A reason for this is that olfactory images have been 
proposed to be more difficult to generate and maintain (Lacey & Lawson, 2014) and 
introspecting may involve multisensory confounds (Auvray & Spence, 2008; 
Schifferstein, 2009). For example, in individuals with typical imagery, olfactory or 
gustatory images may also be accompanied by an involuntary visual image (Nanay, 
2018). Unlike the olfactory and gustatory domains, auditory imagery has been proposed 
to have numerous similarities to visual imagery and thus may be a good candidate to 
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investigate further in aphantasia. For instance, it has spatial characteristics similar to the 
visual domain (Halpern, 1988; Zatorre et al., 1996). Further, evidence from neuroimaging 
and lesion studies have shown that auditory imagery has a ‘what’ and ‘where’ pathway 
similar to the ‘what/where’ pathways described within the visual domain (Clarke et al., 
2000; Warren et al., 2002). At present, spatial and visual imagery differences in 
individuals with aphantasia were not evident in the visual domain, potentially due to the 
difficulties in isolating each construct within a behavioural task. It may be possible, 
however, to separate these constructs within the auditory domain, and this shall be 
explored within the following Chapter. 
 
5.2.5. Chapter conclusion 
This Chapter examined two broad questions. The first was whether it was possible to 
separate visual and spatial imagery constructs within the visual domain, and the second, 
how individuals with aphantasia self-report on broader sensory imagery measures. 
Experiment 7 investigated whether a task that isolated ‘visual’ imagery would show 
performance differences due to aphantasics’ inability to access visual imagery. 
Specifically, this was examined in a task requiring the judgements of spatial and visual 
properties of everyday common objects. No difference in performance on either accuracy 
or response time between aphantasic and control participants were evident, especially in 
statements with regards to visual properties. It was concluded that written statements were 
not an effective means to examine visual and spatial differences. The experiment 
highlighted the difficulties in separating visual and spatial constructs behaviourally 
within the visual domain. However, visual-spatial differences could be explored further 
within other sensory modalities.  
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Experiment 8 explored the variations in self-reports provided by individuals with 
aphantasia within non-visual sensory modalities and also examined in more depth the 
imagery experiences of the auditory domain. The results suggest that the majority of 
aphantasic participants self-reported a lack of imagery across the senses. Furthermore, 
there was a small subset who experienced an absence of imagery in one to three domains, 
typically the olfactory, gustatory and tactile domains. On the other hand, a third of 
aphantasic participants self-reported vivid imagery within the other senses, suggesting 
that there are numerous ways aphantasia can present, and variations in aphantasic 
experience. Similarly, individuals with aphantasia self-report lower on the BAIS 
questionnaire; however, there was a subgroup of aphantasic participants who self-
reported vivid auditory imagery similar to the scores self-reported by typical imagery 
controls. If the auditory domain has many commonalities to the visual domain, this may 
make it a good candidate to further examine visual-spatial (equivalent) differences. 
Moreover, if individuals with aphantasia self-report an absence of auditory imagery, 
exploring their performance objectively within tasks that require auditory imagery would 
contribute to the additional understanding of aphantasic imagery capabilities outside of 








Despite the fact that there is variability in non-visual self-reports (Experiment 8), the 
majority of aphantasic participants do report an absence of mental imagery in at least one 
other domain. One sensory domain that has not been explored objectively in aphantasia, 
is that of audition. Within this Chapter, performance is examined within two auditory 
experiments: a musical imagery pitch task (Experiment 9) and a voice identification task 
(Experiment 10). The paradigm in Experiment 9 was adapted from the seminal auditory 
imagery tasks by Halpern (1988). It involved two conditions, one condition whereby 
participants used imagery to compare the pitch of lyrics within well-known songs and a 
matched perceptual tone condition. Results showed no significant difference in accuracy 
or response time between aphantasic and control participants in either of the two 
conditions. Experiment 10 investigated the ability to generate internal auditory 
representations of different vocal identities. Participants were trained to discriminate 
between two speakers and then required to identify a target speaker producing a novel 
speech utterance that was derived from morphing between the target voice identity and 
another trained speaker. The category boundary between the two speakers was estimated. 
The results of this experiment showed that individuals with aphantasia were able to 
summon equivalently sharp categorical representations of the two voices, indicating that 
they had formed equivalently well-specified internal auditory images of the speakers’ 
voices. Together, the results of these experiments suggest that despite self-reporting a 
lack of auditory imagery, there is no evidence to suggest that the performance exhibited 
by individuals with aphantasia differs to individuals with typical imagery.  
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General Introduction 
Within non-visual sensory questionnaires (Experiment 8), individuals with aphantasia 
reported their imagery experience to be significantly lower than controls with typical 
imagery. This self-reported deficit in the auditory domain is supported by the findings of 
the Bucknell Auditory Imagery Scale (BAIS) questionnaire, in which aphantasic 
participants reported a lack of auditory imagery and an inability to manipulate auditory 
representations. Nevertheless, it should be noted that there was some variability in 
responses - not all aphantasic participants reported a lack of imagery across all senses. 
This variability has also been documented within other studies (Dawes et al., 2020; 
Zeman et al., 2020; Zeman et al., 2015). Therefore, in at least some individuals, 
aphantasia may represent a deficit that extends beyond visual imagery and across other 
modalities. Further, given that differences in objective imagery function have been 
difficult to detect in visual imagery tasks, it is possible that these deficits may be easier 
to detect in auditory imagery tasks. For example, it may be is easier to create tasks that 
require separable perceptual and spatial imagery components.  
 
Within the visual domain, self-reports within visual imagery questionnaires (such as the 
Object Spatial Imagery Questionnaire, OSIQ, see Chapter 2, Experiment 1), have shown 
that aphantasic participants have lower self-report scores on object imagery subscales. 
However, they reported similar levels of spatial imagery to those with typical imagery. 
This preference implies (according to the subscales definitions as outlined by 
Blanjenkova et al., 2006) that aphantasic individuals rate their imagery representations as 
abstract, rather than reflecting the literal representations of objects and their respective 
features. Despite having low self-reported object imagery on a task that probed visual and 
spatial details of common everyday objects (Experiment 7), there was no evidence to 
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suggest differences in objective performance between aphantasic and typical imagery 
participants. This suggests that in the visual domain, the self-reported experience of visual 
imagery in individuals with aphantasia differs from their objective performance within 
imagery tasks. Alternatively, the tasks undertaken in the visual domain (thus far in this 
thesis) may not have been sensitive enough to capture the differences in imagery 
experience. Although performance differences in tasks within the visual domain were not 
evident when examined by group (within Experiment 4, 5 and 6), subgroups of aphantasia 
were identified that had varying patterns of performance within visuospatial tasks. An 
important question then is whether a similar pattern may be seen in the auditory domain, 
i.e. will a self-reported lack of auditory imagery translate to differences in performance 
within auditory imagery tasks? Given that there is no evidence of performance differences 
in the visual domain, one might expect a similar pattern of performance for auditory 
imagery tasks. 
 
Similar to visual imagery, auditory imagery can be defined as “the introspective 
persistence of an auditory experience, including one constructed from components drawn 
from long-term memory, in the absence of direct sensory instigation of that experience,” 
(Inons-Peterson, 1992, pg. 46). Auditory and visual imagery share many characteristics. 
For instance, like visual imagery, auditory imagery can evoke both voluntary or 
involuntary quasi-perceptual experiences (for instance, earworms, e.g. see Williamson et 
al., 2012). In self-report measures, studies have shown a correlation between visual and 
auditory imagery vividness, with higher self-reported vividness in one type of imagery 
experience, i.e. visual imagery, correlating with higher self-ratings in the other, i.e. 
auditory imagery (Lima et al., 2015). It should be noted, however, that while self-reported 
vividness of visual imagery correlates with social desirability (e.g. McKelvie, 1995), no 
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such correlation exists with the self-reported vividness of auditory imagery (Allbutt, Ling, 
Heffernan, & Shafiullah, 2008). Nevertheless, there are similarities between the visual 
and auditory domains, for example, visual imagery can interfere or facilitate the 
discrimination of visual targets (Craver-Lemley & Reeves, 1992; Segal, 1971), and 
likewise, auditory imagery can also interfere or facilitate the discrimination of auditory 
targets (Hubbard & Stoeckig, 1988; Okada & Matsuoka, 1992).  
 
Neuropsychological patient studies have also shown that damage to brain regions relating 
to perception confer parallel patterns of damage in mental imagery for both the visual 
(e.g. DeVreese, 1991, see Chapter 1 section 1.2.2) and auditory domains (Zatorre & 
Halpern, 1993). This suggests that imagery and perception share some common neural 
mechanisms across modalities. Neuroimaging studies have shown that while visual 
imagery corresponds to activity in the primary visual cortex (e.g. Brogaard & Gatzia, 
2017; Kosslyn et al., 2001), auditory imagery corresponds to activity in the primary and 
secondary auditory cortex (Bunzeck, Wuestenberg, Lutz, Heinze, & Jancke, 2005; Oh, 
Kwon, Yang, & Jeong, 2013; Saenz & Langers, 2014). While the specific brain regions 
may differ, neuroimaging and lesion studies have shown that auditory imagery has a 
‘what’ and ‘where’ pathway similar to the ‘what/where’ pathways described within the 
visual domain (Clarke et al., 2000; Warren et al., 2002). The auditory ventral pathway or 
‘what’ pathway is involved with the processing of sound identity including voices or 
speech perception (Arnott et al., 2004; Hickok & Poeppel, 2004; Rauschecker & Tian, 
2003; Zatorre et al., 2002), while the auditory dorsal pathway or ‘where’ pathway 
processes auditory spatial information (Arnott et al., 2004; Rauschecker, 1998; 
Rauschecker & Tian, 2003; Warren & Griffiths, 2003).  
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Auditory imagery also has preserved temporal (spatial) characteristics akin to visual 
imagery. For instance, in the visual domain, visually scanning objects that are further 
apart in terms of distance, or mentally rotating objects that require larger angular 
rotations, take participants longer to undertake (Kosslyn, 1973; Shepard & Metzler, 
1971). The same has been shown within musical imagery studies whereby it takes longer 
to scan through an imagined melody that contains a longer series of beats (Halpern, 1988; 
Zatorre et al., 1996). Similarly, it takes participants longer to judge the loudness or pitch 
of two contrasting sounds within auditory imagery when large adjustments between the 
two sounds are required (Intons-Peterson, Russell, & Dressel, 1992; Intons-Peterson, 
1980). These studies suggest that features of auditory images are extended in time akin 
to the way that visual images are extended in space (Halpern, 1988; Halpern & Zatorre, 
1999).  
 
Several studies have examined the relationship between spatial imagery (in the visual 
domain) and the temporal characteristics of auditory imagery. A positive correlation was 
found between mental rotation performance and a reversal melody task, involving the 
detection of melodies that were presented in reverse (Cupchik, Phillips, & Hill, 2001). 
The authors suggested that this demonstrated a relationship between the ability to 
manipulate both spatial imagery and also temporal auditory information. In a melody 
reversal task (i.e. a temporal auditory imagery task), fMRI showed activation of the 
intraparietal sulcus (Zatorre et al., 2010). This area is also activated during the mental 
rotation of visual stimuli (Zacks, 2008), with the activation of the intraparietal sulcus 
suggested to reflect spatial transformation processes of a sensory input (Zatorre et al., 
2010).  
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Similar results were found in a study that involving the mental manipulation of language, 
namely the reversal of words, which was shown to engage similar mechanisms similar to 
those used for visuospatial mental rotation (Rudner, Rönnberg, & Hugdahl, 2005). 
Further evidence for shared mechanisms in the mental spatial manipulation of visual and 
audition information stem from studies of individuals with amusia. Individuals with 
amusia have spatial processing deficits, specifically, the inability to discriminate changes 
in pitch and perform worse on mental rotation tasks compared to neurotypical controls 
(Douglas & Bilkey, 2007; Tao, Huang, Li, Lu, 2015). From these results, Douglas and 
Bilkey (2007) suggested that pitch processing depends on the same cognitive mechanisms 
that are used for spatial processing. This finding remains controversial as other 
researchers failed to find deficits in spatial processing beyond the auditory domain 
(Tillmann et al., 2010; Williamson, Cocchini, & Stewart, 2011). However, subgroups of 
people with amusia have been identified that may explain for this variation in 
performance (Sun, Lu, Ho, & Thompson, 2017; Tao, Huang, Haponenko, & Sun, 2019; 
Williamson et al., 2011).  
 
If visual and spatial are difficult to separate within behavioural tasks in the visual domain, 
it may be easier to explore these equivalents within the auditory domain. Moreover, 
performance in auditory imagery tasks has not yet been explored in aphantasia. This 
Chapter will explore auditory imagery performance of individuals with aphantasia 
through two different paradigms: a musical imagery pitch task (Experiment 9) and a 
categorical perceptual task, which examines voice identities for unfamiliar voices 
(Experiment 10). Both of these tasks concern the ability to generate voluntary auditory 
imagery. These tasks also involve the retrieval of information from long-term memory, 
such as, the retrieval of familiar song lyrics (Experiment 9) and novel voice 
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representations, which are encoded into long-term memory during the training phase of 
the task (Experiment 10). Understanding how individuals with aphantasia, (specifically 
those that report a lack of auditory imagery) perform within auditory imagery tasks 
compared to individuals with typical imagery, will provide objective insights into the 
imagery capabilities of aphantasic individuals beyond the visual domain.  
 
Experiment 9: Pitch discrimination in imagery and perception 
6.1.1. Introduction 
Musical imagery is a subset of auditory imagery, specifically referring to musical auditory 
experiences, for instance, the ability to hear music in the mind’s ear (e.g. Bailes, 2007). 
Broadly, it is a multifaceted experience and can comprise of interactions of visual, 
auditory and motor domains (Bowes, 2009; Keller, 2012; Reybrouck, 2001), although it 
should be noted that the involvement and interaction of these domains are heavily 
dependent on task demands. Increased involvement of motor representations is 
particularly evident in individuals who have greater musical expertise. These individuals 
are suggested to generate anticipatory musical imagery in response to the mental planning 
of actions for upcoming musical notes (Bangert et al., 2006; Zatorre, Chen, & Penhune, 
2007). However, activation of motor areas, such as the supplementary motor area (SMA), 
is also associated with the rehearsal and maintenance of auditory images within working 
memory (Halpern et al., 2004; Herholz, Halpern, & Zatorre, 2012; Zatorre et al.,1996). 
Thus, motor areas are activated irrespective of musical expertise. Typically, musical 
imagery studies have examined how similar imagery is to perception by asking 
participants to inspect and assess perceptual aspects of the musical image, such as pitch, 
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timbre, tempo and loudness (e.g. Bishop, Bailes, & Dean, 2013; Halpern et al., 2004; 
Jakubowski, Farrugia, & Stewart, 2016; Janata & Paroo, 2006). However, there are 
conflicting arguments as to whether all perceptual features are represented within an 
auditory image, for example, the feature loudness, which is argued to rely more on motor 
imagery systems (Bishop, Bailes, & Dean, 2013; Intons-Peterson, 1980).  
 
Many studies exploring the perceptual features of musical imagery (i.e. pitch, timbre, 
tempo and loudness) have examined these features within musicians who have substantial 
formal musical training (e.g. Bailes, 2007; Schörmann, Raij, Fujiki, & Hari, 2002; Zatorre 
et al., 2010). Alternatively, auditory features have also been examined within studies that 
compare behavioural performance or examined differences in brain activation between 
musicians and non-musicians (e.g. Aleman, Nieuwenstein, Böcker, & De Haan, 2000; 
Herholz, Lappe, Knief, & Pantev, 2008; Janata & Paroo, 2006). Features of auditory 
imagery, such as pitch and tempo are suggested to be more refined in musicians (Halpern, 
1992; Janata & Paroo, 2006; Tervaniemi, Just, Koelsch, Widmann, & Schröger, 2005; 
Weir et al., 2015), with performance in short-term memory tasks that comprised of long 
variations of musical sequences, more biased towards those with musical backgrounds 
(Gelding et al., 2015). 
 
Pitch is a perceptual attribute of sound, defined by the frequency of the sound waves and 
is present within all natural and artificial sounds including music and speech (e.g. Plack, 
Oxenham, & Fay, 2006; Yuskaitis, Parviz, Loui, Wan, & Pearl, 2015). In a musical 
context, melodies are produced by a combination of multiple pitches (Plack et al., 2006). 
The extent to which pitch processing is associated with visuospatial processing and shares 
common processing mechanisms remains unclear. Nevertheless, pitch is often described 
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using spatial terms and is organised on a scale of low to high (e.g. Connell, Cai, & Holler, 
2013), which gives rise to the concept of ‘pitch height’ along a vertical location within 
space (Rusconi, Kwan, Giordano, Umiltà, & Butterworth, 2006). This is a concept 
adopted by both musicians and non-musicians (Lidji, Kolinsky, Lochy, & Morais, 2007). 
In a study by Mossbridge, Grabowecky and Suzuki (2011) the presentation of a high pitch 
sound was shown to modulate visuospatial attention, in that participants attended to a 
visual target within a corresponding higher spatial location. However, these results may 
reflect the associative feature between high pitch and spatial location rather than the idea 
that pitch shares common representations to spatial processes. Evidence from studies 
within amusia has proved inconclusive, with some studies suggesting a relationship 
between visuospatial processing and pitch processing (Douglas & Bilkey, 2007; Tao et 
al., 2015) and others finding no such association (Tillmann et al., 2010; Williamson et 
al., 2011). This suggests that pitch representation deficits are not necessarily comorbid 
with visuospatial deficits, and do not share common mechanisms. In contrast, a number 
of studies in neurotypical populations have suggested that there is a relationship between 
pitch processing, spatial positions and movements (Connell et al., 2013; Rusconi et al., 
2006). Likewise, more broadly it is viewed that different sensory modalities do share 
common mechanisms for the processing of spatial information (Cupchik et al., 2001; 
Rudner et al., 2005; Zatorre et al., 2010).  
 
Pitch is one auditory feature that has been well examined within musical imagery (e.g. 
Aleman et al., 2000; Gelding et al., 2015; Halpern, 1989; Janata & Paroo, 2006; Keller, 
Cowan, & Saults, 1995; Weir et al., 2015). It is also a feature that can be explored within 
individuals who have not had formal musical training (Gelding et al., 2015; Halpern, 
1989; Keller et al., 1995). For instance, in perceptual pitch tasks, non-musicians have 
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been shown to accurately discriminate between small variances in pitch on a range of 
different musical instruments (Tervaniemi et al., 2005). On the other hand, musicians tend 
to perform better than individuals who have had no musical training within imagery pitch 
discrimination tasks (Janata & Paroo, 2006). Nevertheless, individuals with no musical 
training have been shown to still perform well on such tasks (Aleman et al., 2000). 
Further, it has been argued that pitch is accurately represented within auditory images 
(Halpern, 1992; Halpern, 1989; Levitin, 1994). The accuracy of representations of pitch 
can be examined through temporal judgements. For instance, participants are presented 
with the beginning of a well-known song and using musical imagery, indicate when their 
auditory representation of a song has reached a certain point (Halpern & Zatorre, 1999; 
Herholz et al., 2008; Weir et al., 2015). Alternatively, the accuracy of pitch 
representations has been investigated through pitch discrimination paradigms that involve 
determining the highest pitch of two lyrics within a well-known song (Aleman et al., 
2000; Halpern, 1989; Herholz et al., 2008; Zatorre & Halpern, 1993). Although both of 
these methods involve the short-term maintenance of familiar songs, participants are 
more accurate within tasks involving pitch discrimination compared to timing judgments 
(Weir et al., 2015).  
 
 
At present, no study has examined the objective performance of individuals with 
aphantasia on imaging tasks within the auditory domain. Therefore, it is unclear how 
individuals with aphantasia would perform on a musical imagery task that requires the 
inspection of perceptual features of auditory representations. Halpern (1989) suggested 
that individuals have rich auditory representations for familiar music. Moreover, pitch is 
a perceptual auditory feature that can be accurately inspected by individuals who have 
had no formal musical training (Gelding et al., 2015; Halpern, 1989; Keller et al., 1995). 
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If individuals with aphantasia cannot generate such representations, in line with their self-
reported lack of auditory imagery, then it is expected they would perform differently to 
individuals with typical imagery within a musical imagery pitch task. However, given 
that no differences in performance were found within the visual domain, despite 
aphantasic participants self-reported of a lack of visual imagery, it might be expected that 
no differences in performance would be expected. Whilst there might be deficits in 
auditory imagery, no deficits would be expected within a perceptual tone condition (a 




Aphantasic (VVIQ ≤ 26) and control (VVIQ > 33) participants in this study were the 
same as described in Chapter 5, Experiment 7, section 5.1.2.1 and briefly summarised in 
Table 6.1. The ethics are also the same as described in this section.  
 Participant group 
Demographics Aphantasics (n = 30) Controls (n = 30) 
Male 10 10 
Female 20 20 
Mean Age 38y0m (SD = 10.98y) 39y1m (SD 10.27) 
Mean VVIQ Score / 
80 
17.6 (SD = 2.88) 62.14 (SD 8.90) 
Lowest VVIQ Score 16 41 
Highest VVIQ Score 26 80 
 




6.1.2.2. Materials and Piloting 
Auditory Imagery Self-Reports: Bucknell Auditory Imagery Scale (BAIS) 
The BAIS (Halpern, 2015) is an auditory imagery questionnaire that comprises two 
scales: a vividness (BAIS-V) and control (BAIS-C) auditory imagery subscale (see 
Appendix 5.5). See Chapter 5, Experiment 8, section 5.2.2.2 for more detail. 
 
Goldsmiths Musical Sophistication Index (Gold-MSI): General Musical 
Sophistication Scale  
The Goldsmiths Musical Sophistication Index (Gold-MSI, see Appendix 6.1) is a measure 
of musical ability, preferences and degree of sophistication of musical skill and behaviour 
(Müllensiefen, Gingras, Musil, & Stewart, 2014). The original Gold-MSI comprises of 5 
stand-alone dimensions, each of which probe a specific aspect of musical behaviour such 
as perceptual ability, musical training, singing ability, musical engagement and emotion. 
The Gold-MSI also includes a sixth scale known as the General Musical Sophistication 
Scale, which encompasses all 5 of the dimensions. Questions included “I can tell when 
people sing or play out of tune” and “I rarely listen to music as a main activity”. The 
General Musical Sophistication Scale comprises of 18 questions, and individuals are 
asked to rate on a Likert scale of 1 (complete disagreement) to 7 (complete agreement) 
how much they agree or disagree with each statement. Scores of the questionnaires were 
copied into the Goldsmith’s scoring template (see Appendix 6.2) whereby answers for 
certain questions are scored either positively (e.g. “I enjoy writing about music, for 
example on blogs or forums”) or negatively (“I would not consider myself a musician”) 
to provide an overall normalised score for each participant. 
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Musical imagery pitch task: creating and piloting 
 The task was adapted from the classic auditory imagery (Halpern 1988). In total, 49 
popular songs were identified from a variety of sources: Plink “Thin slices” of music 
(Krumhansl & Zupnick, 2013), ‘NME Greatest Songs of All Time’ Spotify playlists: 
‘classic songs, ‘well-known songs’, ‘famous songs’, ‘power ballads’, ‘NOW 100 Hits 
Power Ballads’, ‘iconic songs of all time’, ‘classic pop picks’ Film/TV/Disney ‘Disney’, 
‘Greatest Disney’, ‘Pure Disney’, ‘Movie songs’, ‘Famous movie songs’ ‘Bond 
soundtrack, ‘Movie hits’, ‘Ultimate movie soundtracks’ ‘Christmas classic songs’, 
‘Christmas songs’, ‘Nursery rhymes.’ 
 
Potential familiar songs were identified by four rules: the chorus should contain the main 
title of the song, the title of the song was to be sung in the same way (speed, tempo and 
pitch) in each chorus, the title of the song could not refer to another song (e.g. “Ain’t No 
Mountain High Enough” is a title of a song by two different artists, Marvin Gaye and 
Dianna Ross respectively), and songs must not be chosen if they comprised of one-word 
titles (e.g. “Help”- The Beatles). Songs were excluded if the song title was sung in one 
pitch (e.g. the chorus was sung in the same pitch with no differences in high and low pitch 
variations). A total of 49 songs were chosen. A Qualtrics survey was created and 
circulated on social media to determine how familiar songs were by individuals of 
different ages (see Appendix 6.3). The survey asked individuals (over the age of 18) to 
rate their familiarity for all 49 songs on a scale of 1-5 (1 = I do not know this song, 2 = I 
know of this song but I do not know it well, 3 = I can hum or sing only the chorus of this 
song, 4 = I can hum or sing the majority of this song and 5 = I can hum or sing this song 
from start to finish). In total, 248 responses were received from the Qualtrics survey, with 
209 valid responses from individuals between the age of 18 and 75 (see Table 6.2). 
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Table 6.2: Table to depict the breakdown of age group by respondents in the song 
familiarity survey. 
 
The familiarity of a song (and therefore inclusion within the task) was determined if 
individuals had rated the song a minimum score of 3 (equating to “I can hum or sing the 
chorus of this song only”). Therefore, all songs that were rated as 3 (and above) across 
all ages were selected for the experiment (n = 20). Several songs were also chosen (n = 
4) for the practice block. These songs were familiar to the majority of the age groups (e.g. 
familiar to all ages 20-50, however, were rated 2.6 and above by individuals in their 60s). 
 
For the 20 songs, two alternative versions of high and low differentiation (known as target 
lyrics15) were chosen within each main title of the songs, which formed 40 experimental 
trials (see Appendix 6.4). Each version of the high-low differentiations of the song formed 
one block in the task (i.e. two blocks in total). The placing of high and low target lyrics 
was limited by the length of the song title. For instance, the longest song title “It’s 
Beginning to Look a Lot Like Christmas”, comprised of 11 syllables, therefore 11 
possible placings, in contrast to “Hey Jude”, which comprised of two syllables. 
Moreover, Halpern (1988) found a difference in response time; the further the two target 
lyrics were apart. Thus, target lyrics were either placed 0 syllables (n = 13), 1 syllable (n 
                                               
15 The term lyric within this Experiment is used to determine a word within the song title. 
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= 13) or 2 syllables (n = 14) apart. The first target lyric word appeared on the: first (n = 
17), second (n = 8), third (n = 10), fourth (n = 2), seventh (n = 1), eight (n = 1) and tenth 
(n = 1).   
 
Of the 40 trials, 21 trials presented had the second lyric higher than the first lyric (average 
semitone difference between the high and low pitch = 5.7), and in 19 trials the second 
lyric was lower than the first lyric (average semitone difference between the high and low 
pitch = 4.7). An independent t-test showed no significant difference (t(38) = 1.40, p = .17, 
d = .44) in semitone pitches between the two trial types. The songs for the practice task 
(n = 4) comprised three songs whereby the second lyric was higher than the first lyric, 
while in one song the second lyric was lower than the first lyric. Similarly, one song had 
a spacing of two syllables apart, one song a spacing of one syllable and two songs no 
syllables. The two target lyrics where the respective pitch was to be determined was 
underlined (see Figure 6.1 for an example of a trial). The title and artist of the song were 
also presented.  
 
Figure 6.1: Example of a trial in the lyric imagery condition where the second 
(underlined) syllable is lower in pitch than the first (underlined) syllable.  
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A matching perceptual tone condition was created with stimuli that matched the pitch of 
the target lyric semitones of the songs present in the lyric imagery condition. The tone 
stimuli (n = 40) were pure tones (sine waves) and recorded into Protools v2019.6 using a 
nocturn25 keyboard and Omisphere plugin. Each stimulus was presented in pairs for 
750ms with a 500ms silent gap in between (these timings stayed consistent throughout). 
The perceptual condition comprised of two blocks (n = 20 trials in each block). Tones 
were presented via Sennheiser headphones (HD 25). In both the lyric imagery condition 
and the perceptual condition, responses were made by pressing 1 (marked ‘High’) and 2 
(‘Low’) buttons on the number keypad of a QWERTY keyboard. Both tasks were 
programmed on E-prime version 3. 
 
6.1.2.3. Procedure  
General procedure for the testing session 
The musical imagery pitch task was part of a wider battery of tasks over one testing 
session. At the beginning of the session, participants were verbally briefed on the 
rationale of the study and signed participation consent (see Appendix 6.5). The tasks 
within the testing session are denoted in Figure 5.1 (Chapter 5, Experiment 7) and were 
randomised (but the lyric imagery and perceptual conditions were run consecutively). 
Once a participant had completed all four tasks and questionnaires, participants were 
debriefed (see Appendix 6.6) and asked to sign a declaration that they had received their 
£20 Amazon voucher. 
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Procedure: musical imagery pitch task 
The lyric imagery condition and the perceptual tone condition always appeared one after 
the other16; however, the order in which the tasks were run was counterbalanced. In the 
perceptual tone condition, participants were instructed to put on the headphones. They 
were told they would hear two tones one after the other and to determine whether the 
second tone was higher or lower in pitch than the first tone. Participants first undertook a 
short practice block comprising of four trials (these trials were the semitones of the 
practice trials in the lyric imagery condition). Following this, participants undertook the 
experimental perceptual tone condition. Once participants had finished the perceptual 
tone task, they were asked to remove their headphones, given the song familiarity list (on 
A4 paper) and asked to rate (with a pen) how familiar all 20 songs were on a scale of 1-5 
(see Appendix 6.7). If participants rated any songs either as 1 or 2, the experimenter 
checked whether the participant knew the song. In many instances, participants said they 
knew the song. However, they were hesitant to the extent they were familiar, in which 
case, they were instructed to see how familiar17 they were with the song when it was 
presented in the trial (often the presentation of the lyric during the task prompted the 
recall of the song). If participants were confident that they did not know the song, 
participants were instructed to skip the trial (by pressing 1 or 2).  
 
Following the familiarity ratings for all 20 songs, participants were provided with 
instructions to the task, namely to determine if the pitch of the second syllable of a song 
was higher or lower than the first underlined lyric. Following the instructions, participants 
undertook the practice of the lyric imagery condition (4 trials). During the practice trials 
                                               
16 Participants were not informed that the two conditions were associated with one another 
17 If participants reported recall of the song, then the trial was included in the analysis and if they were 
still unfamiliar with the song, the trial was excluded from the analysis. 
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only, participants were verbally asked if they were familiar with the song presented in 
each practice trial (these songs were not presented on the song-familiarity sheet). Each 
practice trial was also presented with a short clip of a female singing the lyric of the song. 
The female voice sang the exact notes of the song as it appeared in the trial. For three of 
the practice trials, participants were presented with the female vocals. However, on the 
fourth practice trial, if participants were familiar with the presented song, participants 
were asked to respond in the absence of the vocal aid. Participants were asked if they 
understood the nature of the task, and if so, they could begin the experimental version of 
the task. The experimenter stayed in the room (hidden from view) with the participant to 
ensure they did not hum or sing the lyrics. Upon completion of the two blocks, the task 
was finished, and participants were briefed with regards to the following task. 
 
6.1.3. Results  
In instances when data is not normally distributed (e.g. Shapiro-Wilk < 0.05 for all 
variables), data is transformed where stated, or non-parametric test is used. When 
sphericity is violated, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction is used. All tests are 2-tailed.  
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6.1.3.1. Bucknell Auditory Imagery Scale (BAIS) 
BAIS-V Score distribution 
 
Figure 6.2: Frequency histogram to depict the mean responses on the BAIS-V by all 
participants. 
 
Examining the frequency of responses on the BAIS-V (see Figure 6.2) revealed 9 
aphantasic participants who scored high on BAIS-V (BAIS-V > 2, mean = 4.58, 
minimum = 2.1418, maximum = 6.42, SD = 1.48) suggesting they had vivid auditory 
imagery experience. There were two control participants who scored (BAIS-V < 3, 
mean = 2.54, range: 2.43 - 2.64, SD = 0.15).  
 
BAIS Analysis 
To examine differences in the BAIS subscale between participant groups (see Figure 6.3), 
data was transformed using a Box-Cox transformation (Box & Cox, 1964, see Chapter 2, 
Experiment 2, section 2.2.3.4). 
                                               
18 The participant who scored 2.14 in the BAIS-V rated 6 questions as ‘3’, 4 questions rated as ‘2’ and 4 
questions rated as ‘1’ 













   
   
   
   
   













Figure 6.3: Bar chart to depict the mean and standard deviation (represented by error 
bars) of BAIS subscales scores provided by all aphantasic and control participants. 
 
A two-way mixed measures ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser correction with factors 
group (aphantasic/ control) and subscale of the BAIS (vividness/ control) showed no 
significant main effect of subscale (F(1, 58) = 2.48, p = .12, ηp2 = .04). However, there 
was a significant main effect of participant group (F(1, 58) = 65.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .53), 
with controls rating significantly higher in both subscales than aphantasic participants. 
There was no significant interaction between participant group and subscale (F(1, 58) = 
0.40, p = .53, ηp2 =  .007) indicating that there were no evidence of a difference in relative 
responses on the two subscales between groups. These results suggest that the experience 
























For the remaining experiments within this Chapter, performance will be examined for the 
aphantasic sample (n = 21) who score BAIS-V ≤ 2 compared to participants with typical 
imagery (n = 28) BAIS-V ≥ 319 
 
6.1.3.2. Goldsmiths Musical Sophistication Index (Gold-MSI): General Musical 
Sophistication Scale 
Aphantasic participants scored a median of 41 (range: 8 – 94.5) on the Gold-MSI while 
controls scored a median of 74.5 (range: 45 - 149). A Mann-Whitney test showed a 
significant difference (Mann-Whitney U = 91.50, p < .001, r = .58), suggesting that 
control participants self-reported having significantly more sophisticated musical skill 
and abilities than aphantasic participants.  
 
To explore whether the vividness of the auditory imagery was associated with a more 
sophisticated musical skill and ability, a Spearman’s correlation revealed a significant 
strong positive correlation between the Gold-MSI and BAIS-V (rs = .70, p < .001). There 
was also a significant strong positive correlation between the Gold-MSI and BAIS-C (rs 
= .68, p < .001). This significance was driven by a correlation in the control group (BAIS-
V: rs = .59, p = .002; BAIS-C: rs = .55, p = .004) but not the aphantasic group (BAIS-V: 
rs = .21, p = .37; BAIS-C: rs = .11, p = .64).  This suggests that control participants who 
reported significantly higher auditory imagery vividness, and ability to control aspects of 
                                               
19 The remaining sample included: aphantasic participants (n = 21), 8 were male and 13 females, mean age: 
39y09 (SD = 11.53), mean VVIQ score: 16.86 (minimum = 16, maximum = 24, SD = 2.36). Control 
participants (n = 28), 10 male and 18 females, mean age: 39y14 (SD = 10.61), mean VVIQ: 62.07 
(minimum = 41, maximum = 80, SD = 9.20). An independent t-test (t(47) = 0.14, p = .99, d = .001) 
confirmed no significant difference in age between aphantasic and control participants. Three controls were 
hyperphantasic mean: 77.3 (SD = 2.52).  
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an auditory image were more likely to score higher in the Gold-MSI reflecting greater 
and more sophisticated musical skill and ability.  
 
6.1.3.3. Musical imagery pitch task: Accuracy 
Two control participants20, one who self-reported as tone-deaf (his performance accuracy 
within the perceptual tone task was 50%) and another who showed profoundly impaired 
performance on the tone task (whose mean accuracy was: 0.72, compared to the mean 
accuracy of the remaining controls: 0.93, SD = 0.07) were additionally excluded from 
this analysis, resulting in 26 control participants. One additional aphantasic participant 
was excluded as she was unfamiliar with the majority of songs (14 out of 20 songs) within 
the task, resulting in 20 aphantasic participants within the subsequent analysis. These 
participants were also excluded from the analysis of the perceptual tone condition.  
 
In the aphantasic sample, 52 songs in total were identified as unfamiliar, which resulted 
in the removal of 104 trials. In the control sample, 43 songs were identified as unfamiliar, 
which resulted in the removal of 86 trials. Accuracy in the two conditions was compared 
between aphantasic and control participants (see Figure 6.4). 
  
                                               
20 These participants were also excluded from Experiment 10. 
 224 
 
Figure 6.4: Bar chart to depict the proportional mean accuracy and standard deviation 
(represented by error bars) of aphantasic and control participants in the musical imagery 
pitch task. 
 
A 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with factors participant group (aphantasic/ control) and task (lyric 
imagery / perceptual tone) showed a significant main effect of task (F(1, 44) = 101.51 p 
< .001, ηp2 = .70), with both aphantasic and control participants performing more 
accurately in the perceptual tone condition compared to the lyric imagery condition. 
There was no significant main effect of participant group (F(1, 44) = 0.37, p = .55, ηp2 = 
.008) and no significant interaction (F(1, 44) = 1.24, p = .27, ηp2 = .03). These results 
suggest that aphantasic participants who self-report a lack of auditory imagery were as 
accurate as controls in the lyric imagery and perceptual tone conditions. 
 
Effect of familiarity on accuracy 
To examine if one participant group was more familiar with the songs than the other, 
familiarity ratings of songs were compared. Aphantasic participants scored lower for 
familiarity across all 20 songs with a median of 3 (range: 2.65 – 4.20) compared to 
controls who scored a median of 4 (range: 3.12 – 4.81). A Mann-Whitney test showed a 



























Musical Imagery Pitch Task Condition 
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significant difference (Mann-Whitney U = 76, p < .001, r = .50) in familiarity ratings of 
the songs within the musical imagery pitch task. This suggests that controls self-reported 
as more familiar with the songs in the task compared to aphantasic participants.  
 
To examine whether the higher ratings for familiarity by control participants affected 
their accuracy within the musical imagery pitch task, the average familiarity and average 
accuracy for each song were calculated. A Spearman’s rank-order correlation between 
the accuracy of responses for each song (within the lyric imagery condition) and 
familiarity scores for each song showed a weak non-significant correlation (rs = .27, p = 
.10). This suggests that although control participants provided higher familiarity ratings 
for the songs, this did not equate to more accurate performance.  
 
6.1.3.4. Musical imagery pitch task: Response Time 
Response time in the two conditions was compared between aphantasic and control 
participants (see Figure 6.5). 
 
Figure 6.5: Bar chart to depict the mean response time in seconds and standard deviation 
(represented by error bars) of aphantasic and control participants in the musical imagery 
pitch task.   






















To examine response time differences between participant groups, a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA 
with factors participant group (aphantasic/ control) and task (lyric imagery / perceptual 
tone) showed a significant main effect of task (F(1, 44) = 166.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .79), 
suggesting that participants were significantly quicker in the perceptual tone condition 
compared to the lyric imagery condition. There was no significant main effect of 
participants group (F(1, 44) = 0.01, p = .95, ηp2 < .001) and no significant interaction 
(F(1, 44) = 0.25, p = .62, ηp2 = .01). These results suggest that the response times of 
individuals with aphantasia are comparable to typical imagers on both the lyric imagery 
and perceptual tone condition. 
 
6.1.4. Discussion  
This experiment examined the performance of an age-matched sample of aphantasic and 
control participants with typical imagery on a musical imagery pitch paradigm. The 
results showed that individuals with aphantasia had significantly lower self-report scores 
on the BAIS auditory imagery questionnaire. Despite this self-reported difference in their 
conscious experience of auditory imagery, no significant differences in accuracy or 
response time were evident compared to typical imager controls. Moreover, aphantasic 
participants performed similarly to control participants with typical imagery despite 
controls rating significantly higher musical sophistication abilities. This higher musical 
sophistication was shown to correlate with the BAIS-V subscale. Control participants 
were also significantly more familiar with the songs in the task. However, this familiarity 
did not result in more accurate performance in the task. The lack of correlation between 
familiarity ratings and accuracy supports the notion that pitch is well represented within 
auditory images. Moreover, it suggests that one does not need to be overly familiar with 
a song to have a good understanding of the representation of pitch within a particular 
lyric.   
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In line with findings from visual self-reports and performance, there remains a 
discrepancy between self-reported auditory imagery experience and performance within 
an auditory imagery task. Within the current experiment, the majority of aphantasic 
participants self-reported an absence of auditory imagery on both subscales of the BAIS. 
However, there was a subset of aphantasic participants who self-reported vivid auditory 
image experiences. This is consistent with the findings from Experiment 8 (see also 
Dawes et al., 2020; Zeman et al., 2020) and suggests that impairments within the visual 
modality are not necessarily comorbid with impairment within all other sensory 
modalities. Conversely, differing experiences between visual and auditory modalities 
were evident within some individuals with typical imagery. Within the current 
experiment, two controls had high self-report scores for visual imagery; however, they 
had significantly lower scores when describing their auditory imagery experience. This 
may be because introspecting on one’s imagery, especially in other senses, is more 
challenging (Schiffersten, 2009), or it may be a true reflection of their imagery ability 
within that modality. Further research should investigate these variations within 
aphantasic and typical imagery populations.  
 
A tangential observation from aphantasic participants undertaking the BAIS was that 
there was a variation also in their experience or presence of an internal voice. Despite 
self-reporting a lack of auditory imagery, some aphantasic participants commented that 
they had an internal voice, while others reported their “mind was silent”. When 
completing the BAIS, several aphantasic participants self-reported a lack of auditory 
imagery, but reported the presence of an internal voice, and viewed (and used) this 
internal voice as auditory imagery to mimic the scenarios written within the BAIS. Inner 
speech is suggested to comprise auditory traits that are present in overt speech, such as 
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pitch information (Vilhauer, 2016). Moreover, while it is viewed by some that inner 
speech is a subset of auditory imagery (Hubbard, 2010; Price, 2012), it has been argued 
they are separate processes (Alderson-Day & Fernyhough, 2015). Future research should 
establish the relationship between auditory imagery and the internal voice within 
aphantasic individuals who have and self-report an absence of auditory imagery. 
 
Responses in both the BAIS and the lyric imagery task required the formation of auditory 
representations derived from long-term memory. However, the auditory task and BAIS 
questionnaire differed in that the BAIS asks questions relating to the vividness and control 
(a form of manipulation) of auditory scenarios. Vividness within the BAIS relates to the 
introspection and judgement of the clarity of a particular sound-scenario, with the 
majority of aphantasic participants providing self-reports in line with their vividness of 
visual imagery self-reports. On the other hand, the musical imagery pitch task arguably 
assesses the accuracy of the perceptual feature pitch within auditory representations. Pitch 
has suggested to be a temporal characteristic within auditory imagery (Connell et al., 
2013; Intons-Peterson et al., 1992; Rusconi et al., 2006). Within the task, participants 
were asked to make a mental comparison to determine the pitch of certain lyrics of 
familiar songs. This does not necessarily examine the vividness of auditory experience; 
thus, this paradigm may be insensitive to the deficits present within aphantasia.  
 
Moreover, the paradigm involved little manipulation. The lyrics acted as an anchor or 
hook for locating the respective notes within a song to be subsequently compared. This 
requires a greater reliance on top-down processes and involvement of motor regions 
associated with the retrieval of the song and its respective melody (Gelding, Thompson, 
& Johnson, 2019; Tervaniemi et al., 2005), from which a representation of the target notes 
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are assessed. This is in contrast to the perceptual tone condition that relies more on 
bottom-up processes, involving the maintenance of novel tones within working memory.  
 
In the lyric imagery condition, target lyrics were presented visually for each song and 
participants were asked to determine differences in pitch. Recall of auditory 
representations of each song from long term memory can be argued to also comprise 
associated features other than pitch, such as rhythm and language, i.e. imagery of the sung 
lyrics (Zatorre et al., 1996), although neither of these features would provide the 
necessary information about the pitch to respond in the task. Future studies examining 
perceptual aspects of musical imagery could include tasks that avoid the use of song 
lyrics. However, such tasks often involve the maintenance or manipulation of multiple 
tones (for instance, tasks that involve the metal reversal of melodies) and are often too 
complex for non-musicians to undertake (Zatorre et al., 2010; Zatorre, 2012). 
 
Nevertheless, one such task that could be used in future investigations is the pitch imagery 
arrow task (PIAT), which has been made recently available as a validated task to explore 
pitch discrimination in both musical and non-musical populations (Gelding et al., 2020). 
This task has also shown to highly correlated with both the vividness and control 
subscales of the BAIS (Gelding et al., 2015). Tasks corresponding to the control subscale 
of the BAIS are suggested to be particularly challenging to examine within individuals 
who are non-musicians (Zatorre et al., 2010). Within the current experiment, individuals 
with aphantasia scored significantly lower on both subscales of the BAIS. Thus, it could 
be expected that aphantasic participants would exhibit different patterns of performance 
compared to individuals with typical imagery on a task such as the PIAT. Furthermore, 
other perceptual musical features not reliant on lyrics, such as timbre (Halpern et al., 
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2004) could also be examined to get a better understanding of how aspects are represented 
within musical imagery, and the extent of the involvement of motor areas within musical 
imagery paradigms.  
 
The purpose of the perceptual condition was solely to ensure that participants could 
discriminate between pitch, rather than investigate auditory working memory capabilities. 
Both aphantasic and typical imager control participants were more accurate within the 
perceptual condition compared to the lyric imagery condition. This finding has been 
found within previous studies examining other features of musical imagery (Jakubowski 
et al., 2016). Within the current experiment, two short novel tones were presented one 
after the other, separated by a silent interval. Unlike the lyric imagery condition, which 
required the retrieval of auditory information from long-term memory, the perceptual 
tone condition involved the short-term storage of auditory information. In terms of the 
multicomponent working memory, these non-verbal tones would be stored and rehearsed 
via an articulation-based process within the phonological loop (Baddeley, 2011; Baddeley 
& Logie, 1992). Specifically, the first tone would be rehearsed in working memory and 
subsequently compared to the pitch of the second note (Keller et al., 1995). Rehearsal of 
the note is easier given the lack of distractors in the interval between the two tones (Berti, 
Münzer, Schröger, & Pechmann, 2006).  
 
If no differences in performance are apparent within a musical imagery pitch task that 
requires pitch discrimination in familiar songs, questions remain as to how individuals 
would perform within tasks that comprise of unfamiliar sounds. Pitch is an attribute not 
only present within music but also speech (Plack, Oxenham, & Fay, 2006; Yuskaitis, 
Parviz, Loui, Wan, & Pearl, 2015). Pitch information is also key to communicating word 
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meaning (Tillmann, 2014). Another way to explore the accuracy of the generation of 
auditory representations within individuals with aphantasia is through a voice 
identification task. In this task, participants are trained to convert novel voice 
representations of unfamiliar speakers to long-term memory stores for subsequent 
retrieval within a voice identification paradigm. This will be explored within the 
following experiment.   
 
Experiment 10: Categorical perception of voices in aphantasia 
 
6.2.1 Introduction 
Voices are incredibly complex in that they contain a variety of emotional, linguistic and 
non-linguistic information (e.g. see review Scott & McGettigan, 2015). The perception 
of speech or voice identity involves the processing of individual emotional, acoustic and 
phonetic cues at different stages of the auditory cortex (Pannese, Grandjean, & Frühholz, 
2015). Vocal pronunciations of words vary largely due to individual differences in accent 
acquisition, as well as differences in the anatomy of vocal apparatus such as the size of 
vocal folds, shape of the palate and use of the vocal tract (Scott & McGettigan, 2015). 
Overall this variation in acoustic signatures enables listeners to recognise and 
discriminate between different speakers (Lavan, Burton, Scott, & McGettigan, 2019). 
Recognition identity of voices is enhanced if the individual is familiar with the voice 
(Lavan et al., 2019) or if a voice is in an individual’s native language (Perrachione, Del 
Tufo, & Gabrieli, 2011; Perrachione, Pierrehumbert, & Wong, 2009). This is thought to 
be due to the familiar phonology and awareness of one’s language, and this information 
is key during the phonological processing of speech required in voice identification 
(Lavan et al., 2019).  
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A crucial aspect of speech perception is the ability to sort the highly variable acoustic 
features or signals of speech into discrete phonetic categories, known as categorical 
perception (Liberman, Harris, Hoffman, & Griffith, 1957). In speech, for instance, a 
speech continuum between two vowels or phonemes, for instance, /b/ and /d/, can be 
synthesised so that one phoneme gradually transitions to sound like the second phoneme. 
Subsequently, upon hearing phonemes from within the continua, individuals perceive one 
phoneme (e.g. b) or the other phoneme (e.g. d) rather than something in-between 
(Mottonen & Watkins, 2009). Each phoneme, with its unique acoustic features, are sorted 
into discrete speech sounds defined by category boundaries (Mottonen & Watkins, 2009). 
Voice identity categorisation can be examined in a similar way by voice morphing the 
same vowel continua between two different speakers (Latinus & Belin, 2011). Voice 
morphing enables the synthesis of natural-sounding interpolates between the two 
different voices from which voice identity accuracy can be examined. When categorising 
the identity of two different voices on previously unheard speech, one must generate 
internal auditory representations of each speaker, and use these representations to 
compare to ambiguous voice syllables across the morphing continua. Performance is 
enhanced after a period of voice training of the specific voices within the task (Latinus & 
Belin, 2011). This suggests that through training, the listener has greater reliability in 
labelling the speakers, leading to a steeper categorical boundary in speaker identification. 
During training, these voice representations are converted to long-term memory for 
subsequent recall and compared against the ambiguous voice syllables during 
experimental trials. 
 
Categorical perception paradigms are commonly used to examine auditory processing in 
individuals with developmental dyslexia. Individuals with dyslexia exhibit impairments 
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in pitch processing (Lifshitz-Ben-Basat & Fostick, 2019) and show poorer categorical 
perception function due to a phonological awareness or coding deficit (Blomert & 
Mitterer, 2004; Melby-Lervåg, Lyster, & Hulme, 2012; Zoubrinetzky, Collet, Serniclaes, 
Nguyen-Morel, & Valdois, 2016). Within categorical perception tasks, individual with 
dyslexia display categorical perception slopes that are more shallow than controls (Kong 
& Edwards, 2016), suggesting a less precise ability to categorise phonemes around the 
categorisation boundary. Although auditory processing issues are not reported within 
aphantasia, voice identity categorisation involves the generation and synthesis of novel 
auditory voice representations, which are converted to long-term memory. These auditory 
voice representations – auditory images – are subsequently retrieved and compared to 
ambiguous voice syllables. If individuals with aphantasia are unable to synthesise 
accurate voice representations, it is expected that they would display more shallow 
categorical perception functions for speakers. This would suggest they are less precise at 




Both aphantasic (VVIQ ≤ 26) and control (VVIQ > 33) participants in this experiment 
were the same as described in Experiment 9 (see section 6.1.2.1). The ethics are also the 
same as described in this section. As well as age, aphantasic participants were matched 
to control participants in terms of the region of the UK21 they attended Primary School 
(i.e. based in this location during the formative period of speech development ages 0-12 
                                               
21 Aspects of speech such as regional dialects can aid voice identification (Goggin, Thompson, Strube, & 
Simental, 1991; Lavan et al., 2019). The removal of 9 aphantasic and 4 control participants from the 
original sample impacted on the regional matching of participants. The full analysis for all participants 
matched by location (this includes all excluded participants) can be found in Appendix 6.11. The results 
of this analysis showed no significant difference between aphantasic and control participants. 
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years of age, see Table 6.3). All participants were unfamiliar with the voices used in the 
paradigm. 
 
Region of the UK Aphantasics (n= 21)  Controls (n = 26) 
London 9 11 
East of England 2 2 
East Midlands 3 3 
South East 2 2 
North West 3 4 
Yorkshire 0 1 
West Midlands 0 1 
South West 2 2 
 
Table 6.3: Table to depict the number of participants matched per regions of the UK 
where they attended Primary School. 
 
6.2.2.2. Materials 
Voice discrimination task 
Six male voices and seven female voices were recorded speaking 19 consonant-vowel 
syllables (/ba/, /ka/, /da/, /fa/, /ga/, /la/… /za/ etc.), repeated five times, each time in a 
randomised order (randomised in Excel, see Appendix 6.8). Each of the 13 speakers also 
recorded speaking 192 Bamford-Kowal-Bench (BKB) sentences (short 4-6 word 
sentences, such as “the flower stands in a pot”, “the cat jumped off the fence”, see 
Appendix 6.9). Voice recordings were undertaken in a sound-attenuated lab recorded onto 
GarageBand using Scarlet 2i2 with a NT1-A Rode microphone. Voices from all speakers 
were edited, creating multiple individual sound files for each speech syllable and BKB 
sentence, for each speaker.  
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To understand the relationship (differences and similarity) between all 13 recorded 
voices, three syllables (/ba/, /la/ and /va/) for each speaker (resulting in 39 sound files) 
were inserted into a PowerPoint slide in random order. Seven native English-speaking 
individuals who were unfamiliar with the voices were asked to group them in terms of 
how similar they were to each other (each person was sent the same starting PowerPoint 
slide with the voice files in the same order). For instance, voices that were similar could 
be grouped together, while voices that were different could be placed further apart. All 
seven responses were collated informing an overall diagram showing the relationship 
between voices, from which, subsequent morphing was based (Figure 6.6). 
 
Figure 6.6: Overall diagrammatic association between voices (speakers’ names are 
initialised) in the voice identification task. Piloting identified speakers that were most 
distinctive and speakers that were more similar (connected with arrows).  
 
From the representational diagram of male and female voices, pairs of voices were chosen 
who were most acoustically dissimilar to each other (e.g. DH and AE) were paired. This 
resulted in four pairs of voices who were acoustically different from each (DH-AE, AE1-
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PS, DJ-DW, TD-ZN). Six syllables (of the 19 recorded) for each pair were chosen that 
were similar in terms of phoneme pronunciation and duration. The pair of syllables were 
morphed using speech analysis, modification and synthesis system (STRAIGHT; Speech 
Transformation and Reproduction by Adaptive Interpolation of weighted spectrogram, 
Banno, Hata, Morise, Takahashi, Irino and Kawahara, 2006) in MATLAB 2017a 
(Mathworks, Inc., Natick, USA). STRAIGHT performs a pitch-adaptive manipulation, 
considering multiple parameters: f0, frequency, time, spectro-temporal density and 
aperiodicity across two different syllables stimuli and synthesised into a continua or 
single novel sound morph. For each syllable, morphs were created through a linear 
synthesis creating a continuum of 11 steps (i.e. 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100), 
with each endpoint of the continua (i.e. 0 and 100) pertaining to the original voice of each 
speaker. Three-to-four syllables were chosen from each male and female pair for the pilot 




Syllables to be piloted Gender of voice pairs 
DH-AE Ka, Ma,  Female 
AE1-PS La, Na,  
DJ-DW Va, Ya Male 
TD-ZN Ha, La 
 
Table 6.4: Table to show the voice pairings and syllables for the pilot. Syllables in 
underlined were chosen for the final experiment. Syllables for pair DJ-DW did not give 
rise to sharp categorical functions, so this pair of voices were removed. 
 
Male and female voices were not paired on the basis their voices may be easier to 
distinguish based on differences in pitch. The volume of all syllables and BKB sentences 
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across all speakers were RMS normalised on MATLAB to ensure they were the same 
volume. Voices were piloted on Gorilla, an online behavioural testing platform and sent 
to a different set of 15 English-speaking individuals who were unfamiliar with the voices 
within the task. During the pilot, individuals were asked to listen to 20 BKB sentence by 
each speaker (presented as ‘Voice 1’ and ‘Voice 2’) followed by a training phase of 40 
BKB sentences (20 responses for Voice 1 and Voice 2) where response feedback was 
provided. This was followed by the experimental phase with all stages (1 to 11) of the 
phoneme continua presented in random order and repeated 8 times, resulting in 352 
experimental trials. In the training and experimental phase, participants indicated which 
voice (either Voice 1 or Voice 2), the voice stimulus belonged to in a forced two-choice 
discrimination task. In the training phase, the feedback was provided to the participant 
(in the form of a smiley face for correct, or sad face for incorrect, see Appendix 6.10), 
and no feedback was provided in the experimental phase where the morphed continua 
were presented. The speaker assigned to Voice 1 and Voice 2 remained the same 
throughout the block and only changed when a new pair of speakers were presented (see 
Figure 6.7).  
 
To determine the success and accuracy of the categorical perception of the phonemes, 
logistic curves were fit to each participant’s data, as well as an overall logistic curve of 
overall performance. Results of the pilot showed that the morph of DJ-DW across all 
phoneme continua was not appropriate as the majority of participants interpreted both 
voices belonging to one speaker. Therefore, only three pairs of speakers: DH-AE 
(continua: /va/ and /ya/), AE1-PS (continua: /la/ and /na/) TD-ZN (continua: /ka/ and 
/ma/) were used for the real experiment. The task was programmed on the online 




Figure 6.7: Diagram to show the structure and number of trials of the voice 
discrimination task.  
 
6.2.2.3. Procedure  
The task first began with a soundcheck to ensure the volume of the voices were 
satisfactory. Voices were presented via Sennheiser headphones (HD 25). To ensure 
appropriate volume levels, participants were presented (in the voice of DH) two words: 
‘football’ and ‘post’ and participants were asked to type the words into a field provided. 
Volume was adjusted as necessary. Participants were told they would hear/be presented 
with the sound of three pairs of speakers, and for each pair would have to determine if it 
was voice 1 or voice 2 speaking. The pairs of speakers were presented one by one in a 
fixed order: AE1-PS, TD-ZN, DH-AE and this order did not change throughout the 
experiment to prevent confusion over female voices presented in close succession (see 
Figure 6.7).   
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For the first pair of voices AE1-PS, participants first undertook the presentation stage 
where they listened to 40 BKB sentences (20 BKB sentences for one speaker, followed 
by 20 BKB sentence for the other speaker). The BKB sentences were unique to one 
speaker (i.e. no same BKB sentence were repeated twice within a pair of speakers). 
Following the presentation stage, participants undertook the training phase comprising of 
a 40 BKB (20 BKB sentences for each speaker that were presented in a randomised 
order), for each sentence visual feedback was provided in the form of a smiley or unhappy 
face (see Appendix 6.10). The training phase was to ensure that participants could create 
robust auditory representations of the voices (participants who performed less than 90% 
during the training phase would be excluded from the task).  
 
Following training, participants undertook all 264 trials of the experimental phase (i.e. 
two syllables of 11 stages of the continua repeated 12 times), feedback was not provided 
during these trials. Once participants completed the experimental trials, participants could 
take a brief pause before starting the next speaker pair (i.e. starting the presentation stage 
for TD-ZN). This order followed for the third speaker. The experiment was finished upon 
completion of the experimental trials of the last pair of speakers (DH-AE), see Figure 6.7. 
 
6.2.3. Results  
6.2.3.1. Training phase: Accuracy 
Table 6.5 details the accuracy of aphantasic and control participants within the training 
phase of the task (40 trials per speaker pair). Both participant groups were highly accurate 
at identifying the two different speakers.  
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 % accuracy of identifying each speaker within the pair (SD) 
 AE-DH TD-ZN AE1-PS 
Controls 99.73 (0.68) 99.43 (1.15) 99 (1.91) 
Aphantasics 99.4 (1.90) 99.67 (0.76) 98.83 (2.07) 
 
Table 6.5: Table to depict the percentage accuracy for identifying the correct speaker in 
each speaker pair during the training phase of the task. 
 
6.2.3.2. Experimental phase: Accuracy 
To estimate the categorical perception functions, logistic regression curves were fitted to 
each participant’s data through the proportion of Voice 2 responses across the 11 step 
continua. These slopes positions showed the category boundaries for each set of speakers 
and syllable for each participant (see Figure 6.8). The logistic curves were fit to each 
participant on MATLAB (version 2017a) to obtain b values as an indication of slope 
gradient with the higher the slope gradient, the steeper the logistic curve and better 
specified internal representation of the speakers within the task. A group summary for 






Figure 6.8: Aphantasic and control categorical perception function, group summary functions and overall participant group comparison for each 

















To compare categorical slope gradients between participants for each pair of speakers, 
syllables for each pair of speakers were combined, to create one b value for each speaker, 
averaging over speech sound. One aphantasic participant was removed from the analysis 
from speaker pair TD-ZN in the /ka/ and /ma/ continuum as the participant’s responses 
indicated they had confused which speaker was which. No other participants were 
excluded in the analysis. An independent t-test of slope gradients across groups showed 
no significant difference in categorical perception function in speaker pair DH-AE (t(45) 
= 0.76, p = .45, d = .21), TD-ZN (t(44) = 1.08, p = .29, d = .03) or AE1-PS (t(45) = 0.88, 
p = .38, d = .25). Slope gradients were averaged across speakers to form a grand average 
of b-values for the two participant groups (Figure 6.9). 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Grand average of categorical functions between aphantasic and control 
participants. 
 
An independent t-test of slope gradients for aphantasic and control participants showed 
no significant difference (t(45) = 1.22,  p = .23, d = .37) between groups.   



































The continua gradient slopes for AE1-PS (for syllables /la/ and /na/, see Figure 6.8c) 
suggest that these continua produced flatter and more noisy categorical function curves 
by each participant group. To ensure that the inclusion of these two continua did not 
impact on the results (i.e. there remains no significant difference between groups), an 
independent t-test of combined slope gradients for speakers DH-AE and TD-ZN showed 
no significant difference (t(45) = 1, p = .33, d = .29) between aphantasic and control 
participants. Together, these results suggest there is no difference between aphantasic and 
control participants in the ability to generate novel auditory representations of unfamiliar 
voices and accurately identify speakers during the presentation of ambiguous syllables.  
 
6.2.4. Discussion 
In this experiment, the ability to generate novel auditory representations of unfamiliar 
voices and use these representations to assign ambiguous tokens to speaker categories 
was examined. Specifically, the task probed the specificity of the stored representations 
of the speakers. The results showed that aphantasic and control participants assigned these 
ambiguous tokens to the speaker categories in a similar manner. The performance during 
training also confirmed that both aphantasic and control participants had a strong 
representation of the voices. Ultimately, this suggests that individuals with aphantasia 
have a similar stored abstract representation of voices compared to typical imagery 
controls, and can compare this ‘image’ in a similar way to individuals with typical 
imagery. 
 
Pitch is an attribute present within speech (Plack, Oxenham, & Fay, 2006; Yuskaitis, 
Parviz, Loui, Wan, & Pearl, 2015), and combined with timbre cues aids to voice identity 
of a speaker (Latinus & Belin, 2012). For instance, the pitch of a voice is influenced by 
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numerous factors such as the gender and age of the speaker (Klatl & Klati, 1990) and is 
crucial to communicating word meaning and emotional expressions (Tillmann, 2014). It 
is viewed that both speech and musical pitch processing share domain-general 
mechanisms, however, pitch processing is influenced by the type of auditory material that 
is presented, i.e. if it is musical or speech in nature (Vanden Bosch der Nederlanden, 
Hannon, & Snyder, 2015; Zatorre & Baum, 2012).  
 
Pitch differences within music tend to comprise of fine-grained variations in pitch, 
compared to speech, which has large and more coarse variations in pitch (Ayotte, Peretz, 
& Hyde, 2002; Zatorre & Baum, 2012). Evidence to support the notion that speech and 
musical pitch processing share domain-general mechanisms stem from studies that show 
musical training enhances auditory processing for language and music (e.g. Nan et al., 
2018; Yuskaitis, Parviz, Loui, Wan, & Pearl, 2015). Although the exact mechanism 
remains unclear, Yuskaitis et al. (2015) suggested that musical training enhances the 
neural encoding of speech. Although thought to share domain-general mechanisms, there 
is evidence to suggest that the two processes are also partially dissociable with music and 
speech comprising of domain-specific processes (Tillmann, 2014; Zatorre & Baum, 
2012). For instance, individuals with congenital amusia who exhibit pitch processing 
deficits in music do not show such impairments in the processing of pitch within speech 
(Ayotte et al., 2002). However, impairments in speech are evident in congenital amusics 
when speech comprises of marginal fine-grained pitch distinctions, suggesting that 
amusia is not specific to music but a more broad psychoacoustic difficulty in fine-grained 
pitch resolution (Ayotte et al., 2002).   
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In the current experiment, although participants were not told to focus on the pitch of 
voices, this is an attribute that could have been used as a strategy to aid voice 
identification. This may have been easier given that speaker-pairs were chosen within the 
paradigm whose voices were most distinctive, therefore could be argued to have wider 
variations in pitch. Future studies could examine voice representations of speakers who 
have similar voices pitches. Although, if music is associated with more fine-grained 
variations in pitch (Ayotte et al., 2002; Zatorre & Baum, 2012), and no differences were 
apparent within a musical pitch discrimination task than no differences could perhaps be 
expected within a task comprising of voices of similar pitches.  
 
The robustness of voice identity representations for each speaker could be investigated 
further using other forms of vocalisations or non-verbal vocalisations. Several studies 
have shown poor recognition and discrimination of voice identities that are whispered 
(e.g. Bartle & Dellwo, 2015; Yarmey, Yarmey, Yarmey, & Parliament, 2001). In this 
instance, whispered voices are more challenging to identify compared to natural speech, 
due to the reduction in acoustic frequency pitch (Lavan et al., 2019). However, 
performance within these studies in this condition did not fall below chance level (Bartle 
& Dellwo, 2015; Yarmey et al., 2001), suggesting sufficient acoustic information is 
retained in whispered voices to aid identification. Distortions in acoustic frequency pitch 
are also apparent in non-verbal vocalisations such as spontaneous laughter, making voice 
identity difficult (e.g. Bachorowski & Owren, 2001; Lavan, Scott, & McGettigan, 2016). 
Similarly, a study by Juslin and Lukka (2001) showed that emotional speech expressing 
emotions: anger, disgust, fear, happiness and sadness had different acoustic profiles for 
both verbal and non-verbal vocalisations (Banse & Scherer, 1996; Juslin & Laukka, 
2001). An exploration of these speech-specific characteristics may show how robust 
 248 
voice auditory representations are within long-term memory and the ability to extract 
features and cues from a specific voice and apply to them to different vocalisation 
scenarios. 
 
6.2.5. Chapter Conclusion 
This Chapter explored aphantasics’ performance within two auditory imagery tasks. The 
auditory domain was chosen on the basis that no objective imagery differences were 
found within visual imagery tasks. Moreover, deficits may be easier to detect or separate 
within auditory imagery tasks that require both perceptual and spatial imagery 
components. This Chapter explored auditory imagery performance of individuals with 
congenital aphantasia within a musical imagery pitch task (Experiment 9) and a voice 
identification task (Experiment 10). Both of these tasks concerned the ability to generate 
voluntary auditory imagery and retrieve information from long-term memory. 
 
Despite self-reporting a lack of auditory imagery, the results of Experiment 9 suggest that 
individuals with aphantasia performed equivocally to controls in terms of accuracy and 
response time within a musical imagery pitch task. In individuals who self-report a lack 
of both visual and auditory imagery, it may be that motor areas are involved in the 
retrieval of familiar songs (Gelding et al., 2019; Tervaniemi et al., 2005). The retrieval of 
information does not occur in a purely auditory way, but through other forms of 
representation where information with regards to pitch can be assessed.  
 
Musical imagery should be explored further using paradigms comprising of unfamiliar 
lyric-less stimuli (Gelding et al., 2020), which have been validated and shown to highly 
correlate to auditory self-report measures. Both aphantasic and control participants 
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performed near ceiling in the perceptual tone task meaning they were able to distinguish 
differences in pitch perceptually. This Chapter also used a voice identity categorisation 
task to explore the specificity of synthesised and stored internal auditory representation 
of pairs of speakers (Experiment 10). The results of this experiment suggest that within a 
voice identity categorisation task requiring the synthesis of voice representations, 
individuals with aphantasia have a similar stored abstract representation of voices similar 
to individuals with typical imagery. In addition, aphantasic participants were able to 
compare this ‘image’ similarly to individuals with typical imagery. The robustness of 
these representations could be examined further in other forms using non-vocal 
vocalisations (Bachorowski & Owren, 2001; Lavan, Scott, & McGettigan, 2016).  
 
What do these results contribute to the understanding of aphantasia? Pitch is one such 
spatial attribute of auditory imagery and a feature present within both experiments within 
this Chapter. If aphantasic participants self-report intact spatial imagery abilities in the 
visual domain (see Experiment 1, see also Dawes et al., 2020), these results may suggest 
that the equivalent is intact within the auditory domain. However, additional research is 
necessary to support this argument. Individuals with aphantasia (those who self-reported 
a lack of auditory imagery) performed as accurately as typical imagers in a task that 
required the mental comparison of pitches of well-known songs. A similar finding was 
evident within the voice identification task, whereby aphantasic participants were able to 
generate accurate voice representations of speakers and assign ambiguous tokens to 
speaker categories in a similar manner to individuals with typical imagery. Voices 
comprise of pitch information (Plack, Oxenham, & Fay, 2006; Yuskaitis, Parviz, Loui, 
Wan, & Pearl, 2015), and this may have been one spatial attribute participants represented 
in order to perform in the task. Accuracy within the task may have been easier, given the 
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speaker-pairs within the study had distinctive voices. Ultimately, this pattern of 
performance whereby individuals with aphantasia who self-report a lack of imagery but 
consequently perform as well as individuals with typical imagery, is consistent with 
findings throughout this thesis from the visual domain. It may be the case that the tasks 
used within this thesis are not sensitive to the deficits that arise in aphantasia. 
Alternatively, this raises unanswered questions with regards to how individuals with 
aphantasia are undertaking imagery tasks. If they are not using spatial processes, it is 
possible that aphantasia may be explained due to difficulties in consciously accessing 




Chapter 7: General discussion 
The overarching aim of this thesis was to examine possible explanations for the self-
reported lack of visual imagery as described by individuals with aphantasia. Specifically, 
this thesis explored the nature and individual variation of the experience in visual and 
non-visual domains within matched samples. Explored across 10 experiments within the 
current thesis, the performance of individuals with aphantasia was compared to 
individuals who had a typical imagery experience. This performance was compared 
within a wide range of behavioural tasks and self-report measures. Despite self-reporting 
an absence of visual imagery experience, the findings of this thesis show minimal 
objective evidence of group difference in performance between aphantasic and control 
participants with typical imagery. However, variations in performance were apparent, and 
subgroups were identified within the aphantasic sample. This Chapter will first 
summarise the results and then discuss the reasons for this discrepancy between self-
report and performance. 
 
7.1. Summary of thesis findings 
Experiment 1 and 2 interrogated the findings from the literature by including self-report 
measures and behavioural paradigms used within previous case studies and studies with 
small sample sizes. The objective of these experiments was to replicate some of these 
findings within larger participant samples. In Experiment 1, the subjective ratings 
provided in the Object Spatial Imagery Questionnaire (OSIQ, Blajenkova et al., 2006) 
showed individuals with aphantasia scored similar to typical imagery participants on 
spatial imagery, but lower for object imagery. These results replicated the finding of 
Keogh & Pearson (2017), and have since been replicated within several other studies 
(Bainbridge et al., 2020; Dawes et al., 2020). This suggests that it is a robust and 
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consistent finding in self-reports within the aphantasia literature. Due to the fact that 
individuals with aphantasia scored lower for object imagery (i.e. imagery that is colourful 
and pictorial), this may provide an insight into the type of deficit present within 
aphantasia. Experiment 2 examined a finding observed by Jacobs et al. (2017), in which 
AI demonstrated impaired visuospatial working memory performance but not imagery 
performance. In Experiment 2, the results of the experimental design revealed contrasting 
performance to AI. The results showed that aphantasic participants were less accurate in 
the imagery condition, with no differences apparent in the visuospatial working memory 
condition.  
 
Although the study was based on the paradigm used by Jacobs et al. (2017), there were 
some notable differences. Firstly, as a result of a technical error in data collection, control 
and experimental data was collected by two different researchers. However, no 
differences were found between experimenter. The second difference was that 
participants completed 3 blocks in this study, compared to 8 blocks in the original study. 
As a consequence, all participants had a shorter learning phase, which may have resulted 
in the differences in performance between the two tasks. With this reduced learning, 
aphantasic individuals were less accurate in the imagery task than the typical imagery 
controls. Nevertheless, individuals with aphantasia performed as well as control 
participants in the visuospatial condition of the task, which is in line with the performance 
of patient MX who also exhibited accurate performance within a visuospatial working 
memory task (Zeman et al., 2010).  
 
Experiment 3 examined whether aphantasic individuals have a specific personality profile 
that may be linked to their self-reported inability to form visual imagery. It has been 
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proposed that certain personality traits can modulate responses on self-reports (e.g. 
Buchanan, 2015). This is important to examine given that a self-report measure (i.e. the 
VVIQ) is commonly used to identify individuals with aphantasia within a population. 
However, the only difference in personality scales (the Big Five Inventory) between 
aphantasic and control participants with typical imagery, was for the trait agreeableness. 
This finding was explained due to a recruitment bias. In the control sample, there was a 
strong positive correlation between the trait openness to experience and VVIQ score. This 
finding was explained due to the link between openness to experience and synaesthesia 
(e.g. Banissy et al., 2013; Rouw & Scholte, 2016), which is an experience most frequently 
experienced by individuals with hyperphantasia (Zeman et al., 2020). Within the control 
sample, four participants were hyperphantasic, however, these participants were not 
asked if they had synaesthesia. Similarly, in the control sample, there was a strong 
positive correlation between the trait extraversion and VVIQ vividness ratings, consistent 
with the findings in the literature (e.g. McDougall & Pfeifer, 2012; Strelow & Davidson, 
2002). Within the exploration of these correlations in a larger sample of typical imagers 
(Appendix 3.5), openness to experience was shown not to be a predictor for VVIQ scores 
and similarly, extraversion was only shown to be a smaller predictor for VVIQ scores. 
However, the trait conscientiousness was shown to have the strongest influence on VVIQ 
scores. This correlation is not evident within the literature relating to imagery vividness, 
but it is a trait associated with social desirability (e.g. Allbutt et al., 2008). Further 
research is required to explore the relationship between personality traits and self-
reported imagery vividness. 
 
Experiment 4 investigated whether the cognitive profiles of individuals with aphantasia 
differed to age-matched individuals with typical imagery. The battery of tasks, chosen 
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due to their sensitivity to variances within broad cognitive domains and processes 
included: Pattern Recognition Memory (PRM), Verbal Recognition Memory (VRM), 
Spatial Span (SSP) and One Touch Stockings of Cambridge (OTS) task. It was proposed, 
that if differences in performance (compared to typical imagers) were evident within these 
tasks, it would suggest that aphantasia is associated with more global impairments in 
cognitive function. Overall, the findings showed no differences in accuracy across all 
tasks. However, differences in reaction time between aphantasic and control participants 
were apparent during trials in the OTS task, a complex visuospatial task that relies on 
executive function and imagery. Within the task, there were no differences in accuracy 
or reaction time during lower difficulty trials. However, aphantasic participants were 
slower during harder trials that required greater mental manipulation and high working 
memory load of visuospatial information, with no difference in accuracy. Taken together, 
Experiment 3 and 4 suggest that individuals with aphantasia do not differ from typical 
imagers on personality measures; nor do they display a shared global cognitive deficit 
shown through sensitive neuropsychological measures. However, subgroup variations of 
performance were evident, and multidimensional scaling revealed four aphantasic 
subgroups defined by varying patterns of performance in the neuropsychological tasks. 
This is a novel finding within the literature, and an assessment of individual differences 
of performance has not been examined. 
 
As a result of the differences observed within the OTS, the performance was further 
examined within a wider variety of complex visuospatial working memory tasks. In both 
a mental rotation task (MRT) and a task that required spatial perspective taking, no 
differences were apparent in either accuracy or reaction time between aphantasic and 
control participants. However, aphantasic participants displayed greater variability in 
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reaction time for front and back orientations compared to participants with typical 
participants. The result of multidimensional scaling, which grouped (in terms of 
similarity) aphantasic participants’ performance across all behavioural tasks (in 
Experiments 4 to 6), revealed four potential subgroups: 1) a potential subgroup with 
spatial working memory difficulties 2) a subgroup who showed significant differences in 
reaction time in the OTS and possible verbal memory difficulties 3) a subgroup with 
borderline difficulties in the OTS but matched with high accuracy and 4) a subgroup with 
no difficulties in any of the tasks.  
 
It is possible that the visuospatial working memory tasks could have been undertaken 
using spatial imagery alone (in the absence of a ‘visual’ component). Thus, it was 
investigated whether visual and spatial components could be separated and examined 
behaviourally. In an attempt to isolate ‘visual’ imagery, a task (Experiment 7) which 
required responses to statements with regards to visual (e.g. colour) and spatial (e.g. 
location and size) properties of common everyday objects was created. The results of 
Experiment 7 showed no difference in accuracy or reaction time between aphantasic and 
control participants with typical imagery for visual or spatial loaded statements. These 
results were interpreted that the task was not able to identify differences. Alternatively, 
as suggested by Kosslyn (2006), it may be impossible to isolate perceptual and spatial 
imagery within the visual modality. However, it may be possible within the auditory 
modality. 
 
Experiment 8 examined how individuals with aphantasia self-reported imagery across 
non-visual senses compared to individuals with typical imagery. The findings of this 
Experiment suggested that whilst some aphantasic individuals self-reported an absence 
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of imagery across non-visual sensory modalities (as well as the visual modality), this was 
not self-reported by all aphantasic participants. These findings were in line with the 
findings of recent studies (Dawes et al., 2020; Zeman et al., 2020) and further support the 
claim that aphantasia is heterogeneous. Specifically, individuals with aphantasia appear 
to share an absence of visual imagery but vary in experiences within the other sensory 
domains. While this has not been examined, it should also be noted that there may be a 
subset of individuals who experience an absence of non-visual imagery but not visual 
imagery. Current definitions of aphantasia do not reflect this heterogeneity of experience 
or mention the variations of these aphantasic experiences. 
 
Based on the non-visual self-report observations, Experiment 9 and 10 investigated the 
self-reported absence of imagery objectively within auditory imagery tasks. Experiment 
9 adapted the classic auditory imagery task developed by Halpern (1988), which required 
pitch discrimination for familiar songs and a matching perceptual pitch tone task. 
Although aphantasic participants self-reported a lack of auditory imagery, there were no 
differences in accuracy or reaction time in the imagery pitch discrimination task 
compared to individuals who reported vivid auditory imagery. Experiment 10 used a 
speech discrimination paradigm to explore how well individuals were able to generate 
internal voice representations and identify the voices of different speakers. Aphantasic 
participants were found to be as accurate as participants with typical imagery at 
distinguishing speakers in the task. Collectively, these results show that despite a self-
reported lack of auditory imagery, individuals with aphantasia perform similar to 
individuals who have vivid imagery experiences. This thesis has raised questions with 
regards to the nature of imagery experience within aphantasia, and whether the difference 
in aphantasia is due to the differences in the conscious experience of imagery.  
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7.2. Discrepancy between subjective experience and behavioural performance  
Consistently reported within self-report imagery measures throughout this thesis, 
individuals with aphantasia rate their experience of imagery as largely absent. However, 
within tasks that objectively explore this self-reported absence, individuals with 
aphantasia perform as accurately as individuals with a vivid imagery experience. Outlined 
are possible explanations for these discrepancies. 
 
7.2.1. The use of different processes  
The use of alternative ‘strategies’ or processes may be one way to explain the discrepancy 
between self-reports and behavioural performance by aphantasic participants. In this 
context, these ‘strategies’ are best termed as ‘processes,’ with the term ‘strategy’ implying 
a conscious choice, when in fact some processes are undertaken outside of conscious 
awareness (e.g. individuals with typical imagery do not actively ‘choose’ to use visual 
information, they unconsciously just do). For individuals with typical imagery, imagery 
is visuospatial in nature (e.g. Kosslyn et al., 2006). However, a number of studies have 
shown that tasks can be undertaken without visual experience, suggesting tasks rely more 
heavily on ‘spatial’ than ‘visual’ imagery. It is possible that individuals with aphantasia 
lack the ‘visual’ component of imagery, but they are still able to use spatial imagery. 
These adopted processes are not as effective within cognitively demanding tasks whereby 
large amounts of visuospatial information are required to be maintained and manipulated. 
If all aphantasic participants are using an alternative process (i.e. not engaging in visual 
imagery, but using spatial imagery alone), the use of such a strategy generally provides 
adequate or good performance within tasks, which may explain why throughout this 
thesis, no differences in performance are apparent between the two participant groups. 
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However, these strategies are less efficient within cognitively demanding trials, as shown 
by Experiment 4, specifically during the OTS task.  
 
Historically, support for depictive theories stemmed from behavioural performance 
within imagery tasks, such as tasks requiring the mental visualisation of anatomical 
features of two animals (Kosslyn, 1975), as well as mental scanning between two points 
on a map (Kosslyn, 1973) and mental rotation (Shepard & Metzler, 1971). The idea that 
visual images retain spatial information with a linear relationship between time and 
distance apparent in the tasks were key to the idea that visual images were depictive. In 
the current thesis, aphantasic participants undertook a mental rotation task, and a linear 
relationship was evident between the angle of rotation and reaction time. No differences 
in accuracy were evident between aphantasic and control participants with typical 
imagery, and aphantasic participants performing highly accurately within the task. 
According to Kosslyn (1975), this linear relationship may suggest that individuals with 
aphantasia (who self-report a lack of visual imagery), are using spatial imagery in the 
task.  
 
Despite a difference shown through self-reports, differentiating the differences between 
visual and spatial remains challenging (and potentially impossible) behaviourally (as 
attempted within Experiment 7) within the visual domain. This is in line with Kosslyn’s 
theory of mental imagery that suggested visual and spatial images have a spatio-
analogical structure (Kosslyn et al., 2006). Kosslyn’s theory of mental imagery made a 
distinction between the content of visual and spatial images but suggested that the two 
were processed in parallel (Kosslyn, 1994; Kosslyn et al., 2006; Kosslyn, 2005). 
According to the theory, the ‘visualised’ part of a visual image referred to the content of 
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the visual buffer, with the construction of a visual image (e.g. an object) also requiring 
information about its spatial properties (e.g. location), from the content of spatial images 
(Kosslyn, 2006). If the processing of spatial and visual images occurs in parallel, then 
this may imply that the two constructs are difficult to separate. Similarly, Chapter 6 
explored whether perceptual and spatial imagery could be explored and isolated further 
in the auditory domain, with the results showing no differences in performance between 
aphantasic and typical imagery participants. This too may imply that it is difficult to 
separate sensory and spatial elements experimentally.  
 
While the findings of Experiment 7 suggest that it is difficult to differentiate between 
visual and spatial imagery using imagery comparison statements, the paradigm outlined 
in the study by Bainbridge et al., (2020) suggests that drawing may be one sensitive tool 
to distinguish such differences. In this study, the authors showed visual and spatial 
differences in memory drawings of individuals with aphantasia. Briefly, the memory 
drawings of real-world scenes drawn by aphantasic participants contained fewer visual 
details (such as the use of colour) compared to typical imagers, however, these drawings 
were spatially accurate (i.e. objects were drawn in the correct location and were of the 
appropriate size). While aphantasic participants drew fewer objects than typical imager 
participants, they still drew a moderate number of objects (i.e. five objects per image) 
suggesting a preserved use of other non-visual representations such as verbal (e.g. use of 
verbal lists) and spatial memory to aid reconstruction of a scene (Bainbridge et al., 2020). 
This suggests that non-visual processes adopted are conducive to a certain level of 
performance. Although a task involving a different set of requirements, this performance 
is similar to the performance exhibited by aphantasic participants up to move 4 in the 
OTS task. In the OTS (up to move 4) aphantasics participants perform the same as typical 
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imagers, with differences in performance only apparent with increased amount of 
visuospatial information that is required to be manipulated. Further research should try to 
explore and assess ways (possibly through drawing) to increase the amount of ‘visual’ 
information or detail presented that surpasses the amount that can be supported by non-
visual representations or processes.  
 
One way to gain an insight into participants’ processes within a task is by asking them 
with regards to their strategies. For instance, additional qualitative data22 could have been 
collected with regards to how participants approached different spatial and visual 
statements (within Experiment 7). However, as previously mentioned, this involves a 
level of conscious introspection, and it is not clear how accurate people are in the report 
of what they say they did, and such processes may be unconscious. In a similar way that 
it has been proposed that there are numerous ways to perform visuospatial working 
memory tasks (Keogh & Pearson, 2019), the same could be said for imagery tasks, in that 
they can be undertaken with different processes. In a recent study by Milton et al. 
(submitted), the authors compared the performance of hyperphantasic, control (with mid-
range VVIQ scores) and aphantasic participants. The authors found a significant 
difference in accuracy between hyperphantasic (who performed at 88% accuracy) and 
aphantasic participants (who performed at 82% accuracy) in an Animal Tails Test, a 
‘standard imagery task’. On this task, patient MX scored at 90% accuracy - higher than 
the hyperphantasic participants in this sample denoted in Milton et al. (submitted). No 
indication of reaction times was provided. While patient MX may have been advantaged 
                                               
22 Informal verbal discussion (once participants had undertaken the visual-spatial statement task, 
Experiment 7) involved asking participants with regards to their experience of answering the statements 
(i.e. participants were asked: ‘how they found the task’, ‘what was difficult’). Aphantasic participants 
generally commented that the visual questions were more challenging to answer compared to the spatial 
statements. 
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in the task due to the acquired nature of his aphantasia in later life, these findings suggest 
that imagery tasks are not pure measures of ‘visual’ imagery. Evidence from the 
congenitally blind literature suggests that tasks such as mental rotation can be undertaking 
using spatial imagery alone (e.g. Carpenter & Eisenberg, 1978; Kerr 1983). Thus, tasks 
of visual imagery may not reflect or be a measure of pure ‘visual’ imagery ability and 
should be used with caution if one is seeking to gauge participants’ ‘visual’ imagery 
abilities.  
 
7.2.1.1. Effect of working memory load  
Differences between aphantasic and control participants within this thesis only arose in 
the OTS – a task that involved high levels of manipulation and working memory load. 
Briefly, the OTS is based on the Tower of Hanoi and presented increasingly difficult trials 
(in random order). The task required participants to rearrange ball-configurations from a 
minimum number of two items or ‘moves’ to a maximum of six in one’s mind. In low 
load working memory trials, which required the move of no more than four balls (Fukuda, 
Awh, & Vogel, 2010), there were no differences in performance between aphantasic and 
control participants with typical imagery. This suggests that the processes the aphantasic 
participants adopted were conducive to a certain level. However, with increasing 
manipulation and working memory load, significant differences in reaction time were 
evident between the two groups. For individuals with typical imagery, visual imagery 
may serve as the most suitable mnemonic for the maintenance of large amounts of 
visuospatial information. However, it remains unclear as to the processes involved for 
aphantasic participants given their self-reported lack of visual imagery experience.  
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A number of studies have observed variation in the activity in the ventral and dorsal 
prefrontal cortex within different working memory-loaded working memory tasks (de 
Fockert, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001; Rypma & D’Esposito, 1999). Activation of the 
prefrontal cortex is also evident within tasks such as the Tower of Hanoi and the OTS, 
reflecting the use of higher executive function within the task (Causse, Chua, & Rémy, 
2019; Milla, Bakhshipour, Bodt, & Getchell, 2019). In particular, the dorsolateral 
prefrontal regions are associated with the maintenance and manipulation of external 
visuospatial information, while the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex involved in the 
manipulation of internally generated information (Christoff & Gabrieli, 2000; Wagner, 
Koch, Reichenbach, Sauer, & Schlösser, 2006). Activation of the rostrolateral prefrontal 
cortex was particularly evident in the higher difficulty moves (greater than move 4) 
compared to lower moves. Examining aphantasics’ performance at a neural level within 
the OTS during the difficult trials may provide new insights into the differences in 
processes between participant groups. Comparing brain activations between aphantasic 
participants who exhibited significantly longer reaction times during cognitively 
demanding trials compared to aphantasic participants who performed similar to 
participants with typical imagery, could provide further insight into potential variabilities 
within the aphantasic experience. Further research should investigate the effects and 
manipulation of working memory load not only the visual but within other sensory 
domains to test the robust nature of internal representations. 
 
In terms of the relationship between the visual buffer and visual cache, it has been 
suggested that in scenarios where highly detailed visual details are required to be 
maintained, it may involve the repeat generation of the image within the visual buffer, 
rather than maintenance of visual information in the visual cache (Darling et al., 2009; 
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Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003). Individuals with typical imagery may be able to use the 
visual cache and the visual buffer to refresh the contents, which may be true for the 
cognitively demanding trials of the OTS that have been suggested to engage imagery 
(Hodgson et al., 2000). Individuals with aphantasia cannot access the contents of the 
visual buffer, which may be refreshing the contents. This may especially be the case for 
the subgroup of participants who displayed significantly longer reaction times in the OTS 
task. On the other hand, the subgroup who showed no differences in performance (i.e. 
performance that was similar to participants with typical imagery) might have 
unconscious imagery. This subgroup may be able to use the visual buffer to regenerate 
the complex configurations (Darling et al., 2009) required with the OTS task (similar to 
individuals with typical imagery), despite this re-generation process occurring outside of 
conscious awareness. Overall, much more research is required to examine the similarities 
and differences between visuospatial working memory and visual imagery. 
 
7.2.2. Imagery vividness and consciousness 
The discrepancy between aphantasic self-reports and experimental measures may be 
explained by the fact that visual imagery vividness ratings are a limited measure of actual 
visual imagery ability. Vividness is characterised by the clarity and liveliness of the 
conscious experience of imagery (Dean & Morris, 2003; Marks, 2019). It is a process 
involving introspection and judgment of the visual quality of an internal representation - 
the actual amount of content or detail within the representation are less important. 
Vividness is arguably only one aspect of a visual image and does not take into 
consideration other aspects of a visual image that are essential to task performance. For 
example, the content of the visual image, visual and spatial imagery sub-types 
(Kozhevnikov et al., 2005) or sub-processes such as imagery maintenance or 
transformation (Kosslyn et al., 2006). 
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Numerous studies have sought to examine vividness within behavioural tasks. However, 
there are differences in how this is measured and defined. For instance, self-report 
measures such as the VVIQ or behavioural trial-by-trial ratings of vividness (i.e. 
vividness ratings required after each experimental trial) have been adopted within studies. 
It is thought that trial-by-trial ratings of vividness are more informative with regards to 
the ability to generate visual image within a specific context (Bergmann et al., 2016; 
D’Angiulli et al., 2013; Keogh & Pearson, 2011). Thus trial-by-trial ratings of vividness 
are suggested by some to be more reliable (D’Angiulli et al., 2013), unlike the VVIQ, 
which relies on the retrieval of familiar images from long-term memory. However, both 
trial-by-trial vividness ratings and VVIQ scores were found to predict the priming effect 
within a binocular rivalry paradigm (Pearson et al., 2011). The authors suggested that 
individuals with typical imagery have a good metacognitive understanding with regards 
to their imagery vividness using either method (Pearson et al., 2011), and metacognitive 
awareness of visual imagery can be improved with practice (Rademaker & Pearson, 
2012).  
 
Vividness is suggested to be a measure or correlate relating to the conscious experience 
of imagery (Runge, Cheung, & D’Angiulli, 2017). The phenomenological or conscious 
aspect of imagery remains understudied, however, Marks (2019; 1999) describes mental 
imagery as the “basic building block of all consciousness, which plays a primary role in 
mental rehearsal of adaptive, goal-directed action through experimental manipulation of 
perceptual-motor imagery”. This viewpoint echoes non-representational theories of 
visual imagery that surround the concept that visual imagery depends on action (the 
activity of carrying out an action, see Chapter 1 section 1.1.3), and stems from the re-
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enactment of visual perception (e.g. Varela et al., 1991). At present, the idea of 
consciousness (or account for phenomenological vividness, a correlate of consciousness 
as suggested by Runge et al., 2017) is not explicitly mentioned within theories of visual 
imagery. Kosslyn’s Computational Model (Kosslyn, 1981; Kosslyn, 2005) described an 
attentional window that allows for conscious inspection of an image or part of an image. 
However, this does not account for the individual differences in imagery vividness. 
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that vividness refers to the resolution of the visual 
buffer (Dean & Morris, 2003), but this is not explicitly stated. Plyshysn (2003) also does 
not mention consciousness but describes vividness in terms of tactic knowledge ‘details’ 
as either ‘blurry’ or ‘clear’. This suggests that experience can differ in terms of vividness.  
 
Similarly, conscious awareness is implied in non-representational theories of imagery. 
For instance, the enactive approach implies that a level of conscious awareness is needed 
for the re-enactment of visual perception (e.g. Varela et al., 1991). While the sensorimotor 
approach is described as a conscious set of rules (e.g. O’Regan & Noe, 2001) and it is not 
clear how such rules are accessed to support visual imagery (Di Paolo et al., 2017). The 
embodied representational approach also involves the act of seeing an item (Palmiero et 
al., 2019). This approach implies a level of consciousness and considers the variations of 
individual differences in imagery experience (Palmiero et al., 2019; see also Chapter 1, 
section 1.1.3). At present, definitions of mental imagery do not necessarily state that 
imagery is a conscious experience. In fact, the consciousness of internal representations 
seems to be an assumption among definitions; for instance, imagery is sometimes referred 
to as a process involving ‘effortful generation’. However, it may be the case that such 
definitions of imagery need to be refined more so in terms of conscious and unconscious 
attributes.  
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In the literature, one way to explore the consciousness of imagery experience is through 
the inclusion of confidence ratings (Cheesman & Merikle, 1986). Individuals who self-
reported vivid imagery provided more confident responses in relation to their imagery 
ability (Keogh & Pearson, 2011). This supports the idea that vividness is a characteristic 
of conscious experience (Runge et al., 2017). Within the current thesis, differences were 
evident between aphantasic and control participants with typical imagery in terms of their 
confidence in a visuospatial working memory and imagery paradigm (Experiment 2), 
contrasting with the results obtained in the case study by Jacobs et al. (2017). Although 
the confidence ratings provided by participants within Experiment 2 related to the 
confidence in their performance, not necessarily the vividness of their experience. 
Alternatively, conscious experience can also be explored using perceptual stimulus 
awareness ratings, which examine the “degree of clearness” of the conscious content 
(Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004). This involves rating all aspects of a stimulus such as 
colour, stimulus position and shape as on a set categorisation scale, for instance, “nothing, 
weak glimpse, almost clear image, clear image” (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004). 
Awareness, in this case, can either be clearly conscious or a ‘fringe’ experience, which 
exists at the threshold of conscious awareness (Mangan, 2001). These fringes can be 
either sensory (stemming from perception of a sense) or non-sensory (the feeling of 
knowing or rightness), both proposed to have common features. (Mangan, 2001). 
Although imagery is an internal representation of sensory information, Ramsay and 
Overgaard (2004) suggest that the experience of imagery would constitute ‘non-sensory 
fringe.’ This degree of clearness is not to be confused with ‘degrees of certainty’ - one 
can be confident in their response in a task without considering the phenomenological 
experience (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004). How this relates to the vividness of an 
experience is not clearly stated. However, vividness is considered to be an aspect one 
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considers in the introspective process when comparing the experience of a stimulus to a 
set categorisation scale (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004).  
 
An objective way conscious experience could be examined is by galvanic skin responses. 
In a study of prosopagnosia (face-blindness), individuals with prosopagnosia self-
reported the inability to recognise familiar faces, however, showed an emotional 
psychophysiological response to these familiar faces (Tranel & Damasio, 1985). The 
authors report that while these familiar faces were not consciously perceived, autonomic 
physiological processes in response to the faces were still occurring outside of conscious 
awareness. Similarly, studies of blindsight have shown that participants (who have lesions 
to the primary visual cortex) perform to a high level of accuracy (and similar reaction 
time) to controls within a visual discrimination task (Lau & Passingham, 2006; 
Weiskrantz, 1999). This high accuracy is evident despite differing on their conscious 
experience of the task, with participants often believing they are guessing (Lau & 
Passingham, 2006; Weiskrantz, 1999). Using a metacontrast masking paradigm (a mask 
that overlaps with the contour of a target once it is presented), Lau and Passingham (2006) 
found that when the mask was presented at a short time frame (33 msecs) participants 
reported they were ‘guessing’, but when it was presented after a longer delay (of 50 
msecs), participants reporting ‘seeing’ the target with no differences in accuracy in the 
task at either time-frame. This suggests that individuals with blindsight lack 
consciousness of their performance while their ability to process visual information 
remained highly accurate (i.e. there were no differences in accuracy in the two-time 
conditions). Incorporating additional scales or techniques that tap into one’s conscious 
experience (other than vividness) during tasks may provide more information with 
regards to the discrepancy between self-reported experience and performance.  
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7.2.3. Individual differences in the conscious experience of a lack of imagery 
If aphantasia were a unified condition, it might be expected that aphantasic participants 
may all exhibit a similar pattern of performance. For instance, they may all display longer 
reaction times within the OTS task. However, this is not the case, as individual differences 
exploration of performance (Chapter 4) identified a subgroup of aphantasic participants 
who performed as accurately, and showed similar response times similar to participants 
with typical imagery. It may be the case that this subset of aphantasic participants has 
very efficient strategies that are comparable to visual imagery to perform within tasks. 
However, it may also be possible that this subgroup potentially can generate visual 
imagery; however, have no conscious access to this imagery - this visual imagery is 
unconscious. This means that during the OTS, they are engaging in unconscious visual 
imagery, which results in performance that exhibits similar response times and accuracy 
to controls with typical imagery.  
 
This is in contrast to the subgroup of aphantasic participants who used a different process 
in the OTS that were not as efficient as the (likely visual imagery) strategy adopted by 
controls with typical imagery (Hodgson et al., 2000), but still resulted in highly accurate 
performance. This subgroup exhibited significantly longer reaction times during the more 
complex and difficult moves within the OTS task. It is proposed that this aphantasic 
subgroup are using an alternative process (such as spatial imagery, or another process) in 
the task, possibly because they have a complete lack of conscious and unconscious visual 
imagery, i.e. they have extreme aphantasia, characterised by a complete lack of sensory 
visual imagery (although not defined by a score 16 on the VVIQ, see Table 4.2, Chapter 
4, section 4.3.1). The processes adopted by this subgroup are efficient only within less 
cognitively demanding trials. This variation in either conscious or unconscious imagery 
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experience in individuals with aphantasia may explain these differences in performance. 
Specifically, a subgroup who performed as well as controls with typical imagery on all 
tasks, and another subgroup who exhibited significantly different reaction times, while 
remaining as accurate. One way to examine if such differences exist is through 
neuroimaging, whereby different patterns of brain activation would be expected for 
unconscious (activation within the primary visual cortex) and in aphantasic individuals 
who have a total absence of imagery (higher activation within brain regions associated 
with verbal or spatial strategies). 
 
Keogh and Pearson (2017) suggested that aphantasia was due to a loss of sensory visual 
imagery and not because of a lack of metacognitive abilities. The authors suggested that 
if aphantasia were due to difficulty in the process of introspecting, a priming effect would 
have occurred within their binocular rivalry paradigm (see Chapter 1, section 1.4.3). 
However, Keogh and Pearson (2017) did not examine the individual variation in the data. 
Instead, they analysed the experiment by averaging across participant group (i.e. an 
aphantasic group and a control ‘general population’), which will have averaged across 
any variations in priming effect. The authors suggested the majority of aphantasic 
participants in their sample had priming scores below chance (50%), and they showed 
that a proportion of the general population had priming scores at chance level (i.e. 50%) 
(Keogh and Pearson, 2017). In the graphs provided within the study of Keogh & Pearson 
(2017), it can be seen there are a few aphantasic participants who perform above chance 
exhibiting up to approximately 70% priming scores – a higher priming score than a large 
proportion of the general population (with typical imagery). The exact number of 
aphantasic participants this occurs in is not clear, but it is evident there are individual 
difference variations within the binocular rivalry priming data. If the majority performed 
below chance, with a few aphantasic individuals performing highly above chance, any 
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variation in overall priming performance would not be observed when priming responses 
were averaged by participant group.  
 
It may be the case that within the aphantasic sample denoted by Keogh & Pearson (2017), 
there was a small sub-set who had unconscious imagery, which may explain for the 
aphantasic participants who had high priming effects. The results of this thesis have 
shown that when performance is analysed by group, individual variations and differences 
are not apparent. In contrast, individual examination of the data offers an opportunity to 
identify subgroups and different patterns in behaviour. Moreover, Keogh & Pearson 
(2017), suggest that all individuals with aphantasia provided low trial-by-trial vividness 
ratings (between 1-2 out of a scale of 4) within the binocular rivalry paradigm. This 
assumes that scores within this range were also provided by the aphantasic participants 
who displayed above chance priming, suggesting that their self-reported vividness 
experience contrasted to their priming performance (as a possible result of their 
unconscious visual imagery). 
 
The visual imagery priming condition of the binocular rivalry experiment denoted by 
Keogh & Pearson (2017) required participants to voluntarily generate a colour rivalry-
display – this voluntary aspect is under conscious control and a process unavailable to 
individuals with aphantasia. However, this does not mean that the same priming 
responses would be obtained within conditions where unconscious visual imagery is 
involuntarily generated. This has been examined so far, in one study, whereby 
participants were asked to ‘avoid imagining’ an object (such as a red apple), and 
participants were instructed to push a button if they failed to follow this instruction (i.e. 
they generated the image of a red apple) (Kwok, Leys, Koenig-Robert, & Pearson, 2019). 
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While this heavily relies on the accurate introspection and reliability of participants’ 
reports. The authors found that when participants successfully reported suppressing the 
image (of a red apple), their subsequent responses within the rivalry were still biased at a 
similar level to when the images were not suppressed (Kwok et al., 2019). The authors 
suggested that these suppressed images are likely to comprise of sensory representations 
that are represented in visual areas such as the primary visual cortex (Kwok et al., 2019).  
 
In two additional priming conditions, a luminance condition (whereby a highly luminous 
yellow stimulus was presented during suppression) and a spatial condition (binocular 
rivalry display was presented within a different spatial location), priming was still found 
to occur, although at a significantly lower level, but still above chance (Kwok et al., 
2019). Both the luminous and spatial conditions are suggested to interfere with the low-
level visual features in V1 of the primary visual cortex (Goodyear & Menon, 1998), and 
interfere with the formation of intentional visual images (Pearson et al., 2008). While the 
authors did not state that this suppression involved unconscious imagery, Nanay (2019, 
2021) suggests that this suppression might be indicative of the use of unconscious 
imagery. At present, this paradigm involving the suppression of images has not been 
investigated within individuals with aphantasia. If a subset of individuals with aphantasia 
do have unconscious imagery, this could be examined further within voxel decoding 
paradigms (Naselaris et al., 2015), which might show differences in decoded activity 
compared to aphantasics with a total lack of sensory visual imagery.  
 
Whether an equivalence of the binocular rivalry paradigm can be translated across to 
other sensory domains (other than the visual domain) remains a challenging notion. While 
such a paradigm in the visual domain provides evidence for the sensory strength of visual 
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imagery, it is unknown whether this can be translated to other senses. For instance, 
ensuring equal dominance in each eye is key to the binocular paradigm. However, this 
would be more challenging in translation to other senses such as the auditory domain, 
whereby it is more likely that there may be vast individual differences with regards to 
hearing abilities. Moreover, in the investigation of unconscious imagery within binocular 
rivalry paradigms, luminance and spatial conditions were added to interfere with the 
primary visual cortex. Equivalent control conditions may be more difficult to establish 
for other senses. For example, a spatial control in the auditory domain would involve an 
auditory image extended over time, rather than location as in the visual domain. Further, 
the act of suppression (i.e. avoiding the imagined experience of a sense) is not the norm, 
and it may be more difficult to introspect suppression attempts that are successful, as well 
as the act itself, may be more challenging to investigate in other senses. 
 
On a tangential note, if there is a subgroup of individuals with aphantasia who have 
unconscious imagery, it would be of interest to explore whether there is a correlation 
between individuals who have unconscious imagery to those who self-report experiences 
of flashes of imagery, or who dream visually. It has been documented in three studies that 
despite the inability to generate voluntary visual imagery, individuals with aphantasia do 
dream and can recall this visual contents (Dawes et al., 2020; Zeman et al., 2015; Zeman 
et al., 2020). These are arguably imagery experiences occurring within different 
consciousness states. One way that this variability may be explained is that individuals 
who experience unconscious imagery may be more predisposed to dreaming. Fosshage 
(2013), defines dreaming as “unconscious thinking”, and patient and child developmental 
studies suggest that there may be shared neural organisation in wakeful visual imagery 
and dreaming (Foulkes, 1999; Kerr, Foulkes, & Jurkovic, 1978). However, this is purely 
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speculation, and an exploration of the differences in imagery generation during wakeful 
voluntary imagery and unconscious-states are necessary.  
 
More broadly, further research should explore aphantasics’ ability to dream. In one study, 
the self-reported examination of dream content revealed that aphantasic participants 
dreamt significantly less than controls with typical imagery (Dawes et al., 2020). 
Moreover, their dream content comprised of less vivid emotions and sensory details 
(Dawes et al., 2020). Although the authors suggested no difference within spatial details 
of dreams (gathered through self-report measures), no indication is provided with regards 
to the visual (or object) details of the format of dreams, such as colour. The nature of this 
content has yet to be examined in more detail. It is unknown whether aphantasic 
participants who experience a lack of imagery within one sensory modality, if this is also 
absent within dream content. For individuals who once had vision, over time there is a 
gradual shift in dream content containing more references to other senses such as, 
audition, gustation and olfaction (Hurovitz, Dunn, Domhoff, & Fiss, 1999; Kirtley, 1975). 
Given that the dream content of sighted individuals contains high visual content, dream 
content of aphantasic individuals may reveal important information about visual function.  
In addition, while some individuals with aphantasia self-report visual dream content, it is 
not known the stage of sleep this originated. For instance, whether aphantasic individuals 
can recall their dreams or even have lucid visual dreams, a dreaming state whereby 
individuals are conscious that they are dreaming and can control dream content (LaBerge, 
2000; Voss, Holzmann, Tuin, & Hobson, 2009). The findings of dream self-reports in the 
study by Dawes et al. (2020) showed that individuals with aphantasia self-reported less 
control over their dreams. However, this implies there was still an element of control, 
albeit less than individuals with typical imagery. This has implications for differences 
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between a distinction between wakeful visual imagery and dream imagery, which have 
been suggested to share common neural mechanisms (Domhoff, 2003) despite their 
voluntary and involuntary basis. 
 
7.3. Future research 
At the outset of the PhD, the largest published sample size within the aphantasic literature 
was fifteen. This thesis was exploratory, and it was not known how easy or hard it would 
be to recruit participants with aphantasia. Since starting this PhD, general awareness of 
aphantasia within the general public and research literature has dramatically increased. 
For example, the experience has been publicised in a number of different news outlets, 
television programmes and social media platforms. Although the behavioural 
experiments in this thesis had low statistical power (i.e. with sample sizes between 20-30 
in each participant group), larger effect sizes were obtained for the self-report measures, 
which used the internet to recruit large aphantasic samples. Future research should adopt 
online behavioural methodologies in order to gather larger participant samples. 
 
In addition to providing evidence of the difference between self-report and performance 
on objective imagery measures in aphantasic individuals, this thesis shows that aphantasia 
is unlikely to be a homogenous experience and that there are subgroups or subtypes of 
aphantasia. This is evident in the individual differences’ behavioural exploration in 
Chapter 4 and the sensory exploration in Chapter 5. In the behavioural individual 
differences exploration, several possible subgroups emerged. Given the sample sizes, the 
proposed nature of these groups is tentative. However, this work provides an important 
evidence base upon which future research can build. Large sample sizes will enable 
researchers to confirm and profile the extent or presence of the impairments in the 
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subgroups. Similarly, the results of the non-visual questionnaires showed that individuals 
with aphantasia differed in their experience of imagery across the sensory modalities. It 
is not known whether these subgroups differ either behaviourally or at a neural level. If 
these subgroups differ, then new terms are required to describe these variations, rather 
than one set definition generalising to one type of experience.  
 
Exploration of the potential subgroups within aphantasia can provide an empirical basis 
for the different degrees of aphantasia. In the study by Zeman et al. (2020), the authors 
referred to aphantasic participants who scored 16 on the VVIQ as “extreme aphantasia”. 
Similarly, those who scored between 17-23 on the VVIQ were defined as “moderate 
aphantasia” (Zeman et al., 2020). It has not been examined whether there are objective 
differences between individuals who fall within these two groups. Although the majority 
of individuals with aphantasia scored 16 (the lowest score) on the VVIQ, some also 
scored above 30 on the VVIQ (Dawes et al., 2020; Wicken et al., submitted; Zeman et 
al., 2015). Currently, there is no consensus of a cut off in the literature to define 
aphantasia, and different research groups have adopted various cut-off criteria (Dawes et 
al., 2020; Wicken et al., 2021; Bainbridge et al., 2020).  
 
Similarly, where stated, there are no set criteria for the definition of typical imagers. 
However, the meta-analysis undertaken by McKelvie (1995) provided some normative 
VVIQ scores for ‘high’ and ‘low’ imagery groups. In the current thesis, control 
participants with typical imagery were defined by scores VVIQ > 33, in line with the wide 
range of VVIQ scores for typical imagers adopted by previous studies (Dawes et al., 2020; 
Wicken et al., submitted). More broadly, however, what is lacking in the literature is an 
investigation of performance between different scores of the VVIQ. For instance, 
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examine if there are any differences between typical imagers who have a conscious 
experience of weak imagery (e.g. VVIQ scores between 30-40) compared to aphantasic 
individuals who score between 25-30 on the VVIQ. Alternatively, whether there are any 
differences between individuals who have a conscious experience of weak imagery 
compared to individuals with “extreme aphantasia”. The identification of 
hyperphantasia, an experience characterised by highly vivid visual imagery, also provides 
the opportunity to compare performance across imagery extremes. A recent study by 
Milton et al. (submitted) showed that within three visual imagery tasks, there was no 
difference in performance between aphantasic and control participants (who had mid-
range VVIQ scores). This is similar to the findings of this thesis. However, there was a 
significant difference in performance in an object imagery task between aphantasic and 
hyperphantasic participants. Future studies should examine hyperphantasia – although 
this may be a more difficult population to identify owing to the subjectivity of their 
experience. 
 
Kosslyn’s theory of mental imagery, as well as the majority of evidence to support 
depictive theories, stem from the idea that visual imagery shares processes and 
mechanisms to visual perception (e.g. Kosslyn et al., 1999; Naselaris et al., 2015; Thirion 
et al., 2006). However, the extent of this overlap in resources has been contested by 
numerous neuroimaging studies failing to find common overlaps and patient case studies 
(e.g. Bartolomeo et al., 1998; Farah 1984; Ishai et al., 2000, Winlove et al., 2018). The 
discovery of a population of individuals who self-report the inability to use visual imagery 
but have intact visual perception also provides evidence against the notion of these two 
processes sharing identical mechanisms. Further neuroimaging research comparing 
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individuals with typical imagery to individuals with aphantasia may reveal differences 
between the neural networks involved in visual perception and visual imagery. 
 
In Chapter 6, individual differences in auditory experience were apparent as some 
aphantasic participants self-reported the presence of an internal voice, despite a self-
reported lack of auditory imagery. Anecdotal evidence collected through conversation 
revealed several aphantasic participants self-reported a lack of auditory imagery, but 
reported the ability to use their internal voice (inner speech). On the other hand, others 
self-reported both a lack of auditory imagery and internal voice (“mind silent”). Inner 
speech is suggested to comprise of auditory traits as found in overt speech, for instance, 
pitch, loudness and emotional tone (Vilhauer, 2016), and is thought by some to be a subset 
of auditory imagery (Hubbard, 2010). Evidence to suggest that inner speech is a form of 
auditory imagery stem from articulatory suppression studies and neuroimaging studies 
which show they both activate similar brain regions (Hubbard, 2010; Price, 2012). 
However, neuroimaging studies have also documented different patterns of activation 
(Fegen, Buchsbaum, & D’Esposito, 2015; Zatorre & Halpern, 2005). This suggests that 
although inner speech and auditory imagery may share common mechanisms, such as the 
use of phonological information (Shergill et al., 2001), they are somewhat separable 
processes (Alderson-Day & Fernyhough, 2015). Furthermore, it has been argued that 
inner speech is a form of articulated language representations with more overlaps with 
overt speech than auditory imagery speech representations (Alderson-Day & 
Fernyhough, 2015; Zatorre & Halpern, 2005). Future studies could explore the 
differences between inner speech and auditory imagery experience. This feature and 
distinction may aid further to characterise the auditory experience within individuals with 
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aphantasia. Similarly, it may provide additional evidence to whether the two processes 
are separable.  
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7.4. Thesis conclusion 
The objective of this thesis was to use objective experimental measures to investigate the 
cognitive basis of aphantasia – a variant of human experience defined by a self-reported 
lack of visual imagery. Despite the difference in self-reported conscious experience, 
individuals with aphantasia performed as well as individuals with typical imagery in a 
range of visual/spatial imagery, visuospatial working memory and auditory imagery 
tasks. The main findings of this thesis showed a discrepancy between subjective 
experience and behavioural performance. However, in one task, significant differences in 
response time were evident during cognitively demanding trials (but this pattern of 
performance was not exhibited by all aphantasic participants). This suggests that there 
may be different processes that underpin performance, and these processes are less 
effective with an increase in working memory load. Although it was proposed that 
individuals with aphantasia use spatial imagery in the absence of the ‘visual’ component, 
the results showed no evidence to support this notion, but this may be due to the 
insensitivity of the paradigm. A key finding of this thesis concerns individual differences, 
specifically, the possibility of aphantasic subgroups who have unconscious visual 
imagery and other subgroups who have a total absence of sensory imagery (extreme 
aphantasia). Further research should examine whether there are behavioural and neural 
differences to support the existence of these subgroups and explore the role of 
consciousness within imagery experience. Visual imagery is key to many cognitive 
processes, and the discovery of aphantasia suggests that our mental experiences are not 
experienced universally, but there are vast (and fascinating) variations within our inner 
lives. Understanding the unique mental experience of individuals with aphantasia will 
provide novel insights and offers exciting opportunities to investigate further the nature 
of visual imagery, perception and memory.   
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APPENDICES for Chapter 2:  
Appendix 2.1: Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) 
For each item on this questionnaire, try to form a visual image, and consider your 
experience carefully.  For any image that you do experience, rate how vivid it is using 
the five-point scale described below.  If you do not have a visual image, rate vividness 
as ‘1’.  Only use ‘5’ for images that are truly as lively and vivid as real seeing.  Please 
note that there are no right or wrong answers to the questions, and that it is not 
necessarily desirable to experience imagery or, if you do, to have more vivid imagery. 
Perfectly clear and vivid as real seeing   5 
Clear and reasonably vivid    4 
Moderately clear and lively    3 
Vague and dim      2 
No image at all, you only “know” that you are 
thinking of the object     1 
 
For items 1-4, think of some relative or friend whom you frequently see (but who is not 
with you at present) and consider carefully the picture that comes before your mind’s 
eye. 
1. The exact contour of face, head, shoulders and body  _______________ 
2. Characteristic poses of head, attitudes of body etc.  _______________ 
3. The precise carriage, length of step etc., in walking  _______________ 
4. The different colours worn in some familiar clothes  _______________ 
 
Visualise a rising sun.  Consider carefully the picture that comes before your mind’s 
eye. 
5. The sun rising above the horizon into a hazy sky  
 _______________ 
6. The sky clears and surrounds the sun with blueness  _______________ 
7. Clouds.  A storm blows up with flashes of lightning  _______________ 
8. A rainbow appears      _______________ 
 
Think of the front of a shop which you often go to.  Consider the picture that comes 
before your mind’s eye. 
9. The overall appearance of the shop from the opposite side 
 of the road       _______________ 
10. A window display including colours, shapes and details 
 Of individual items for sale     _______________ 
11.         You are near the entrance.  The colour, shape and  
               details of the door.      _______________ 
12.         You enter the shop and go to the counter. The counter 
 assistant serves you.  Money changes hands   _______________ 
 
Finally think of a country scene which involves trees, mountains and a lake.  Consider 
the picture that comes before your mind’s eye.    
 _______________ 
13. The contours of the landscape    _______________ 
14.  The colour and shape of the trees    _______________ 
15. the colour and shape of the lake    _______________ 
16. A strong wind blows on the trees and on the lake causing 
  waves in the water.      _______________  
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Appendix 2.2: Object-spatial imagery questionnaire (OSIQ) 
1.  I was very good in 3-D geometry as a student.  
2. If I were asked to choose between engineering professions and visual arts, I 
would prefer engineering. 
3. Architecture interests me more than painting.  
4. My images are very colourful and bright.  
5. I prefer schematic diagrams and sketches when reading a textbook instead of 
colourful and pictorial illustrations. 
6. My images are more like schematic representations of things and events rather 
than detailed pictures. 
7. When reading fiction, I usually form a clear and detailed mental picture of a 
scene or room that has been described. 
8. I have a photographic memory.  
9. I can easily imagine and mentally rotate 3-dimensional geometric figures.  
10. When entering a familiar store to get a specific item, I can easily picture the 
exact location of the target item, the shelf it stands on, how it is arranged and the 
surrounding articles. 
11.  I normally do not experience many spontaneous vivid images; I use my mental 
imagery mostly when attempting to solve some problems like the ones in 
mathematics. 
12.  My images are very vivid and photographic.  
13. I can easily sketch a blueprint for a building that I am familiar with  
14. I am a good Tetris player.  
15. If I were asked to choose between studying architecture and visual arts, I would 
choose visual arts. 
16. My mental images of different objects very much resemble the size, shape and 
colour of actual objects that I have seen. 
17. When I imagine the face of a friend, I have a perfectly clear and bright image. 
18. I have excellent abilities in technical graphics.  
19. I can easily remember a great deal of visual details that someone else might 
never notice. For example, I would just automatically take some things in, like 
what colour shirt someone wears or what colour are his/her shoes. 
20. In high school, I had less difficulty with geometry than with art.  
21. I enjoy pictures with bright colours and unusual shapes like the ones in modern 
art. 
22. Sometimes my images are so vivid and persistent that it is difficult to ignore 
them. 
23. When thinking about an abstract concept (e.g. ‘a building’) I imagine an abstract 
schematic building in my mind or its blueprint rather than a specific concrete 
building. 
24. My images are more schematic than colourful and pictorial. 
25. I can close my eyes and easily picture a scene that I have experienced.  
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26. I remember everything visually. I can recount what people wore to a dinner and 
I can talk about the way they sat and the way they looked probably in more 
detail than I could discuss what they said. 
27. I find it difficult to imagine how a 3-dimensional geometric figure would exactly 
look like when rotated. 
28. My visual images are in my head all the time. They are just right there.  
29. My graphic abilities would make a career in architecture relatively easy for me. 
30. When I hear a radio announcer or a DJ I’ve never actually seen, I usually find 
myself picturing what he or she might look like. 
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1 25 42 110 107 101 54 44 110 107 
2 29 25 80 88 102 33 45 115 110 
3 66 49 123 115 103 31 45 115 110 
4 37 44 111 108 104 37 42 110 107 
5 25 50 129 119 105 57 46 113 109 
6 28 48 120 114 106 30 46 117 112 
7 24 45 120 114 107 37 47 119 113 
8 58 46 113 109 108 41 45 115 110 
9 69 28 84 91 109 55 42 106 105 
10 41 48 120 114 110 37 43 111 108 
11 23 41 113 109 111 42 45 115 110 
12 35 42 110 107 112 39 39 104 104 
13 31 47 119 113 113 29 45 115 110 
14 27 45 115 110 114 31 39 104 104 
15 32 49 122 115 115 38 37 101 102 
16 32 27 84 91 116 42 42 110 107 
17 23 45 120 114 117 28 39 104 104 
18 27 38 103 103 118 38 47 119 113 
19 31 47 119 113 119 46 47 115 110 
20 63 50 125 117 120 55 42 106 105 
Mean 36.3 42.8 112 108.55  Mean 40 43.35 111.2 108 
SD 15.06 7.64 14.00 8.88  SD 9.15 3.01 5.44 3.21 
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Appendix 2.5: Participant information and consent 
This research is being conducted by Elena Vryzakis as part of an MSc Psychology at the 
University of Westminster. It is being supervised by Sam Evans and Zoe Pounder in the 




The aim of the study is to examine visual imagery and working memory performance in 
healthy individuals.  
 
Design  
The study requires you to complete an online screening questionnaire to see whether 
you are eligible to take part in the study. If you are eligible, you will be asked to attend 
two testing sessions at the University of Westminster Cavendish campus, spaced one 
week apart. Each session will last approximately 40 minutes. During the two sessions, 
you will complete several questionnaires and a computerised imagery task. Each 
computerised task will have a practice element or demo so you understand the nature of 
the task before starting.  
 
Confidentiality of the data  
The data and responses you provide will remain confidential in accordance with the 
University of Westminster ethical guidelines and British Psychological Society code of 
human research ethics. It will be securely stored and managed in accordance with the 
General Data Protection Regulation 2018 and the Data Protection Act 2018. The data 
you have provided may be shared with the project supervisors and the project markers. 
No individuals will be identifiable from any written report of the research, or any 
publications arising from it. Additionally, you have the right to ask for any data you 
have provided to be destroyed.  
 
Voluntary participation  
It is important that you know that your participation in this experiment is entirely 
voluntary, and you have the right to withdraw at any time without having to give a 
reason. Furthermore, you do not have to answer particular questions if you do not wish 
to and you have the right to ask for your data to be withdrawn after the session until the 
research has been published/submitted.  
 
Debrief 
 Please note that you will receive written debriefing information at the end of the study.  
 
Questions  
As a participant, you have the right to ask questions at any time, even during the 
experiment. If you need to contact the researcher after participating, please send an 
email to Elena Vryzakis at w1704957@my.westminster.ac.uk; Zoë Pounder 
z.pounder@my.westminster.ac.uk; or Sam Evans S.Evans@westminster.ac.uk 24 
 
Consent Form  
Please tick each box, as appropriate, to confirm that your participation has been 
explained to your satisfaction.  
 
• My participation in this research is on an entirely voluntary basis.  
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• I am able to stop at any point during the process without having to provide an 
explanation. 
 • Once I have taken part, I am still able to withdraw my data at any point until the 
research has been published/submitted as part of my research project, or has been 
anonymised. 
 • I do not have to answer all questions asked, and I can decline to answer any questions 
as I see fit. • My data will be anonymised, and all identifying features will be removed 
so that my contribution will not be identifiable when reporting this research.  
• If I provide any personal identity data this will be treated confidentially and in 
accordance with the University of Westminster ethical guidelines and British 
Psychological Society code of human research ethics. It will be securely stored and 
managed in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation 2018 and the Data 
Protection Act 2018. 
 • My personal information may be shared with members of the research and/or teaching 
team, and the University of Westminster External Examiner.  
• The duty of confidentiality is not absolute and in exceptional circumstances this may 
be overridden by more compelling duties such as to protect individuals from harm.  
• My anonymised contribution to this research may be used for future research, and may 
undergo secondary analysis. Future research may be related or unrelated to the goals of 
this study.  
 
If you consent to participate under these conditions, please sign below. This consent 
form will be stored separately from any data you provide so that your responses remain 
anonymous. 
 
 I have read the Participation Information Sheet, I have confirmed my understanding of 
it and I am willing to participate in the research study.  
Print name _________________________________ 
Signature____________________________________ 
Date_________________________  
All reasonable steps have been taken to provide an appropriate explanation of the 
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1 28 44 113 109 101 54 44 110 107 
2 30 40 106 105 102 33 45 115 110 
3 26 40 106 105 103 31 45 115 110 
4 25 45 115 110 104 37 42 110 107 
5 25 36 99 100 105 57 46 113 109 
6 27 37 101 102 106 30 46 117 112 
7 57 47 115 110 107 37 47 119 113 
8 37 44 113 109 108 41 45 115 110 
9 32 48 120 114 109 55 42 106 105 
10 25 33 94 97 110 37 43 111 108 
11 42 40 106 105 111 42 45 115 110 
12 52 43 108 107 112 39 39 104 104 
13 46 37 97 99 113 29 45 115 110 
14 55 47 115 110 114 31 39 104 104 
15 44 43 111 108 115 38 37 101 102 
16 40 43 111 108 116 42 42 110 107 
17 51 44 110 107 117 28 39 104 104 
18 30 47 119 113 118 38 47 119 113 
19 54 43 108 106 119 46 47 115 110 
20 55 45 111 108 120 55 42 106 105 
Mea
n 39.05 42.3 108.9 106.6 
 
Mean 40 43.35 111.2 108 
SD 11.90 4.12 7.02 4.42  SD 9.15 3.01 5.44 3.21 
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Appendix 3.3: Informed consent, participation sheet (continued) and debrief 
 
I have read and understood the information on the “Information for Participants” sheet, 
and I have received enough information about the study. I have understood that my 
participation is completely voluntary and that I can at any instance discontinue the 
experiment, and such discontinuation does not affect my treatment in the future. 
 
With my signature, I confirm my participation to this study, and volunteer for a research 
subject. 
 





Signed ………………………………………………       Date 
………………………………………. 
On behalf of Principal Investigators:  
Dr Jane Jacob 
Dr Juha Silvanto 
Dr Maria Flynn  
Miss Zoë Pounder 
 
Address: 
Cognitive Research Group  
Westminster University 







Appendix 3.3: Informed consent, participation sheet (continued) and debrief 
Introduction 
We would like to invite you to participate in our study regarding cognitive function in 
individuals who have aphantasia (lack visual mental imagery) and individuals who have 
visual imagery. Before you sign the informed consent form, we would like to ask you to 
read the following information carefully. 
Aim of this study 
The goal of this study is to examine cognitive function in individuals with aphantasia 
compared to non-aphantasics (controls).  
Criteria for Study 
To take part in this study you must have normal or correct to normal vision, and no 
history of mental illness 
Design of the study 
The study requires you to attend two sessions one week apart. Each session will last 
approximately 2 hours and you will be paid for your time with love2shop vouchers. 
During the two sessions you will undertake a range of cognitive tasks. Each task will have 
a practice element or demo so you understand the nature of the task before starting. 
What is asked of you 
We would like to ask you to pay attention to the following. Please make sure that you do 
not drink more than 2 units of alcohol and do not take any drugs on the day of the study 
or the night before. Furthermore, make sure that you are well rested before the 
experiment. If you have recently started to take any medication, you feel tired or not 
rested, please inform the experimenter (see phone number below) before coming to the 
experiment.  
Confidentiality of the data  
Your privacy will be assured by coded gathering and analysis of the data. The data will 
only be available to current members of the research team, and not be Transposemitted 
to a third party. The data will be preserved for a maximum of 15 years.  
Voluntary participation 
It is important that you know that your participation in this experiment is completely 
voluntary, and that you can stop at any moment, without reason.  
Questions 
As a participant, you have the right to ask questions at any time, even during the 
experiment. It is also possible that you have questions after having finished the 




Appendix 3.3: Informed consent, participation sheet (continued) and debrief 
 
Thank you for attending the two testing sessions and taking part in our study.  
This study aims to examine cognitive function in healthy individuals and in individuals 
who have aphantasia (lack visual mental imagery). The tests which you have undertaken 
in the two sessions involve visual imagery and aspects of working memory. The data 
gathered will be used to examine how cognitive performance (e.g. working memory) in 
individuals with aphantasia differs from those participants who have normal imagery. 
 




Appendix 3.4: The Big Five Inventory (BFI) 
Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For example, do 
you agree that you are someone who lies to spend time with others? Please write a 









Neither agree nor 
disagree 
3 








I see myself as someone who 
__1. Is talkative __ 23. Tends to be lazy 
__2. Tends to find fault with others __ 24. Is emotionally stable, not easily upset 
__3. Does a thorough job __25. Is inventive 
__4. Is depressed, blue __26. Has an assertive personality 
__5. Is original, comes up with new ideas __ 27. Can be cold and aloof 
__6. Is reserved __28. Perseveres until the task is finished 
__7. Is helpful and unselfish with others __29. Can be moody 
__8. Can be somewhat careless __30. Values artistic, aesthetic experiences 
__9. Is relaxed, handles stress well __31. Is sometimes shy, inhibited 
__10. Is curious about many different things __32. Is considerate and kind to almost everyone 
__11. Is full of energy __33. Does things efficiently 
__12. Starts quarrels with others __34. Remains calm in tense situations 
__13. Is a reliable worker __35. Prefers work that is routine 
__14. Can be tense __36. Is outgoing and sociable 
__15. Ins ingenious, a deep thinker __37. Is sometimes rude to others 
__16. Generates a lot of enthusiasm __38. Makes plans and follows through with them 
__17. Has a forgiving nature __39. Gets nervous easily 
__18. Tends to be disorganised __ 40. Likes to reflect, play with ideas 
__19. Worries a lot __41. Has few artistic interests 
__20. Has an active imagination __42. Likes to cooperate with others 
__21. Tends to be quiet __43. Is easily distracted 
__22. Is generally trusting __44. Is sophisticated in art, music, or  
literature  
Please check: Did you write a number in front of each statement?  
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Appendix 3.5: Investigating the relationship between self-report of visual imagery 
and extraversion 
Summary 
During Experiment 3, the results of 20 participants with typical imagery showed a strong 
correlation between personality and self-reported vividness of visual imagery. 
Specifically, individuals with higher extraversion scores tended to report more vivid 
experiences. This is important in the context that the VVIQ is used to diagnose elements 
of a disorder or experience such as in the case of individuals with synaesthesia who score 
high on the VVIQ (Barnett & Newell, 2008). The aim of this study is to investigate 




Participants and ethics 
419 responses were received in Qualtrics and were downloaded into a SPSS file. A 
number of participants were excluded: 10 participants did not give consent to participate 
at the start of the Qualtrics questionnaire, 5 participants did not provide consent at the end 
of the study, 5 participants were removed due to their age (under the age of 16) and 2 
participants were removed as they did not provide their age. As a result, this left 397 
participants. Of these 397 participants, 259 were female, 119 were male and 19 
respondents did not specify their gender.  
 
The protocol for the study was in accordance with the British Psychological Society 
guidelines and the ethical approval provided by the Psychology Department Ethics 
Committee of the University of Westminster, UK. All participants consented to undertake 




Table 1: Participant demographics for Experiment 2 






Highest level of education  
Grammar/ Secondary/ High school/  
Vocational 
108 
College/ University/ University graduate 191 
Postgraduate 44 
Postgraduate/Professional Degree 53 










Missing/No details provided 13  
 
Materials 
Participants were asked to complete two visual imagery questionnaires: the Vividness of 
Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) and the Spontaneous Use of Imagery 
Questionnaire (SUIS). Participants also undertook the 41-item Five Factor personality 
inventory validated for use on the Internet (Buchanan, Johnson & Goldberg, 2005) that 
provides quick measures of Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, 
Neuroticism (emotional stability), and Openness to Experience An additional 
Extroversion scale of the Five Factor Model of personality comprising of 8 questions was 
also included (see Appendix III). 
Procedure  
Participants were recruited via a personality-testing website 
(www.personalitytest.org.uk).  This website is a privately owned research tool and 
educational resource, separate to the University of Westminster. The website has existed 
for a number of years, and attracts around six thousand users per month. No attempt was 
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made to recruit respondents or otherwise attract them to the site - they were referred by 
other sites or found the website through search engines.  
 
Respondents receive brief feedback on the 'meaning' of each variable, and how their own 
scores compared to a reference sample (above average, average, below average scores). 
On completion of the personality questionnaire, respondents are invited to volunteer for 
a second study (Investigating the relationship between self-reports of visual imagery and 
extraversion). Once participants provided consent to participate in the study, participants 
were asked to complete 8 questions regarding extraversion taken from the Five Factor 
Model of personality. Subsequently, participants completed the VVIQ (16 questions) and 
the SUIS (12 questions). Participants were asked to complete some additional questions 
regarding demographics: age, location (country), gender, level of education, occupation 
status. At the end of the study, participants were provided with feedback in relation to 
their visual imagery scores in comparison to the imagery scores. 
Data analysis  
Cronbach’s alpha examined the internally reliability of the four questionnaires. A 
Pearson’s correlation was undertaken for all of the personality traits in the Five Factor 
Model and two imagery questionnaires. A regression examine personality influences on 
imagery questionnaires, including age and gender as predictors of scores.  
 
 Results 
The 41-item Five Factor personality inventory was used and found to be highly reliable 
for each trait: neuroticism (8 items; α = 0.841), extraversion (9 items; α = 0.865), 
conscientiousness (10 items; α = 0.856), agreeableness (7 items; α = 0.748). Although 
openness to experience had a lower level of internal consistency (7 items; α = 0.685). The 
BFI Extraversion scale, an additional measure of extraversion comprised of 8 questions  
(α = 0.879). The VVIQ (16 items) and SUIS (12 items) also have high levels of internal 
consistency (α = 0.902 α = 0.764 respectively).  
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 Scale Mean score (SD) 
Imagery 
Questionnaires 
VVIQ /80 61.97 (11.39) 
SUIS /60 40.64 (8.80) 
BFI Extraversion scale Extraversion /40 24.37 (7.09) 
Five Factor Scale  Extraversion /45 27.60 (7.69) 
Agreeableness /35 28.06 (4.49) 
Conscientiousness /50 34.58 (7.72) 
Neuroticism /38 21.75 (7.09) 
Openness to Experience /35  27.96 (4.63) 
Table 2: Means and standard deviations (SD) for VVIQ, SUIS and for the personality 
measures (Five Factor and BFI Extraversion scale).  
 
 
Table 3: Pearson correlation between personality/demographic factors and imagery 
questionnaires (VVIQ and SUIS) 
 
A regression analysis was used to examine if the personality traits on the Five Factor 
personality inventory predicted participants’ ratings on both the VVIQ and SUIS. Age 
and gender were also included as predictors as they influence responses provided on the 
VVIQ and SUIS. The regression analysis of personality, age and gender on VVIQ (R2 = 
.132) suggests that individual differences account for over 10% of variance in VVIQ 
scores. Out of all the personality traits extraversion (β = 0.125, p = 0.021) and especially 
most significantly conscientiousness (β = 0.271 , p<0.001) are the main predictors of high 
VVIQ scores23. 
                                               
23 The other traits: agreeableness (β = 0.091, p = .09), neurotiscm (β = 0.04, p = .52) and openness to 
experience (β = 0.04, p = .46). 
 Trait VVIQ SUIS 
Five Factor 
Scale 
Extraversion  r = .19, p < .001 r = .10, p = .06 
Agreeableness  r = .15, p = .003 r = .19, p < .001 
Conscientiousness  r = .31, p < .001  r = .14, p = .005 
Neuroticism  r = -.17, p = .001 r = -.01, p = .76 
Openness to 
Experience  




Extraversion r = .16, p = .002 r = .04, p = .38 
Demographic 
Factors 
Age r = .17, p = .001 r = .006, p = .91 
Sex r = .06, p = .24 r = .19, p < .001 
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The regression analysis of personality, age and gender on SUIS (R2 = .096) suggests that 
individual differences account for less than 10% of variance in SUIS scores. Traits 
extraversion (β = .109, p = .05), agreeableness (β = .179, p = .001), conscientiousness (β 
= .148, p = .01), neuroticism (β = .138, p = .03) and gender (β = .144, p = .005) are 
statistically significant predictors of high SUIS scores. 
 
Discussion 
Self-report questionnaires are one way in which to gain an insight into an individual’s 
experiences. There is a considerable amount of research suggesting that certain 
personality traits can influence the way an individual may self-perceive and consequently 
report their experiences (Buchanan, 2015). This experiment examined the relationship 
between the personality trait extraversion and self-reported visual imagery vividness 
within a large sample. The results showed that although extraversion is a small predictor 
for VVIQ scores, other traits such conscientiousness have a stronger influence.  
 
Despite this, extraverted individuals did self-report their visual imagery experience as 
more rich, other traits had a stronger influence on vividness scores. Moreover, there was 
a significant trend between SUIS scores and the Five Factor extraversion scale, however, 
the results suggest that this effect size would be small, for instance a small difference in 
the amount of self-reported spontaneous imagery. This indicates the effect of extraversion 
is unique to the VVIQ, rather than being a response bias. This reflects the nature of the 
two scales: the VVIQ requires individuals to visualise specific details of scenes while the 
SUIS considers the frequency or likelihood to which imagery is used in certain everyday 
life scenarios (Reisberg et al., 2003). While the SUIS has good reliability (McCarthy-
Jones et al., 2012), the VVIQ has been shown to have a high internal validity for 
measuring a mental construct (Campos, 2011). 
 
If personality explains 10% of variance on these scales, the question is with regards to 
the amount that this variation matters.  This depends on the context in which the VVIQ 
is used to diagnose elements of a disorder or experience. For instance, the VVIQ has been 
used to examine the relationship between the vividness of visual imagery and schizotypal 
traits in a non-clinical population (Bell & Halligan, 2010). Moreover, individuals with 
synaesthesia tend score highly on the VVIQ (Barnett & Newell, 2008). In a forensic 
setting, extraverted individuals are more likely to provide partial false memories (Porter, 
Birt, Yuille, & Lehman, 2000) or express memories which they have imagined 
(Heinstroöm, 2003), although vividness of visual imagery is not normally assessed in 
such a setting. Overall the practical implication are that individual differences should 
routinely be measured in research which uses imagery scales, so that effects can be 
controlled for in analyses. 
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MATERIALS FOR THIS SUB-STUDY (undertaken on Qualtrics) 
Appendix 3.5.A: Participation information and consent for The Big Five Inventory 
(BFI) 
Thank you for your interest in this online personality test, which is based on an 
International Personality Item Pool representation of the Five Factor Model of 
personality. The Five Factor Model (also known as the "Big 5" or BFI) is based on the 
idea that five main dimensions are necessary and sufficient for broadly describing 
human personality.  
The next page contains the 41 items of the test and some additional questions. Once you 
have filled these in and submitted the test for scoring, you will be told your scores on 
these five basic dimensions and given some information about what they mean.  
This version of the inventory was developed for use in online psychological research 
projects and at times may still be used to collect data. Additional questions may also be 
added from time to time. However, it is possible to take the test without your data being 
used in research, and you will have the opportunity to request this.  
All of the information you provide will be treated as confidential. 
No information about your identity will be requested at any stage. 
Please answer the questions as honestly and accurately as possible. 
Please make sure you respond to all the items and do not leave any blanks (your test 
scores cannot be computed if you miss any out).  
No risks or benefits to you as an individual are anticipated as a result of your 
participation. 
It is assumed that you are taking the test purely for interest: you should never use the 
information given here for any serious "real life" purposes. 
If you wish to take the test, but do not wish your data to be used for research purposes, 
you will have the opportunity to say so before submitting the test for scoring. 
You might occasionally get a message that there has been an 'Internal Server Error'. If 
this happens, refreshing the page should fix things. Apologies for any inconvenience 
this causes. 
This website might change or go away entirely with no warning at any time. There are 
no current plans to take it down, but also no guarantee of its continued existence.  
By clicking below you are giving your consent to proceed under the conditions outlined 
on this page.  
I understand and wish to continue 
Instructions  
On the following pages, there are phrases describing people's behaviours. Please use the 
rating scale below to describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe 
yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself 
as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as 
you are, and roughly your same age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest 
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manner, your responses will be kept in absolute confidence. Please read each statement 
carefully, and then fill in the bubble that corresponds to your reply.  
 
Appendix 3.5.B: The Big Five Inventory (BFI) 
Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For example, do 
you agree that you are someone who lies to spend time with others? Please write a 









Neither agree nor 
disagree 
3 








I see myself as someone who 
__1. Is talkative __ 23. Tends to be lazy 
__2. Tends to find fault with others __ 24. Is emotionally stable, not easily 
upset 
__3. Does a thorough job __25. Is inventive 
__4. Is depressed, blue __26. Has an assertive personality 
__5. Is original, comes up with new 
ideas 
__ 27. Can be cold and aloof 
__6. Is reserved __28. Perseveres until the task is finished 
__7. Is helpful and unselfish with 
others 
__29. Can be moody 
__8. Can be somewhat careless __30. Values artistic, aesthetic experiences 
__9. Is relaxed, handles stress well __31. Is sometimes shy, inhibited 
__10. Is curious about many 
different things 
__32. Is considerate and kind to almost 
everyone 
__11. Is full of energy __33. Does things efficiently 
__12. Starts quarrels with others __34. Remains calm in tense situations 
__13. Is a reliable worker __35. Prefers work that is routine 
__14. Can be tense __36. Is outgoing and sociable 
__15. Ins ingenious, a deep thinker __37. Is sometimes rude to others 
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__16. Generates a lot of enthusiasm __38. Makes plans and follows through 
with them 
__17. Has a forgiving nature __39. Gets nervous easily 
__18. Tends to be disorganised __ 40. Likes to reflect, play with ideas 
__19. Worries a lot __41. Has few artistic interests 
__20. Has an active imagination __42. Likes to cooperate with others 
__21. Tends to be quiet __43. Is easily distracted 
__22. Is generally trusting __44. Is sophisticated in art, music, or 
literature  
 
What is your age in years? (Pick from this list) 
Where are you located? (Pick from this list) 
Are you male or female? (Pick from this list) 
What is the highest level of formal schooling you have completed? (Pick from this list) 
Which of these best describes your main current occupational status? (Pick from this 
list) 
How did you come to be taking this test? (Pick from this list).  
Feedback  
The test that you have just taken is based on the Five Factor Model of personality. There 
is a broad consensus amongst personality theorists that this model, which describes five 
major 'domains' or traits, is the best current description of the structure of personality. 
The five major dimensions, and your scores on them, are described below. Try to 
interpret your results on the basis of the overall pattern, rather than just concentrating on 
particular scores.  
Factor I : Extraversion (AKA Surgency)  
This trait reflects preference for, and behavior in, social situations. People high in 
extraversion are energetic and seek out the company of others. Low scorers (introverts) 
tend to be more quiet and reserved. Compared to other people who have taken this test, 
your score on this dimension (25) is about average.  
 
Factor II : Agreeableness (AKA Friendliness)  
This trait reflects how we tend to interact with others. People high in agreeableness tend 
to be trusting, friendly and cooperative. Low scorers tend to be more aggressive and less 
cooperative. Compared to other people who have taken this test, your score on this 
dimension (19) is relatively low.  
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Factor III : Conscientiousness (AKA Will or Dependability)  
This trait reflects how organized and persistent we are in pursuing our goals. High 
scorers are methodical, well organized and dutiful. Low scorers are less careful, less 
focussed and more likely to be distracted from tasks. Compared to other people who 
have taken this test, your score on this dimension (30) is about average.  
Factor IV : Neuroticism  
This trait reflects the tendency to experience negative thoughts and feelings. High 
scorers are prone to insecurity and emotional distress. Low scorers tend to be more 
relaxed, less emotional and less prone to distress. Compared to other people who have 
taken this test, your score on this dimension (20) is about average.  
Factor V : Openness (AKA Culture or Intellect)  
This trait reflects 'open-mindedness' and interest in culture. High scorers tend to be 
imaginative, creative, and to seek out cultural and educational experiences. Low scorers 
are more down-to-earth, less interested in art and more practical in nature. Compared to 
other people who have taken this test, your score on this dimension (27) is about 
average.  
A word of caution - your score on each scale was interpreted relative to a large (2448) 
sample of other people who have done the test: 'relatively low' means your score was in 
the bottom 30%, 'relatively high' in the top 30%, and 'about average' somewhere in the 
middle. However, it is known that different groups of people (e.g. men and women) are 
likely to score differently on various measures. Therefore, the people you were 
compared to in generating the feedback may not have been people exactly like you.  
If you wish to know more about this personality inventory and how it was developed, 
you may find the following paper useful:  
Buchanan, T., Johnson, J. A., & Goldberg, L. R. (2005). Implementing a Five-Factor 
Personality Inventory for Use on the Internet. European Journal of Psychological 
Assessment, 21, 115-127.  
Would you be willing to quickly help with a research project?  
We are doing a project looking at people's experiences of visual imagery. Participating 
is quick and easy, and should take no more than 10 minutes. Participants will find out 
how they score on two measures of visual imagery. If you would be willing to help, or 
just want to know more about the project, you can find further information here.  
Thank you for your participation in this project. 
Appendix 3.5.C: Participant information and consent, visual imagery study. 
Thank you for your interest in this project, which is concerned with individual 
differences in how we experience visual imagery.  
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If you choose to take part, you will be asked to answer a few more questions about your 
typical thoughts, feelings and behaviour. You will then be asked to complete two short 
questionnaires about your experiences of visual imagery. Participating in this study 
should take most people about 10 minutes.  
Once you've completed the study, you'll be given more information about it and told 
what your scores on the imagery questionnaires were.  
No information from which you can be personally identified (names, email addresses, 
or similar) will be collected or shared at any time, or published in research outputs 
arising from this project. We will take care to respect your privacy at all times. The duty 
of confidentiality is not absolute and in exceptional circumstances this may be 
overridden by more compelling duties such as to protect individuals from harm. 
Your responses to the personality questionnaire you just completed will be combined 
with the data you provide in this study.  
If you change your mind about participating, you have the right to stop at any time 
without giving a reason. Data you have already submitted in this study will not be 
analysed. Once you have indicated your consent at the end of this study, it will no 
longer be possible to withdraw your data, as you are responding anonymously. 
The data you provide will be stored indefinitely on computer systems controlled by the 
University of Westminster. The data you provide may be re-used in other research 
projects at the University of Westminster or elsewhere. The data may be 
Transposeferred or made openly available to other researchers, e.g. through a data 
repository, for such purposes.  
No risks or benefits to you as an individual are anticipated as a result of your 
participation.   
If you have read the information above, and give your consent to participate under these 
conditions, please tick "I wish to take part in the study" and then click the 'Continue' button.  
I wish to take part in the study 
I do not wish to take part in the study  
Section 1 (BFI) 
Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For example, do you 
agree that you are someone who likes to spend time with 
others? Please select a response next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree 
or disagree with that statement.  
I see myself as someone who….  
Is talkative 
Is reserved 
Is full of energy  
Generates a lot of enthusiasm 
 303 
Tends to be quiet 
Has an assertive personality 
Is sometimes shy, inhibited 
Is outgoing, sociable 
 
Appendix 3.5.D: Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) 
For each item on this questionnaire, try to form a visual image, and consider your 
experience carefully.  For any image that you do experience, rate how vivid it is using 
the five-point scale described below.  If you do not have a visual image, rate vividness 
as ‘1’.  Only use ‘5’ for images that are truly as lively and vivid as real seeing.  Please 
note that there are no right or wrong answers to the questions, and that it is not 
necessarily desirable to experience imagery or, if you do, to have more vivid imagery. 
 
Perfectly clear and vivid as real seeing   5 
Clear and reasonably vivid    4 
Moderately clear and lively    3 
Vague and dim      2 
No image at all, you only “know” that you are 
thinking of the object     1 
 
For items 1-4, think of some relative or friend whom you frequently see (but who is not 
with you at present) and consider carefully the picture that comes before your mind’s 
eye. 
1. The exact contour of face, head, shoulders and body  _______________ 
2. Characteristic poses of head, attitudes of body etc.  _______________ 
3. The precise carriage, length of step etc., in walking  _______________ 
4. The different colours worn in some familiar clothes  _______________ 
 
Visualise a rising sun.  Consider carefully the picture that comes before your mind’s 
eye. 
5. The sun rising above the horizon into a hazy sky  
 _______________ 
6. The sky clears and surrounds the sun with blueness  _______________ 
7. Clouds.  A storm blows up with flashes of lightning  _______________ 
8. A rainbow appears      _______________ 
Think of the front of a shop which you often go to.  Consider the picture that comes 
before your mind’s eye. 
9. The overall appearance of the shop from the opposite side 
 of the road       _______________ 
10. A window display including colours, shapes and details 
 Of individual items for sale     _______________ 
11.         You are near the entrance.  The colour, shape and  
               details of the door.      _______________ 
12.         You enter the shop and go to the counter. The counter 
 assistant serves you.  Money changes hands   _______________ 
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Finally think of a country scene which involves trees, mountains and a lake.  Consider 
the picture that comes before your mind’s eye.    
 _______________ 
13. The contours of the landscape    _______________ 
14.  The colour and shape of the trees    _______________ 
15. the colour and shape of the lake    _______________ 
16. A strong wind blows on the trees and on the lake causing 
  waves in the water.      _______________ 
 
Appendix 3.5.E: Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (SUIS) 
Please read each of the following descriptions and indicate the degree to which each is 
appropriate for you. Do not spend a lot of time thinking about each one, but respond 
based on your thoughts about how you do or do not perform each activity. If a 
description is always completely appropriate, please write “5”; if it is never appropriate, 
write “1”; if it is appropriate about half of the time, write “3”; and use the other 
numbers (2,4) accordingly.  
 
1. When going to a new place, I prefer directions that include detailed descriptions 
of landmarks (such as the size, shape, and colour of a gas station) in addition to 
their names. 
2. If I catch a glance of a car that is partially hidden behind bushes, I automatically 
“complete it,” seeing the entire car in my mind’s eye. 
3. If I am looking for new furniture in a store, I always visualise what the furniture 
would look like in particular places in my home. 
4. I prefer to read novels that lead me easily to visualise where the characters are 
and what they are doing instead of novels that are difficult to visualise. 
5. When I think of visiting a relative, I almost always have a clear mental picture 
of him or her. 
6. When relatively easy technical material is described clearly in a text, I find 
illustrations distracting because they interfere with my ability to visualise the 
material. 
7. If someone were to tell me two-digits numbers to add (e.g., 24 and 31), I would 
visualise them in order to add them.  
8. Before I get dressed to go out, I first visualise what I will look like if I wear 
different combinations of clothes. 
9. When I think about a series of errands I must do, I visualise the stores I will 
visit. 
10. When I first hear a friend's voice, a visual image of him or her almost always 
springs to mind. 
11. When I hear a radio announcer or DJ that I’ve never actually seen, I usually find 
myself picturing what they might look like. 
12. If I saw a car accident, I would visualise what happened when later trying to 
recall the details. 
Total: Out of 60. 
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Appendix 3.5.F: Debrief 
Thank you very much for taking part in this study.  
In a pilot study, we found a relationship between personality and the experience of visual 
imagery. Specifically, people with higher extraversion scores tended to report more vivid 
experiences. In this study, we wanted to confirm that finding, and also to look at relationships 
between personality and other aspects of imagery. The data you have provided will help us to 
do this. You completed two established questionnaires dealing with how we experience 
imagery. In our analyses, we will look at how personality scores (specifically extraversion) 
correlate with scores on these two measures.  
Having a high or low score on these scales doesn't mean your experience of imagery is 'good' or 
'weak'. It just tells us about your subjective experience. There are no right or wrong answers in 
the questionnaires. It is not necessarily desirable to experience imagery, or if you do, to have 
more vivid imagery. However, participants are often curious to know what their scores were.  
On the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire, your score was out of a possible 80 points. 
In our pilot study using 20 people, we found the average score for participants was 64 points. 
However, remember these may not have been people exactly like you so your scores may not be 
directly comparable.  
On the Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale, your score was out of a possible 60 points. Again, it 
is difficult to give you anything to compare this score with. However, in our previous pilot 
study using 20 people, we found the average score for participants was 39 points.  
Once again, thank you for participating in our research. The study is now over, and you may 
close this browser window.  
 
Zoe Pounder 
Tom Buchana  
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Appendix 3.7: Z-scores and psychometric description of performance for aphantasic (A) and control participants (B) in the CANTAB Battery 
 Highlighted yellow figures indicate z-scores that equate to: impaired to profoundly impaired performance in the tasks. 
 
A) Aphantasic (Aph) z-scores and psychometric description of performance for each participant by CANTAB task 
Aph       Z-scores by task  
VRM 
 
OTS:  -    Accuracy 
- Reaction Time ( +ve z-scores = slower RT) 
SSP PRM 
Age Recall Correct Recognition 
Correct 
Move 2 Move 3 Move 4 Move 5 Move 6 Spatial  
Span 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A) Control z-scores and psychometric description of performance for each participant by CANTAB task 
Controls    Z-scores by task 
 VRM OTS:  -    Accuracy 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDICES for Chapter 4:  
Appendix 4.1: Z-scores aphantasic and control participants within the MRT and 
OBT/transpose tasks with psychometric descriptions 
a) Aphantasic z-scores on the Mental Rotation Task 
APHANTASIC PARTICIPANTS: MRT Z-scores accuracy and reaction time 
 MRT: Accuracy MRT: Reaction Time 
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0.75 
































b) Control z-scores on the Mental Rotation Task 
CONTROL PARTICIPANTS: MRT Z-scores accuracy and reaction time 
 MRT: Accuracy  MRT: Reaction Time 





































































































































































































































































































 Controls OBT: Reaction time z-scores 
OBT Transpose 



























































































































































































d) Reaction time Z-scores for aphantasic participants in the OBT/transpose conditions 
 Aphantasic OBT: Reaction time z-scores 
OBT Transpose 





















 High Av 
0.81 


































































































































































APPENDICES for Chapter 5:  
 








Appendix 5.2: True/False statements  
 
Key for statements: New statements  / Eddy & Glass (1981) as used in  
Zeman et al., (2015) / Cortical blindness and visual imagery (Policardi 1996) 
 
Each of these sentences is either true or false. I would like you to tell me whether  
you think each sentence is true or false and respond as accurately and as quickly  
as possible. (Answers are in brackets). 
 
VISUAL DETAILS  
Colour discrimination  
1. Apricots are darker than a banana skin (T) /  
2. Raspberries are darker than strawberries (T) 
3. Aubergines are darker than Blueberries (T) 
4. Tangerines are darker than terracotta (F) 
5. Daffodil are darker than hay (F) X 
6. Milk is darker than spaghetti (F) 
7. Oats are darker than talcum powder (T) 
8. Radish are darker than ham (T) 
9. The inside of a grapefruit is darker than the insides of an orange (T) 
10. Avocado skin is darker than spinach (T) 
11. A post box is darker than a UK passport (F) 
12. Turmeric is darker than paprika (F) 
13. Grass is darker than a pine tree (F) 
14. Spinach is darker than celery (T) 
15. Walnuts are darker than a coffee bean (F) 
16. Milk chocolate is darker than Brown bread (T) 
17. A tomato is darker than a red onion (F) 
18. Potatoes are darker than a cauliflower (T) 
19. Pumpkin is darker than a butternut squash (T) 
20. The colour of Blue-Tack is darker than the colour of lavender   X (F) 
21. Avocado skin is darker than a kiwi (T)  
 
Colour feature statements   
1. A ‘No Entry’ sign is red and white (T) 
2. Fire exit signs are usually blue (F) 
3. Cadburys packaging is purple (T) 
4. First aid signs are usually green (T) 
5. The EU flag is navy and white (F) 
6. Donald Trump has brown hair (F) 
7. The central cross on the Union Jack is white (T) 
8. A first class stamp is red (T) 
9. A second class stamp is green (F) 
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10. A tennis ball is yellow (T) 
11. An ambulance is red (F) 
 
Texture (smooth) statements  
1. A raspberry is smoother than a grape (F) 
2. A brick is smoother than a tangerine (F) 
3. A petal smoother than hay (T) 
4. A piece of chocolate smoother than a slice of bread (T) 
5. A shell of a walnut is smoother than marshmallow (F) 
6. A pebble is smoother than glass (F) 
7. A scouring pad is smoother than paper (F) 
8. Bubble wrap is smoother than tree bark (T) 
9. Foil is smoother than ribbon (T) 
10. An apple is smoother than a tennis ball (T) 
 
SPATIAL 
Size discrimination statements/ Structure/location statements 
1. A recycle symbol is comprised of three arrows (T) 
2. The figure in the Starbucks logo is male (F) 
3. The number four can be written using four lines (F) 
4. A star of David has five points (F) 
5. Tractors have two very large wheels at the front (F) 
6. The number eight can be constructed by two circles (T) 
7. The symbol for degrees is a tiny circle (T) 
8. A rugby ball is spherical (F) 
9. A wheelbarrow has two wheels (F) 
10. An acoustic guitar has a square shaped sound hole (for sound to resonate) (F) 
11. The key lock on a door is above the handle (F) 
12. A bicycle saddle is narrower at the front than behind (T) 
13. A baseball bat is thicker at the end than the grip (T) 
14. A penguin has longer legs than a duck (F) 
15. A goat is larger than a hare (T) 
16. A worm is larger than a woodlouse (T) 
17. A canoe is widest in the centre than the ends (T) 
18. A grapefruit is larger than an orange (T) 
19. A £1 coin is larger than a 2p coin (F) 
20. A golf ball is larger than a snooker ball (F) 
21. A 5p coin is larger than a 1p coin (F) 
22. A match is larger than a toothpick (F) 
23. A ladle is larger than a tablespoon (T) 




Size Are these objects higher than wider or wider than higher? 11 T / 11 F 
1. Soap (width) – A bar of soap is more wide than tall (T) 
2. Traffic-light (high) – A traffic-light is more wide than tall (F) 
3. Bottle (high) – A bottle is more wide than tall (F) 
4. Crate (width) – A crate is more wide than tall (T) 
5. Vase (height) – A vase is more wide than tall (F) 
6. Sofa (width) – A sofa is more wide than tall (T) 
7. Wardrobe (high) – A wardrobe is more wide than tall (F) 
8. Boot (high) – A boot is more wide than tall (F) 
9. Television set (width) – A TV is more wide than tall (T) 
10. Egg (high) – An egg wider is more wide than tall (F) 
11. Typewriter (width) – A typewriter is more wide than tall (T)  
12. Bell (high) – A bell is more wide than tall (F) 
13. Can of tuna (width)  - A can of tuna is more wide than tall (T) 
14. Tankard (high) – A tankard is more wide than tall (F) 
15. Fridge (high) A fridge is more wide than tall (F) 
16. Bench (width) – A bench is more wide than tall (T)  
17. Dining chair (height) – A dining chair is more wide than tall (F) 
18. Bed (width) – A bed is more wide than tall (T) 
19. Lid of a pot (width) – A lid of a pot is more wide than tall (T) 





Appendix 5.3: Participant familiarity sheet-checker 
Participant number………………………………………………………… 
 
Below are a list of items which were listed in the previous task. Please look  
through and put an X next to any of these items which are unfamiliar to you/ if  
you do not know the item. 
 
Item Rating Item Rating 
 
Apricots  Fire exit  
Banana  Cadburys  
Raspberries  First aid sign  
Strawberries  EU flag  
Tangerine  Donald Trump  
Terracotta  Second class stamp  
Milk  Ambulance  
Spaghetti  Grass  
Radish  Pinetree  
Ham  Grape  
Post Box  Brick  
UK Passport  Tangerine  
Turmeric  Petal  
Paprika  Hay  
Spinach  Marshmallow  
Celery  Pebble  
Walnuts  Glass  
Coffee bean  Scouring pad  
Milk chocolate  Paper  
Brown bread  Bubble wrap  
Tomato  Tree bark  
Red onion  Tractor  
No entry sign  The number eight  
Apple  Tennis ball  
Recycle symbol  Symbol for degrees  
Bicycle saddle  Rugby ball  
Baseball bat  Wheelbarrow  
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Penguin  Guitar sound hole  
Duck  Key lock  
Goat  Woodlouse  
Hare  Canoe  
Worm  Grapefruit  
Orange  Golf ball  
£1 coin  Snooker ball  
2p coin  1p coin   
5p coin  Ladle  
Tablespoon  Cigar  
Bar of soap   Cigarette  
Traffic light  Wardrobe  
Bottle  Boot  
Crate  TV  
Vase  Egg  
Sofa  Typewriter  
Bell  Can of tuna  
Barrel  Keyboard  
Tankard  Dining chair  
Fridge  Bed  
Bench  Lid of a pot  





Appendix 5.4: Demographic Questions           
 
  Participant Number……………………………………. 
 
Age……………………………………………………..   Sex………………… 
 
 
Where were you born (closest major city)? …………………………………… 
 
 












Appendix 5.5: The Bucknell Auditory Imagery Scale (BAIS) 
 
Bucknell Auditory Imagery Scale (BAIS-V)  
The following questions measure auditory imagery, or the way in which you  
“think about sounds in your head.”  For the following items you are asked to do the 
following:  
1. Read the item and consider whether you think of an image of the described  
sound in your head.   
2. Then rate the vividness of your image using the following “Vividness Rating Scale" 
between 1-7 on the following scale for each question. 
 
1 = No 
image 
2 3 4 = Fairly 
as vivid 




Feel free to use all of the levels in the scale when selecting your ratings.  
 
1. For the first item, consider the beginning of the song “Happy Birthday.” 
The sound of a trumpet beginning the piece._____ 
 
2. For the next item, consider ordering something over the phone. 
The voice of an elderly clerk assisting you._____ 
 
3. For the next item, consider being at the beach. 
The sound of the waves crashing against nearby rocks. _____ 
 
4. For the next item, consider going to a dentist appointment. 
The loud sound of the dentist’s drill.______ 
 
5. For the next item, consider being present at a jazz club. 
The sound of a saxophone solo.______ 
 
6. For the next item, consider being at a live baseball game. 
The cheer of the crowd as a player hits the ball._____ 
 
7. For the next item, consider attending a choir rehearsal. 
The sound of an all-children’s choir singing the first verse of a song. ______ 
 
8. For the next item, consider attending an orchestral performance of Beethoven’s Fifth. 
The sound of the ensemble playing. ______ 
 
9. For the next item, consider listening to a rain storm. 
The sound of gentle rain. ______ 
 
10. For the next item, consider attending classes. 
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The slow-paced voice of your English teacher.______ 
 
11. For the next item, consider seeing a live opera performance. 
The voice of an opera singer in the middle of a verse.______ 
 
12. For the next item, consider attending a new tap-dance performance. 
The sound of tap-shoes on the stage.______ 
 
13. For the next item, consider a kindergarten class. 
The voice of the teacher reading a story to the children.______ 
 
14. For the next item, consider driving in a car. 
The sound of an upbeat rock song on the radio.______ 
 
 
Part 2: Bucknell Auditory Imagery Scale (BAIS-C)  
  
The following scale is designed to measure auditory imagery, or the way in which you “think 
about sounds in your head.”  - Use the same scale as on the opposite page  
  
For the following pairs of items you are asked to do the following: Read the first item 
(marked “a”) and consider whether you think of an image of the described sound in your 
head. Then read the second item (marked “b”) and consider how easily you could change your 
image of the first sound to that of the second sound and hold this image.  
Rate how easily you could make this change using the “Ease of Change Rating Scale.” If no 
images are generated, give a rating of 1. Please read “a” first and “b” second for each pair. It 
may be necessary to cover up “b” so that you focus first on “a” for each pair. 
 
1. For the first pair, consider attending a choir rehearsal. 
a. The sound of an all-children’s choir singing the first verse of a song. 
b. An all-adults’ choir now sings the second verse of the song. ______ 
 
2. For the next pair, consider being present at a jazz club. 
a. The sound of a saxophone solo. 
b. The saxophone is now accompanied by a piano.______ 
 
3. For the next pair, consider listening to a rain storm. 
a. The sound of gentle rain. 
b. The gentle rain turns into a violent thunderstorm.______ 
 
4. For the next pair, consider driving in a car. 
a. The sound of an upbeat rock song on the radio. 
b. The song is now masked by the sound of the car coming to a screeching halt. ______ 
 
5. For the next pair, consider ordering something over the phone. 
a. The voice of an elderly clerk assisting you. 




6. For the next pair, consider seeing a live opera performance. 
a. The voice of an opera singer in the middle of a verse. 
b. The opera singer now reaches the end of the piece and holds the final note. ______ 
 
7. For the next pair, consider going to a dentist appointment. 
a. The loud sound of the dentist’s drill. 
b. The drill stops and you can now hear the soothing voice of the receptionist.______ 
 
8. For the next pair, consider the beginning of the song “Happy Birthday.” 
a. The sound of a trumpet beginning the piece. 
b. The trumpet stops and a violin continues the piece.______ 
 
9. For the next pair, consider attending an orchestral performance of Beethoven’s Fifth. 
a. The sound of the ensemble playing. 
b. The ensemble stops but the sound of a piano solo is present.______ 
 
10. For the next pair, consider attending a new tap-dance performance. 
a. The sound of tap-shoes on the stage. 
b. The sound of the shoes speeds up and gets louder.______ 
 
11. For the next pair, consider being at a live baseball game. 
a. The cheer of the crowd as a player hits the ball. 
b. Now the crowd boos as the fielder catches the ball._____ 
 
12. For the next pair, consider a kindergarten class. 
a. The voice of the teacher reading a story to the children. 
b. The teacher stops reading for a minute to talk to another teacher. ______ 
 
13. For the next pair, consider attending classes. 
a. The slow-paced voice of your English teacher. 
b. The pace of the teacher’s voice gets faster at the end of class. ______ 
 
14. For the next pair, consider being at the beach. 
a. The sound of the waves crashing against nearby rocks. 






Appendix 5.6: The Plymouth Sensory Imagery Questionnaire (Psi-Q) 
Please try to form the images described below and rate each mental image 
 on the following scale: 
 
0 (no image at all) to 10 (image as clear and vivid as real life) 
Please rate every item 
 
Imagine the appearance of: 
- A friend you know well 
- A cat climbing a tree 
- A sunset 
- The front door of your house  
- A bonfire 
 
Imagine the sound of: 
- An ambulance siren 
- Hands clapping in applause 
- The mewing of a  cat 
- The sound of a car horn 
- The sound of children playing 
 
Imagine the smell of: 
- A stuffy room 
- A rose 
- Fresh paint 
- Newly cut grass 
- Burning wood 
 




- Sea water 
- Black pepper 
 
Imagine touching 
- Warm sand 
- A soft towel 
- The point of a pin 
- Icy water 
- Fur 
Imagine the bodily sensation of: 
- Relaxing in a warm bath 
- Having a sore throat 
- Threading a needle 
- Jumping into a swimming pool 








- In love 




Appendix 5.7: Participant information sheet and consent for sensory questionnaires 
Information sheet 
 (Please copy and paste this information so that you can either print or save it and  
refer to if necessary). 
 The aim of this questionnaire is to examine self-reports of imagery within different  
sensory modalities. It should take you between 20-25 minutes to complete. At the end of the 
questionnaire, you will be asked to leave your contact details (name and email address) if you  
wish to be contacted with regards to further research. We will only contact you if you agree to 
participate in further research.  
As you go through the questionnaire, please note that there are no right or wrong answers to the 
questions. It is not necessarily desirable to experience imagery or, if you do, to have more vivid 
imagery. 
  Please note: 
 Participation is entirely voluntary.  
 You have the right to withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
 You have the right to ask for your data to be withdrawn and for personal information to 
 be destroyed. 
The results of this study will be published in appropriate outlets. 
 Your responses will be confidential. 
 No individuals will be identifiable from any collated data, written report of the research, 
 or any publications arising from it. 
 If you have any queries please contact: Zoe Pounder:  z.pounder@my.westminster.ac.uk 
Consent Form 
Please select below if you have read the above information and are willing to act as  
a participant in the research study.  




Appendix 5.8: Debrief for sensory questionnaires 
Thank you for taking the time to complete our questionnaires. These questionnaires aim to 
examine self-reported imagery vividness across various sensory modalities in aphantasics 
who lack visual mental imagery, and non-aphantasics who have normal visual imagery. These 
results will form the basis of future studies within this area. 
 







APPENDICES for Chapter 6:  
Appendix 6.1: The Goldsmiths Musical Sophistication Index (Gold-MSI) 
 
Score on a scale of 1-7 (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree), please put  
an X in the appropriate column. 
 
 1 = 
completely 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 = 
completely 
agree 
I spend a lot of my free 
time doing music-related 
activities. 
       
I enjoy writing about 
music, for example on 
blogs and forums. 
       
If somebody starts 
singing a song I don't 
know, I can usually join 
in. 
       
I can sing or play music 
from memory. 
       
I am able to hit the right 
notes when I sing along 
with a recording. 
       
I can compare & discuss 
differences between two 
performances or versions 
of the same piece of 
music 
       
I have never been 
complimented for my 
talents as a musical 
performer. 
       
I often read or search the 
internet for things related 
to music. 
       
I am not able to sing in 
harmony when 
somebody is singing a 
familiar tune.  
       
I am able to identify 
what is special about a 
given musical piece. 
       
When I sing, I have no 
idea whether I'm in tune 
or not. 
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Music is kind of an 
addiction for me - I 
couldn't live without it. 
       
I don’t like singing in 
public because I’m 
afraid that I would sing 
wrong notes. 
       
I would not consider 
myself a musician. 
       
After hearing a new song 
two or three times, I can 
usually sing it by myself. 
       
 
I engaged in regular, daily practice of a musical instrument (including voice)  
for ___ years.  
 
At the peak of my interest, I practiced ___ hours per day on my primary instrument. 
 




Appendix 6.2: Copy of Goldsmiths Musical Sophistication Index (Gold-MSI) 










In this questionnaire, you will be asked to rate how familiar you are with a variety 
 of different songs.  
 
You will be asked to rate these songs on a scale of 1-5. As you go through the list  
of songs, please note there are no right or wrong answers. This should take you no 




Participation is entirely voluntary and all responses are anonymous.  
  
You have the right to withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
 




Please select below: 
 
Please select how familiar each of these songs are on a scale of 1-5.  The artist  
of the song is provided first, followed by the name of the song.  
 
Rating scale: 
1 = I do not know this song 
2 = I know of this song but I do not know it well 
3 = I can hum or sing only the chorus of this song 
4 = I can hum or sing the majority of this song 
5 = I can hum or sing this song from start to finish 
 
 
Song 1 = I do not 
know this 
song 
2 = I know of 
this song but I 
do not know 
it well 


















Madonna – Like a 
Virgin 
     
Louis Armstrong 
– What a 
Wonderful World 
     
The La’s – There 
She Goes 
     
The Beatles – 
Hey Jude 
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Oasis – Don’t 
Look Back in 
Anger 
     
Kate Bush – 
Running Up that 
Hill 
     
The Verve – 
Bitter Sweet 
Symphony 
     
Marvin Gaye & 




     
Wham! – Wake 
Me Up Before 
You Go-Go 
     
Gabriel – Outta 
Reach 
     
Big Mountain – 
Oooh Baby, I 
Love Your Way 
     
Neil Diamond – 
Sweet Caroline 
     
Irene Cara – What 
a Feeling 
     
The Calling – 
Wherever You 
Will Go 
     
Starship – 
Nothing’s Gonna 
Stop Us Now 
     
Whitney Houston 
– I Wanna Dance 
with Somebody 
(Who Loves Me) 
     
Jerry Lee Louis – 
Great Balls of 
Fire 
     
Take That – Rule 
The World 
     
Blue & Elton 
John – Sorry 
Seems To Be The 
Hardest Word 
     
Judy Garland, 
Wizard of Oz – 
Somewhere Over 
The Rainbow 
     
Sound of Music – 
My Favourite 
Things 
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Elton John – Can 
You Feel the 
Love Tonight 
     
Sam Smith – 
Writing’s On The 
Wall 
     
Ryan Gosling – 
City of Stars 
     
Shirley Bassey – 
Diamonds Are 
Forever 
     
Julie Andrews, 
Mary Poppins – A 
Spoonful of Sugar 
     
IIlene Woods, 
Cinderella  – A 
Dream Is a Wish 
Your Heart 
Makes 
     
Peabo Bryson & 
Regina Belle, 
Aladdin – A 
Whole New 
World 





     
Frank Sinatra  – 
Have Yourself A 
Merry Little 
Christmas 
     
Gabrielle Aplin – 
The Power of 
Love 
     
Mariah Carey – 
All I Want for 
Christmas Is You 
     
Wizzard – I Wish 
It Could Be 
Christmas 
Everyday 
     
Perry Combo & 
Mitchell Ayres – 
It’s Beginning to 
Look a Lot Like 
Christmas 
     
Peter Auty – 
Walking In the 
Air 
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The Jackson 5 – 
Santa Claus Is 
Coming To Town 
     
Ella Fitzgerald – 
Frosty The 
Snowman 
     
Frere Jacques 
(nursery rhyme) 




     
Rock a Bye Baby 
(nursery rhyme) 
     
Baa, Baa, Black 
Sheep (nursery 
rhyme) 





Appendix 6.4: Final song list based on song response by different age groups 
Highlighted code: HIGH PITCH and LOW PITCH   
Songs in light grey songs are excluded 
QUESTION: Is the pitch of the second underlined syllable higher or lower than the  
pitch of the first underlined syllable? 
VERSION 1: 17 Certain songs that all 20-70s scored 3 and above for familiarity:   
In this list there are: 10 songs where the second syllable is lower // 7 songs where the second 
syllable is higher 
1. Madonna – Like A Virgin  (Like a vir-gin) 3 semitones 
2. The Beatles – Hey Jude  3 semitones 
3. Oasis – Don’t Look Back in Anger   (Don’t Look Back in An-ger) 7 semitones 
4. Wham! – Wake Me Up Before You Go-Go  (wake me up be-fore you go go) 4 
semitones 
5. Neil Diamond – Sweet Caroline  (Sweet Caro-line) 7 semitones 
6. Whitney Houston – I Wanna Dance With Somebody 
 (I wan-na dance with some-bod-y) 4 semitones 
7. Judy Garland – Somewhere Over the Rainbow  
(Some-where o-ver the rain-bow) 12 semitones 
8. Sound of Music – My Favourite Things (My fa-vour-ite things) 4 semitones 
9. Mary Poppins – A Spoonful of Sugar (A spoon-ful of su-gar) 6 semitones  
10. Frank Sinatra – Have Yourself A Merry Little Christmas 
 (Have your-self a mer-ry lit-tle Christ-mas)  8 semitones 
11. Mariah Carey – All I Want For Christmas Is You  
(All I want for Christ-mas is you) 4 semitones 
12. Wizzard – I Wish It Could Be Christmas Every Day  
(I wish it could be Christ-mas every da-y) 5 semitones 
13. Perry Combo & Mitchelle Ayres – It’s Beginning to Look a Lot Like Christmas 
 (It’s be-gin-ning to look a lot like Christ-mas) 9 semitones 
14. Ella Fitzgerald – Frosty the Snowman (Fros-ty the snow-man) 8 semitones 
15. Frere Jacques (Fre-re Jac-ques) 4 semitones  
16. Twinkle Twinkle Little Star (Twin-kle, twin-kle, lit-tle star) 7 semitones 
17. Ba Ba Black Sheep 7 semitones 
Gaps: 0 gap = 5  / 1 gap = 7  / 2 gap = 5 
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Average number of semitones when the second syllable is low: 5.4 -  10 songs in total 
Average number of semitones when the second syllable is high:  6.9  - 7 songs in total 
7 Less certain songs (but still familiar to most):  
1. The La’s – There She Goes  
2. The Verve – Bitter Sweet Symphony (A bit-ter sweet sym-pho-ny) 
3. Irene Cara – What A Feeling (What a feel-ing)   
4. Jerry Lee Louis – Great Balls of Fire 
5. Elton John – Can You Feel The Love Tonight (Can you feel the love to-night?)  
6. Shirley Baddey – Diamonds are Forever (Dia-monds are for-ev-er) 
7. Peter Auty – Walking in the Air (Walk-ing in the air) 
7/  7 /7  
-------  
Practice/demo examples: 
1. Peabo Bryson & Regina Belle Aladdin – A Whole New World  (1 syllable gap) 
2. The Ronettes - I Saw Mommy Kissing Santa Claus (2 syllable gap) 
3. Starship – Nothing’s Gonna Stop Us Now (no gap) 
4. Shirley Bassey – Diamonds are Forever  
 
Version 2 (of the above songs) with different high/low markings: 
1. Madonna – Like a Virgin 
2. The Beatles – Hey Jude –  
3. Oasis – Don’t Look Back in Anger  
4. Wham! – Wake Me Up Before You Go-Go 
5. Neil Diamond – Sweet Caroline 
6. Whitney Houston – I Wanna Dance With Somebody 
7. Judy Garland – Somewhere Over the Rainbow 
8. Sound of Music – My Favourite Things 
9. Mary Poppins – A Spoonful of Sugar 
10. Frank Sinatra – Have Yourself A Merry Little Christmas 
11. Mariah Carey – All I Want For Christmas Is You 
12. Wizzard – I Wish It Could Be Christmas Every Day 
13. Perry Combo & Mitchelle Ayres – It’s Beginning to Look a Lot Like Christmas 
14. Ella Fitzgerald – Frosty the Snowman  
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15. Frere Jacques  
16. Twinkle Twinkle Little Star  
17. Ba Ba Black Sheep  
18. The La's -  There She Goes  (less familiar) 
19. The Verve – Bitter Sweet Symphony (less familiar) 
20. Irene Cara - What A Feeling (less familiar) 
 
10 low second syllable / 7 high second syllable  
Gaps:  0 gap = 7 / 1 gap = 6 / 2 gap = 7 







Appendix 6.5: Informed consent and participant information sheet 
 
Primary researcher: Zoë Pounder  
 
Supervisors: Dr Alison Eardley, Professor Catherine Loveday and Dr Samuel Evans  
 
Introduction 
We would like to invite you to participate in our study exploring auditory imagery  
in individuals who have aphantasia (lack visual mental imagery) and individuals  
who have typical visual imagery. Before you sign the informed consent form, we would 
 like to ask you to read the following information carefully. 
 
Participant Criteria 
If you have any of the following, please notify the experimenter: have impaired 
 hearing, are colour blind.  
If you were born and went to school outside of the UK, please also inform the  
experimenter. 
 
Aim of this study 
The goal of this study is to examine performance between individuals with aphantasia  
and individuals with typical imagery in tasks which involve auditory imagery. At  
present, research in aphantasia has focused on the visual domain and no studies  
have yet explored performance within the auditory domain. 
 
Design of the study 
The study requires you to attend one testing session. The session will last approximately 
 1 hour 30 minutes including breaks. During this session, you will undertake four  
computerised tasks. Each task will have a practice element or demonstration so you  
understand the nature of the task before starting. You will also be asked to complete a  
Feedback sheet with regards to the tasks at the end of the session and answer  
questions with regards to your musical ability. 
 
Confidentiality of the data  
Your privacy will be assured by coded gathering and analysis of the data. The data  
will only be available to current members of the research team, and not be given to a  
thirdparty. All data will be stored in compliance with the Data Protection Act 2018  
and General Protection Regulations (GDPR) 2018. The data will be preserved for  






• It is important that you know that your participation in this experiment is 
 completely voluntary, and that you can stop at any moment, without reason.  
• As a participant, you have the right to ask questions at any time, even  
during the experiment. It is also possible that you have questions after  
having finished the experiment. In that case, please contact Zoë Pounder at 
z.pounder@my.westminster.ac.uk   
 
 
Results of the study 
The results of this study are likely to be disseminated at national and/or international 
conferences and published in scientific peer-reviewed journals. These results will also be 
written up for the purposes of Zoë Pounder’s PhD thesis.  
 
Further information 
Zoë Pounder (z.pounder@my.westminster.ac.uk) and supervisor Dr Alison Eardley 
(a.eardley@westminster.ac.uk) will be glad to answer your questions about the study  
at any time. 
 
By signing below you are agreeing that: 
1. You have read and understood the information sheet and have had the  
opportunity to ask questions which have been answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. You are taking part in this research study voluntarily and have been made 
 aware of your rights to withdraw at any time without providing an explanation. 
 
3. You understand once you have taken part in the study, you are still able to  
withdraw your data at any point until the research has published/submitted 
as part of my research project, or has been anonymised. 
 
4. You are aware your identity and the information provided will be treated 
confidentially and in accordance with the University of Westminster  
ethical guidelines and British Psychological Society code of human research  
ethics.  
 
5. Your data will be securely stored in compliance with the Data Protection  




6. Your data will be anonymised and will not be identifiable from  
subsequent research papers that arise from this study.   
 
With my signature, I confirm my participation to this study, and volunteer  
for a research subject. 
 
Name of participant: ………..…………………………………………………… 
 




Appendix 6.6: Debrief Sheet: Auditory Imagery Study 
 
Thank you for participating in this study investigating aspects of auditory imagery.  
The tasks you have undertaken comprise of various aspects of auditory imagery  
and required you to recall and/or hold information as well as manipulate this auditory 
information. The data gathered will be used to examine how performance in individuals 
 with aphantasia differs from those participants who have typical imagery. At present, 
 no studies have investigated the auditory domain in individuals with aphantasia,  
with much of the research undertaken in the visual domain. Research suggests that 
 both visual imagery and auditory imagery have several characteristics in common. By 
investigating the auditory domain, it may provide new insights into aphantasia and open 
further avenues for investigation.  
 
Results of the study 
The results of this study are likely to be disseminated at national and/or international 
conferences and published in scientific peer-reviewed journals. These results will also be 
written up for the purposes of Zoë Pounder’s PhD thesis.  
 
For further information 
If you have any further queries regarding this research, please contact one  
of the research team at the University of Westminster:   
 
Zoë Pounder: z.pounder@my.westminster.ac.uk  








Appendix 6.7: Familiarity rating list for songs in the lyric task 
Participant number……………………………………………………………………………………. 
Please put an X in the box rating how familiar these songs are (continues on the next page). 
 Artist (first) and Song (second) Familiarity Rating: How familiar are these songs? 





2 = I know of 
this song but I 
do not know it 
well 
3 = I can hum or 
sing only the 
chorus of this 
song 
4 = I can hum 
or sing the 
majority of 
this song 
5 = I can hum or 
sing this song from 
start to finish 
1 Madonna – Like A Virgin      
2 The Beatles – Hey Jude      
3 Oasis – Don’t Look Back in Anger       
4 Wham! – Wake Me Up Before You Go-
Go 
     
5 Neil Diamond – Sweet Caroline      
6 Whitney Houston – I Wanna Dance 
With Somebody 
     
7 Judy Garland – Somewhere Over the 
Rainbow 
     
8 Sound of Music – My Favourite Things       
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9 Mary Poppins – A Spoonful of Sugar      
10 Frank Sinatra – Have Yourself A Merry 
Little Christmas 
     
11 Mariah Carey – All I Want For 
Christmas Is You 
     
12 Wizzard – I Wish It Could Be 
Christmas Every Day 
     
13 Perry Combo & Mitchelle Ayres – It’s 
Beginning to Look a Lot Like 
Christmas 
     
14 Ella Fitzgerald – Frosty the Snowman      
15 Frere Jacques      
16 Twinkle Twinkle Little Star      
17 Ba Ba Black Sheep      
18 Bittersweet Symphony – The Verve      
19 There She Goes – The La’s      
20 What A Feeling – Irene Cara/ 
Flashdance 























Sounds  original V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 
1 ba ka ma va ja ra 
2 ca ya na ca ra wa 
3 da za ja ya ha ma 
4 fa la ra za ga ca 
5 ga sa fa sa wa ja 
6 ha ba ka pa va ka 
7 ja ma ta ka ma va 
8 ka ja ba da pa da 
9 la da pa la ta na 
10 ma ta wa ra na ha 
11 na ca da ta ba ga 
12 pa ga va ha ya ta 
13 ra ha ca ja ca za 
14 sa ra la ga za ya 
15 ta pa sa ma da sa 
16 va va ga ba fa fa 
17 wa na ha fa ka la 
18 ya fa za wa la ba 
19 za wa ya na sa pa 
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Appendix 6.9: Bamford-Kowal-Bench (BKB) sentences 
No  
  
1 The clown had a funny face. 
2 The car engine’s running. 
3 She cut with her knife. 
4 Children like strawberries. 
5 The house had nine rooms. 
6 They’re buying some bread. 
7 The green tomatoes are small. 
8 They’re looking at the clock. 
9 He played with his train. 




The bag bumps on the ground. 
12 The boy did a handstand. 
13 A cat sits on the bed. 
14 The lorry carried fruit. 
15 The rain came down. 
16 The ice cream was pink. 
17 The ladder’s near the door. 
18 They had a lovely day. 
19 The ball went into the goal. 




21 He cut his finger. 
22 The thin dog was hungry. 
23 The boy knew the game. 
24 Snow falls at Christmas. 
25 She’s taking her coat. 
26 The police chased the car. 
27 A mouse ran down the hole. 
28 The lady’s making a toy. 
29 Some sticks were under the tree. 




They’re watching the train. 
32 The school finished early. 
33 The glass bowl broke. 
34 The dog played with a stick. 
35 The kettle’s quite hot. 
36 The farmer keeps a bull. 
37 They say some silly things. 
38 The lady wore a coat. 
39 The children are walking home. 
40 He needed his holiday. 
41 The milk came in a bottle. 
42 The man cleaned his shoes. 
43 They ate the lemon jelly. 
44 The boy’s running away. 
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45 Father looked at the book. 
46 She drinks from her cup. 
47 The room’s getting cold. 
48 A girl kicked the table. 
49 The wife helped her husband. 




The old man worries. 
52 A boy ran down the path. 
53 The house had a nice garden. 
54 She spoke to her son. 
55 They’re crossing the street. 
56 Lemons grow on trees. 
57 He found his brother. 
58 Some animals sleep on straw. 
59 The jam jar was full. 




The girl lost her doll. 
62 The cook’s making a cake. 
63 The child grabs the toy. 
64 The mud stuck on his shoe. 
65 The bath towel was wet. 
66 The matches lie on the shelf. 
67 They’re running past the house. 
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68 The train had a bad crash. 
69 The kitchen sink’s empty. 




She used her spoon. 
72 The park’s near the road. 
73 The cook cut some onions. 
74 The dog made an angry noise. 
75 He’s washing his face. 
76 Somebody took the money. 
77 The light went out. 
78 They wanted some potatoes. 
79 The naughty girl’s shouting. 




The paint dripped on the ground. 
82 The mother stirs the tea. 
83 They laughed at his story. 
84 Men wear long trousers. 
85 The small boy was asleep. 
86 The sun melted the snow. 
87 The father’s coming home. 
88 She had her pocket money. 
89 The lorry drove up the road. 






The lady goes to the shop. 
92 A sharp knife’s dangerous. 
93 They took some food. 
94 The clever girls are reading. 
95 The broom stood in the corner. 
96 The woman tidied her house. 
97 The children dropped the bag. 
98 The dog came back. 
99 The floor looked clean. 




The fruit lies on the ground. 
102 Mother fetches a saucepan. 
103 They washed in cold water. 
104 The young people are dancing. 
105 The bus went early. 
106 They had two empty bottles. 
107 A ball’s bouncing along. 
108 The father forgot the bread. 
109 The girl has a picture book. 




He’s holding his nose. 
112 The new road’s on the map. 
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113 The boy forgot his book. 
114 A friend came for lunch. 
115 The match boxes are empty. 
116 He climbed his ladder. 
117 They heard a funny noise. 
118 The jug stood on the shelf. 
119 The ball broke the window. 




The family bought a house. 
122 The pond water’s dirty. 
123 Police are clearing the road. 
124 The bus stopped suddenly. 
125 She writes to her brother. 
126 The footballer lost a boot. 
127 The three girls are listening. 
128 The coat lies on a chair. 
129 The book tells a story. 




They’re climbing the tree. 
132 She stood near her window. 
133 The table has three legs. 
134 A letter fell on the mat. 
135 The five men are working. 
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136 The shoes were very dirty. 
137 He listens to his father. 
138 They went on holiday. 
139 Baby broke his mug. 




The dinner plate’s hot. 
142 The train’s moving fast. 
143 The child drank some milk. 
144 The car hit a wall. 
145 A tea towel’s by the sink. 
146 The cleaner used a broom. 
147 She looked in her mirror. 
148 The good boy’s helping. 
149 They followed the path. 




Someone’s crossing the road. 
152 The postman brings a letter. 
153 The dog jumped on the chair. 
154 They’re cycling along. 
155 He broke his leg. 
156 The milk was by the front door. 
157 The shirts hang in the cupboard. 
158 The ground was too hard. 
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159 The buckets hold water. 




The family like fish. 
162 Sugar’s very sweet. 
163 The baby lay on a rug. 
164 The washing machine broke. 
165 They’re clearing the table. 
166 The cleaner swept the floor. 
167 A grocer sells butter. 
168 The milkman drives a small van. 
169 The bath water was warm. 




She hurt her hand. 
172 The boy slipped on the stairs. 
173 They’re staying for supper. 
174 The girl held a mirror. 
175 The cup stood on a saucer. 
176 The cows went to market. 
177 The boy got into trouble. 
178 They’re going out. 
179 The football hit the goalpost. 




181 The teacloth’s quite wet. 
182 A cat jumped off the fence. 
183 The baby has blue eyes. 
184 Mother made some curtains. 
185 They sat on a wooden bench. 
186 The oven’s too hot. 
187 The girl caught a cold. 
188 The raincoat’s hanging up. 
189 She brushed her hair. 




The man tied his scarf. 
192 The flower stands in a pot.  
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Appendix 6.10: Visual feedback presented to participants during the training phase of 

























Appendix 6.11: Analysis of entire participant sample (location matched and including 
all aphantasic participants who self-report auditory imagery) 
 
Average b values (i.e gradient of the curve) were calculated on MATLAB for each set of 
speakers. One aphantasic participant was removed from the analysis from speaker pair 
TD-ZN in the /ka/ and /ma/ continuum as the participant’s responses indicated they had 
confused which speaker was which. No other participants were excluded in the analysis. 
An independent t-test of slope gradients across groups showed no significant difference 
in categorical perception function in speaker pair DH-AE (t(58) = 1.02, p = .31, d = .25), 
TD-ZN (t(57) = 0.91, p = .37, d = .22) or AE1-PS (t(58) = 0.95, p = .35, d = .25).  
 
 
Figure 1: Graph to show overall averaged categorical functions between aphantasic and 
controls 
 
Slope gradients were averaged across speakers to form a grand average of b-values for 
the two participant groups. An independent t-test of slope gradients for aphantasics and 
controls showed no significant difference (t(58) = -0.41,  p = .69, d = .11) between groups. 
The continua gradient slopes for AE1-PS (for syllables /la/ and /na/, see Figure 6.7c) 
suggest that these continua produced flatter and more noisy categorical function curves 
by each participant group. To ensure that the inclusion of these two continua did not 
impact on the results (i.e. there remains no significant difference between groups), an 
independent t-test of combined slope gradients for speakers DH-AE and TD-ZN showed 
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